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ABSTRACT
This research explores how ‘authenticity’ is constructed in counselling psychology and asks
what the ethical implications of this commonly taken-for-granted value might be. A discourse
analytic approach known as ‘critical discursive psychology’ was used to examine eight
counselling psychologists’ talk of ‘authenticity’ in semi-structured interviews. The analysis
suggested that counselling psychologists may draw on a number of interpretative repertoires
regarding ‘authenticity’, using them to establish their identity and negotiate their relationships
with clients. However, taken together these repertoires might be said to form an ‘authenticity
ideal’, which often functions to position the therapist as authentic and the client as
inauthentic. Furthermore, in drawing upon various psychotherapeutic and humanistic
discourses, the participants in this study appeared to be distanced from their power in
positioning clients as inauthentic, although they demonstrated a problematizing of their own
‘authenticity’ in relation to the need for professional boundaries.
This research suggests that talk of ‘authenticity’ tends to locate therapeutic action
within a humanistic moral discourse of self-unity. This is of concern because the emphasis on
individualism may lead therapists to underestimate the social and relational context of their
clients’ difficulties. It should be noted that this critique falls not on the individuals involved in
this research, for their answers were consistent with a range of accepted theoretical
guidelines; but instead upon the reification of authenticity within counselling psychology and
Western society in general.
The participants in this study further problematized ‘authenticity’ in terms of needing
to balance it with the demands of training and employment organisations. It was found that
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both institutional power and individual embodiment may act as ‘extra-discursive’ influences
and constraints upon ‘authenticity’ discourse; however, the methodological feasibility of a
critical-realist epistemology within discursive research is questioned. The limitations of the
research findings and their relevance for reflexive practice are considered.
Word count: 298
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1. PREFACE
1.1 Situating the research author
Reflexive research requires the author of a project to ‘engage in explicit self-aware meta-
analysis’ (Finlay, 2002a: 209). It is based on the idea that factors such as culture, social
convention, selective attention, politics, ideology, power and so forth, will all permeate the
research activity (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). In accordance with this view, it has been
argued that the use of an anonymous voice in research accounts acts to mystify the person of
the writer, hiding the context and background that they are bringing to their work and thus
creating a false impression of objectivity (Clare & Hamilton, 2003). As a reflexive approach,
discourse analysis therefore encourages researchers to ground their accounts in the personal.
The aim of this is not to provide a ‘confessional tale’ (Van Maanen, 1988) but rather to
position the research author within the project and the wider social world of the research
(Wetherell, Taylor & Yates, 2001). In keeping with such a tradition, this preface will provide
an outline of the influences that led me to research the values underlying counselling
psychology and in particular the notion of ‘authenticity’1.
I first encountered academic psychology approximately sixteen years ago, when I
undertook an A’level in the subject at college. During that time I was encouraged to view
psychology as ‘the science of mind and behaviour’; a description that was further reinforced
as I progressed to study it at university and gained a Bachelor of Science degree. As appears
typical in many undergraduate psychology programmes, the teaching included such subjects
as neurology, health psychology, and psychopathology. There was an emphasis on gaining
1 Inverted commas are used throughout this report to indicate a taken-for-granted concept that the research is
bringing into question.
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competence in statistical analysis and students were required to complete a quantitative
research dissertation. Successful completion of the degree conferred the ‘Graduate Basis for
Registration’ (GBR) with the British Psychological Society; this being a national requirement
for progression to further training as a counselling psychologist. It could be said that my early
experience of psychology immersed me in the discourses of empiricism, professionalism and
the bio-medical model.
Following university I worked for four years in the field of learning disabilities and for
a further two and half within domestic violence services, both primarily in the voluntary
sector. I also completed a year-long diploma in person-centred counselling. In contrast to my
previous education, I found that my work and new training encouraged a more
phenomenological approach to supporting people. My early employment coincided with a
general concern in the UK to increase the provision of ‘person-centred planning’ for people
with learning disabilities and I worked for a charity that promoted an ethos of empowerment,
choice and respect. This was later echoed in my domestic violence employment, where the
staff were trained to provide non-directive and empathic support. Altogether, my experience
encouraged a confidence in humanist values and the person-centred notions of empathy,
unconditional-positive-regard and congruence (Rogers, 1951/1961). I believed that these
values would provide a solid foundation upon which to base my future counselling practice.
Pica (1998: 361) has noted: ‘struggling with ambiguity is one of those unspoken
aspects of clinical training that students do not comprehend until they begin their graduate
program’. Although my work had exposed me to a diversity of individuals experiencing
psychological distress, I commenced clinical training with a somewhat naive certainty about
psychotherapeutic theory. As I engaged for the first time with ideas from such arenas as
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existential philosophy, social constructionism and postmodernism, I began to appreciate the
depth of ontological and epistemological conflict that exists within counselling psychology
(Strawbridge, 2003; Williams & Irving, 1996). For example, it has been said that counselling
psychology is embedded in a humanistic value base (Cooper, 2009; Orlans & Van Scoyoc
2008), a central aim being to honour the client’s subjectivity and capacity for self-
determination (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010); however, as my experience demonstrates, this
phenomenological approach  is at odds with the empiricism of counselling psychology’s pre-
requisite (undergraduate) training. This indicates an epistemological clash which continues in
the later teaching of ‘evidence-based’ models of therapy and within the wider context of
occupational opportunity, as shaped by the UK government’s recent preference for
randomized control trials and cognitive behavioural therapy (Lees, 2008: Pilgrim, 2009).
Postmodernism cautions that values are culturally determined. This highlights a need
for ongoing reflexivity in deciding what constitutes ethical practice. As I progressed with my
training I realised that counselling values might easily be taken for granted, shaped by a
particular school of thought and their ‘goodness’ assumed rather than understood as a social
construction. I wondered in what ways such values may serve a function and noted for
example how counselling psychology is sometimes defined as having a ‘relational’ approach
in order to differentiate it from other more medically orientated professions (James &
Bellamy, 2010). I became interested in how counselling psychologists (myself included)
might negotiate their values in light of their profession’s conflicted foundation and the
pervasiveness of empiricist and medical-model discourses in mental health settings (Freeth,
2007).
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I was particularly drawn to exploring ‘authenticity’ because of the attention it was
given in the teaching of both person-centred therapy and existential philosophy during the
first year of my doctoral studies. As part of this learning, it became apparent that within
person-centred counselling ‘authenticity is synonymous with congruence’ (Tudor & Worrall,
2006: 156), being demonstrated by someone ‘who can relate to people directly and uniquely...
coming from the centre, not from a role.’ (Rowan, 2001: 40). In contrast, existential
philosophy approaches the self as a relational construct without a unitary inner centre, thus
opening up ideas such as Heidegger’s (1927/1962) argument that inauthenticity is as much a
part of our being as authenticity. If inauthenticity is considered ontological then one
implication is that therapists should avoid prescribing an ethical code of values to it (Garza,
2006).
Counselling psychology is sometimes described as a postmodern discipline which
welcomes plurality (e.g. Milton, 2010). As such, differences in the meaning of authenticity
might be expected and embraced. Indeed, as I began to explore the literature on authenticity I
soon encountered a diverse and complex range of notions. However, discussion with
colleagues suggested that such differences are often overlooked by a more common
agreement that authenticity is important and ‘good’. My impression was that authenticity is
often linked to the idea of ‘being in touch with’, or expressing, an ‘authentic inner self’ and I
wondered whether this might manifest in therapy as an implicit goal for clients.
The conflicted ontological basis of counselling psychology presents a source of
potential difficulty for practitioners. The importance generally attributed to the therapeutic
relationship reflects an acknowledgement of relational factors in constructing ‘the self’
(Gergen, 1995), which ties in with a postmodern ontology whereby ‘the self’ is understood to
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be continually constructed through that which a person is ‘subject to’, e.g. language and
culture (Hansen, 2004). However, this conflicts with the idea of a pre-given or more separate
inner self, as found in humanism and much traditional psychotherapeutic theory. Furthermore,
postmodernism has been criticised for the ethical nihilism risked by relativist thinking, and in
terms of the self, for encouraging a form of idealism which fails to acknowledge the material
aspects of embodiment (e.g. Harré, 1999). Alternatively, the individualism exemplified in
humanism has been criticized for minimizing the significance of the therapist’s assumptions
and practices, and for locating client difficulties within the individual without due regard for
the social, cultural or political context within which individuals operate (Sinclair, 2007). Such
conflicted ontology offers a range of possible discourses regarding authenticity, for example a
postmodern perspective may prompt talk of ‘intersubjectivity’, whereas a modernist view is
more likely to invoke the notion of a ‘true / authentic self’. Despite counselling psychology’s
claims to postmodernism, its Western practitioners are positioned within strongly
individualistic societies, which Guigon (2004) argues have idealized the notion of the
‘authentic self’. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising if practitioners frequently draw upon this
discourse in defining themselves and their work.
Counselling discourse provides a framework within which people may be assisted to
create, or to reinvent, their identity (Foucault, 1981). Russell (1999) argues that it also offers
therapists preconceived notions of authentic selfhood which they may seek to reveal. If
counselling psychology is regarded as a technology of subjectivity, the ethical need for a
reflexive engagement with the notion of authenticity becomes clear.
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1.2 Introducing the research
Research that focuses specifically on authenticity in counselling is sparse. Therefore the
rationale for choosing this topic was to open up a taken-for-granted foundational value, to
explore the ways in which it is constructed and to consider the implications of these
constructions for ethical practice. I was interested to see how social conditions (such as
training and paid employment) might offer a range of possible ways-of-being in relation to
‘authenticity’, which counselling psychologists may then appropriate (Willig, 1999a). I also
wished to consider in what ways constructions of authenticity may be used (e.g. permitting or
limiting action). To this end, a discourse analysis approach known as critical discursive
psychology was used to explore counselling psychologists’ talk of ‘authenticity’.
Although drawing strongly on social constructionism, I decided to adopt a critical-
realist epistemology. This holds that whilst language constructs social realities, the limitations
and possibilities of the material world will interact with and constrain these constructions. It
also holds that it is possible for research to address the ‘non-discursive’, for example the idea
that ‘authenticity’ might be constrained by embodiment or the material power of institutions
(Cromby & Nightingale, 1999; Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig, 2007). This thesis therefore
also explores the methodological feasibility of using a critical realist approach within a
discursive study such as this.
1.3 The use of reflexive boxes
Reflexive research recognises that total objective detachment is not possible and therefore
‘the researcher’s influence must be taken into account and even utilized’ (Hammersley &
Atkinson, 1995: 17). There are a variety of ways by which to approach this reflexive aim, one
being to provide biographical details (as above), however, the intention is ‘to use personal
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revelation not as an end in itself but as a springboard for interpretations and more general
insight’ (Finlay, 2002a: 215). Reflexive methodologies require an ongoing reflexive
engagement with both the research process and its written presentation (Finlay, 2002b). For
this reason, a series of reflexive boxes will be placed at various points throughout the
following report, their aim being to facilitate explication of the forces at work in the
production of the main text. The use of a separately boxed area is conceptualized as providing
a space which the author can use to step out of the main body of the account and explore a
specific issue or point of contention (Edwards & Potter, 1992). It is intended that these
reflexive summaries will complement (rather than replace) the reflexivity within the main
text.
1.4 Reflexive box 1
In the above preface I have attempted to contextualise the research idea and to orientate
the reader to the background motivations for conducting this research. I commenced
training with a strong humanistic value base, relatively unaware of the epistemological
and ontological conflicts within counselling psychology; however, as I began to
appreciate and identify with postmodern and social constructionist approaches to
counselling, my idealistic foundation was challenged. I was then particularly perplexed by
the way in which certain philosophical contradictions appeared to be ‘brushed over’ and I
began to question counselling psychology as a discipline. This provided the incentive to
explore taken for granted counselling psychology values, with authenticity being a prime
example.
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Whilst the identification of biographical and disciplinary influences may help to
situate me as the research author, Finlay (2002a) argues that introspection must be
balanced with critical self-analysis in order to be of value and to avoid the charge of self-
indulgence. It is therefore worth addressing the effects of my having had my values and
chosen profession thrown into doubt. For example, whilst I believe this questioning
helped me to develop a more critical and reflexive understanding, it was also somewhat
anxiety producing. It is possible that my choice to use a critical-realist framework was a
defence against ontological anxiety, i.e. that which may have arisen in response to a
relativist deconstruction of my values, profession and own ‘authenticity’. However, I
consciously chose a critical-realist framework because it appeared to fit my experiential
positioning between epistemologies, whilst also reflecting the relativist-realist tension that
is inherent to counselling psychology as a whole.
The above preface and indeed the text in this reflexive box, both attempt to
capture the ‘conditions of possibility’ (Foucault, 1980) from which this research emerged.
However offering a biographical account is problematic because it implies that a
transparent telling of the ‘truth’ is possible. If language is understood to construct social
reality, then it must be acknowledged that an account such as this provides just one of
many possible narratives (Hansen, 2005). It is also ontologically problematic to suggest a
coherent self-narrative, raising the question of whether it really is inevitable that an
explicit situating of the researcher will result in a better account of the research.
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Coyle (2006) argues that it would be disingenuous of discourse analysts to
demonstrate the constitutive function of other people’s language use whilst making an
exception for their own. This could be applied as equally to the above preface as to the
text within an interview transcription. For example, a brief discursive analysis of the
above ‘situating the research author’ text suggests that it performs a number of rhetorical
functions. These include positioning the author as well-educated and experienced (e.g.
having first begun to study psychology ‘approximately sixteen years ago’), as well as
inquisitive and critical (e.g. by choosing ‘to open up a taken for granted foundational
value’). The function of such positioning is arguably to establish the credibility of the
author and demonstrate characteristics that are presumably desirable in a researcher. The
overall emphasis on counselling psychology’s complex and conflicted epistemological
and ontological basis could be seen to function as a defence against any criticism
pertaining to the research findings, whilst the positioning of the author as critical and
reflexive might act to confer legitimacy on the ensuing analysis.
Of course this reflexive box is equally a constructed text and subject to the same
criticisms as outlined above. It would be possible to deconstruct this text in just the same
way (for an example of this approach see Ashmore, 1989), however this sets up a
potential spiral of analysis in which each representation is further deconstructed, with
each deconstruction paradoxically acting as a rhetorical strategy to claim authority and
credibility (Derrida, 1980). As Finlay (2002a: 226) notes, the possibility of an infinite
regress may result in ‘interminable deconstructions of deconstructions where all meaning
gets lost’. This text (and the research as a whole) therefore attempts to strike a balance
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between critical deconstruction and ‘relativist nihilism’, in effect taking a critical realist
position whereby reflexive writing ‘attempts to capture something of a ‘real’ story while
acknowledging its partial, tentative status’ (Finlay, 2002a: 224).
11
2. INTRODUCTION
‘Counselling Psychology... emphasizes the subjective experience of clients... the
notion of ‘doing something to’ clients is replaced by that of ‘being with’ and the
core conditions of empathy, acceptance and authenticity are paramount
whatever the therapeutic modality’
(Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010:11)
The above quote, taken from the most recent edition of the ‘Handbook of Counselling
Psychology’, illustrates some of the importance commonly attributed to ‘authenticity’. Indeed
as a central tenet of both humanist and existential philosophy, it is arguably one of
counselling psychology’s foundational values. The term ‘authenticity’ is open to numerous
interpretations and is often used to refer to such different things as sincerity, truthfulness and
originality; however, in a review of the literature regarding authenticity, Vannini & Franzese
(2008: 1621) argue that it is most precisely conceptualized as ‘the feeling and practice of
being true to oneself and to others’. The persuasiveness and apparent common-sense
simplicity of this latter definition is eloquently conveyed in Shakespeare’s well-known
dictum:
This above all: to thine own self be true
And it doth follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.
(Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 1, 3:78)
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Building on the work of social commentators such as Bell (1976) and Lasch (1979), several
contemporary writers (e.g. Guigon, 2004; Potter, 2010) have noted that such an appreciation
of authenticity is on the ascendancy in Western society, with an increasing number of
individuals aspiring to find their ‘true selves’, live more ‘authentic lives’ and enjoy more
‘authentic relationships’. They argue that a vast array of marketed life-styles and
commodities fuel such desires, ably assisted by popular psychology and the ‘self-help’
industry. They caution that the notion of ‘authenticity’ is assumed to be good, when in fact it
may be viewed as a ‘hoax’ (Potter, 2010); a taken-for-granted value which promises much
but actually magnifies the alienation of modern day life by encouraging a self-centred and
competitive individualism.
Counselling psychology has been described as ‘postmodern and multi-modal in
nature’ (Milton, 2010: xxiii); however, practitioners must navigate a conflicted
epistemological and ontological field, and it appears that fundamentally modernist
assumptions remain highly influential (see literature review). This research is therefore
interested in exploring how counselling psychologists construct ‘authenticity’, in what ways
such constructions are used (e.g. to limit or justify action), and what the ethical implications
may be. In doing so it considers how ‘authenticity’ may be shaped by social conditions (e.g.
training or paid employment) and what possible ways-of-being may be offered to
practitioners and clients as a result. Although several noteworthy philosophical works have
addressed the topic of authenticity, there is little empirical research in the area and there
exists no prior examination of how authenticity discourse may shape the therapeutic
relationship.
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This research uses a discourse analytic approach known as ‘critical discursive
psychology’ (Adams, 2001: Edley & Wetherell, 2001) to explore the talk of eight counselling
psychologists, using semi-structured interviews. Critical discursive psychology addresses not
only discursive practice (how participants construct and negotiate meaning), but also the
availability of discursive resources (how social and institutional frameworks provide and
shape constructions). This allows for the recognition of people as both producers and products
of discourse (Billig, 1991). The research is framed within a critical-realist epistemology
(Cromby & Nightingale, 1999; Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig, 2007), which holds that
whilst language constructs social realities, the limitations and possibilities of the material
world will interact with and constrain these constructions. As such, a number of ‘extra-
discursive’ influences or constraints upon ‘authenticity’ are tentatively proposed.
Methodologically, this research questions whether it is possible to authentically research
authenticity. It also addresses the epistemological tension between realism and relativism and
evaluates the use of a critical-realist approach in a discursive study such as this.
The following chapters give an account of the research process; however, prior to
outlining them it is worth acknowledging that they provide just one possible, and hopefully
plausible, way of ordering the research data. For ease of reading, the term ‘therapist’ and
‘counselling psychologist’ will be used interchangeably. The literature review provides an
extensive, though by no means exhaustive, account of counselling psychology and
authenticity; the aim being to contextualise the research, demonstrate the variety of potential
authenticity constructions presently available and problematize the taken-for-granted nature of
‘authenticity’. The methodology chapter outlines the ontological, epistemological and
axiological basis of the research and the method chapter provides an account of the specific
research design. The results chapter presents the research findings, supported by a range of
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transcript extracts. The thesis then concludes with a discussion chapter, which summarizes the
research, explores the implications for ethical practice and evaluates the chosen methodology.





This chapter provides a review of the literature relevant to counselling psychology and
authenticity, its aim being to contextualise the present study, to demonstrate the variety of
potential authenticity constructions available and finally to problematize authenticity as a
taken-for-granted value. Although it is not possible to provide an exhaustive account of
‘authenticity’, the intention is to offer an extensive and integrated exploration of relevant
discourse. The literature review of a discursive study plays an integral role in the research
process, for as Yardley (2000: 220) advises: an ‘awareness of the different perspectives and
complex arguments that can be brought to bear on the subject provides the researcher with the
scholastic tools to develop a more profound and far-reaching analysis’.
The following review begins by locating this study within the current research
literature, after which it is organised into four broad sections. The first section sets out to
provide a context for the study by outlining a brief history of counselling psychology and its
inherent epistemological and ontological conflicts. The second section similarly provides a
genealogical account of the concept of ‘authenticity’, with specific attention given to
existential philosophy. The review then goes on to consider the institutional influence of
counselling psychology training and regulation, with a focus on authenticity in relation to
professional socialisation and the increasing professionalisation of counselling psychology.
The fourth and final section explores authenticity in relation to counselling psychology
practice; examining differences in theoretical approach, the notion of the therapeutic
relationship and the issue of ethics. While it is clearly beyond the scope of this review to give
a detailed description of all the ways that authenticity is constructed and enacted within
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psychotherapy, reference is made to the person-centred, psychodynamic and cognitive-
behavioural schools of thought. The review ends with a summary, followed by a reflexive
analysis.
3.2 Locating the present study in the research literature
Despite a long tradition of theoretical debate within such fields as philosophy and psychology,
the topic of authenticity has generated relatively limited empirical research. An exception to
this may be found within the discipline of cultural studies, although Vannini & Williams
(2009: 12) note that ‘systematic discussions on authenticity have become more common
within social psychology and the sociology of culture only in the last fifteen years or so’, with
much of the resultant research being focused on authenticity in relation to group membership
and sub-cultural identity (e.g. Levitt & Hiestand, 2004; Riley & Cahill, 2005; Williams,
2006). Authenticity has also recently emerged as a popular topic within business and
management studies, particularly in relation to the qualities that might engender ‘authentic
leadership’ (e.g. Avolio & Gardner, 2005; Chan et al., 2005; Ladkin & Taylor, 2010).
However, as Harter (2005: 382) observes, ‘there is no single, coherent body of literature on
authentic self-behaviour, no bedrock of knowledge’.
Wood et al. (2008: 385) suggest that research into authenticity has been made difficult
because of ‘definitional confusion regarding the construct’.  They note that ‘the study of
authenticity has largely been neglected in empirical psychology’ (p.385) and cite Lopez &
Rice (2006) as lamenting ‘the virtual absence of available measures of the construct’ (p.362).
Their solution has been to develop a measure of dispositional authenticity, the ‘Authenticity
Scale’, arguing that authenticity is a personality trait that can be assessed (Wood et al., 2008).
Goldman & Kernis (2002) have similarly developed the ‘Authenticity Inventory’: an
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assessment tool which breaks authenticity into four related, yet independent components,
these being awareness (of one’s ‘true’ self, feelings, motives etc), unbiased processing
(accepting feedback without defensiveness or ‘interpretative distortions’), behaviour (acting
in accord with one’s values, preferences and needs), and relational orientation (striving for
openness and truthfulness in relationships). Such research opens up questions about what it
means to be authentic and the impact that such an ‘attribute’ or ‘attitude’ might have.
However, from a perspective informed by social constructionism, such quantitative studies are
flawed, not least because they are based on the modernist premise of a unified ‘true’ or ‘core’
self. It is also unclear what meaning may lie within a ‘unit’ of authenticity along a scale, and
by what standards an authenticity instrument might be validated.
Very little research (either quantitative or qualitative) has specifically addressed the
concept of authenticity in terms of counselling or psychotherapy practice, although much
attention has been directed towards understanding the qualities that may contribute to the
success or failure of the therapeutic alliance (Cooper, 2008). A number of these qualities may
be linked with the discourse of authenticity, for example, Grafanaki & McLeod (1995)
qualitatively explored ‘congruence’ (Rogers, 1957) within an initial person-centred
counselling session and found that the most ‘helpful event’, as defined by the client, occurred
when the therapist was ‘relating as a person and not as a professional, and everything was
happening naturally, without much thinking’ (p.316). Therefore whilst it is possible to
construct ‘congruence’ and ‘authenticity’ in significantly different ways, there is also
considerable overlap in their use and accepted meaning. Further qualities and constructs that
may be of particular relevance include sincerity, empathy and countertransference (Minnillo,
2008); these and other possible aspects of authenticity discourse will be addressed in greater
detail below.
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In recognition of the ‘fragmented domains of knowledge specific to the construct’ and
the lack of targeted research within psychotherapy, Minnillo (2008: 6) employed a grounded
theory methodology to examine how therapists conceptualize authenticity. The aim was to
provide an ‘indicative description of its [authenticity’s] place within the process and potential
outcome of therapy’ (p.5). In doing so, Minnillo was interested to discover whether therapists
understood authenticity as ‘an integral part of their authentic self or as a clinical procedure
invoked at the therapist’s discretion’ (p.5). His research resulted in a ‘model of authentic
meaning making’ (p.92), whereby personal values and characteristics interact with
professional influences and experience, to counter barriers and increase therapeutic skill over
time, the conclusion being that authentic interactions facilitate positive therapeutic outcome.
Minnillo’s research is highly relevant to the present study and his findings will be addressed
in more detail below (e.g. see discussion chapter); however, he states from the outset that
authenticity is ‘operationalized within this study as being a transformational construct that
facilitates positive outcome’ (p.26), and that his research is ‘based on the hypothesis that
authenticity is a contributing factor in developing and strengthening the therapeutic alliance’
(p.27). As such, Minnillo’s research might be considered indicative of the ‘taken-for-granted’
value of ‘authenticity'. In contrast, the present study adopts a more critical perspective and
seeks to explore how the language of authenticity may be used to achieve personal, social and
political projects, i.e. in what ways authenticity discourse may function to create and enact
different identities and activities.
For the purposes of this research, a systematic review of the literature was undertaken
via PsycARTICLES, PscyINFO and SciVerse Science Direct, using the search terms
‘authentic’, ‘authenticity’, ‘counselling’, and ‘therapy’. The search indicated that no previous
discourse analytic studies exist regarding authenticity in counselling or psychotherapy.
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3.3 Counselling psychology
This section begins with a brief historical account of counselling psychology. Whilst it is
acknowledged that such a ‘history’ presents just one of many possible constructions (Burr,
1995), it is hoped that the account is of sufficient richness to contextualise the research
interest. It is followed by an exploration of the major tensions inherent to counselling
psychology, these being indicative of current dominant discourses within the field.
3.3.1 A brief history of counselling psychology
Counselling psychology has a comparatively short history as a distinct domain of applied
psychology, only attaining divisional status within the British Psychological Society (BPS) as
recently as 1994 (BPS, 2010a). However, in order to appreciate the powerful nature of the
conflicts within counselling psychology discourse, it is helpful to trace the backdrop against
which the discipline emerged.
Until the late 19th century psychology was widely regarded as a branch of
philosophy, however the Enlightenment brought a critical questioning of traditional
institutions, customs and morals (Mandler, 2007). Medieval philosophy was replaced by an
emphasis on reason and the belief that true knowledge could be discovered through
objectively observed ‘facts’ verifiable against sense-experience (Erwin, 1999). The first
psychological research laboratory was established by Wilhelm Wundt at the German
University of Leipzig in 1879, and with the adoption of experimental methods, psychology
began to gain recognition as a distinct field of study (Benjamin, 2007). Interest in
consciousness and subjectivity waned as the evident success of the natural sciences
encouraged psychologists to focus on that which was testable and measureable. In Britain
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and the USA in particular, psychology came to be defined as a behavioural science and a
positivist-empiricist philosophy was embraced. Behaviourism was set to dominate until the
‘cognitive revolution’ of the 1960’s, which led to a renewed interest in mental process, albeit
still within a modernist framework (Hergenhahn, 2009).
While empiricism characterised the field of psychology, interest in consciousness
and subjectivity continued to flourish in Continental Europe, within the frameworks of
phenomenology and existential philosophy. Humanism also emerged as a cultural force in
1940’s America, placing the individual at the centre of social phenomena and claiming that
the self was stable and knowable (Jenkins, 2001). Humanistic thinkers such as Maslow
(1943,1966), May (1969) and Rogers (1951,1961) argued that in trying to measure human
experience it was being stripped of all meaning and relevance to lived existence. They
advocated the integration of humanistic values into psychology and sought a re-engagement
with subjective experience, values and beliefs (Hergenhahn, 2009). Humanism gained
momentum within Britain in the 1960’s, alongside a revival of the phenomenological
tradition, and both were key influences on the emergence of counselling psychology in the
1980’s (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010).
Counselling psychologists sought to define their new discipline as an alternative to
mainstream approaches. They challenged the determinism perceived within behaviourism,
psychoanalysis and the medical model, emphasising the significance of the therapeutic
relationship and the facilitation of well-being, rather than the treatment of ‘sickness’
(Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010). Humanism thus offered an attractive ideological framework
that allowed clients to be understood in terms of their subjective, lived experiences, rather
than diagnosed and pathologised. There was also an increasing body of research which
21
suggested that the principal effects of psychotherapy were a result of the quality of the
therapeutic relationship, rather than a particular brand of therapy (for a review see Norcross,
2002). This interest in the ‘common factors’ of therapy provided a strong rationale for
prioritising the core conditions of ‘empathy, congruence and unconditional positive regard’
as suggested by Rogers (1957). Phenomenology and existentialism further supported an
emphasis on the relationship as they offered an understanding of people as unique yet
fundamentally inter-twined with others in the world (Spinelli, 2005).
The 1980’s and 1990’s also saw the beginning of postmodern ideas having a
significant influence upon different counselling orientations (Sexton & Griffin, 1997). Social
constructionist and poststructuralist theories were more widely taken up and the ‘turn to
discourse’ (see methodology chapter) prompted a radical review of language as ‘productive
rather than (merely) reflective’ (Edley, 2001a: 435). Psychotherapeutic theories, whether
psychoanalytic, humanistic or otherwise, had traditionally been offered as accurate reflections
of that which they sought to describe (Corsini & Wedding, 2000; Speed, 1991), but
postmodernism challenged the notion that a knowable reality exists, positing instead that
‘reality’ is always a human construction that cannot be objectively discovered. Such thinking
complements the non-pathologising ethos of counselling psychology, for if the discovery of
objective truth is no longer the goal of therapy, clients and counsellors are free to renarrate a
client's life in any way that is helpful (Hansen, 2002). Counselling psychology is arguably
postmodern in its refusal to align itself with a single therapeutic model or epistemology
(Milton, 2010). Indeed it has embraced a diverse range of therapeutic approaches, ranging
from the person-centred, cognitive-behavioural and psychodynamic, to the constructionist,
narrative and systemic, whilst always claiming ‘a firm value base grounded in the primacy of
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the counselling or psychotherapeutic relationship’ (British Psychological Society, 2005).
The above account provides just one possible version of psychology’s history and it is
likely that the development of counselling psychology has been far less linear than this short
construction suggests. It is also important to acknowledge the existence of political and
economic influences. Rose’s (1979) seminal study is relevant for it provides a sociological
analysis of the emergence of what he coined the ‘psy-complex’ (1985, 1989); this being the
‘network of theories and practices concerned with psychological governance and self-
reflection in Western culture’ (Parker, 1998: 68). He proposed that the formation of
psychology occurred as part of a state-led campaign of socialisation, whereby evolutionism
and eugenic concerns about the mental deficiency, criminality and pauperism of the lower
classes, created a political desire for instruments and techniques of mental measurement.
Therefore, as Richards (2002: 38) notes, ‘the appeal of psychological expertise lay in its
promise that those possessing it would be able to more effectively manage the populations
under their control’, with applications ranging from the understanding of attention and
motivation so as to improve industrial efficiency, to the creation of a diagnostic system in
order to deal with pathology.
Such arguments link to the work of Foucault (e.g. 1971, 1977, 1986), who proposed
that modern societies are managed not by overt force but by the self-disciplined practices of
the population, and that psychology developed as part of the increasing disciplinary
surveillance of populations in the West, brought about as a result of urbanization and growing
secularism. Foucault warned that not only had the mind become the target of professional
knowledge for reasons of social control by the state (1977), but that confessional modes of
subjectivity have developed so that people will do the work of surveillance themselves
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(1981). From this perspective, counselling psychology and psychotherapy are forms of ‘psy-
work’ that construct selfhood, experience and understanding, whilst working up and
regulating power relations (Hook, 2007).
3.3.2 Epistemological and ontological conflicts:
‘Epistemology’ refers to the branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge; it
addresses questions about what can be known and how (Willig, 2008), whereas ‘ontology’ is
the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of being and reality (Ponterotto, 2005).
As a field of interest, counselling psychology encompasses a number of conflicting
epistemological and ontological positions, an examination of which highlights the
impossibility of theorizing about authenticity from within a single meta-narrative.
Counselling psychology is sometimes defined in terms of its humanistic value base,
‘that it is, in its essence, the application of those values’ (Cooper, 2009: 2); however, it is
arguable that counselling psychology is also embedded within an empiricist framework, thus
indicating an epistemological clash between phenomenology and positivism. For example,
Pugh & Coyle (2000) analysed how counselling psychologists discursively constructed their
profession within the Counselling Psychology Review in 1990 and 1996. They found a
concern for establishing a unique identity but also a desire for legitimization. This translated
into the use of ‘empiricist discourse to lend weight and respectability to the argument being
constructed’ (p.92) and ‘differences in therapeutic approach and outcome across the
therapeutic professions being minimized’ (p.97). They concluded that although differences in
research methods were emphasized (i.e. the use of a human science/qualitative approach),
similarities to established professions were also highlighted in order to promote acceptability
24
and gain status. Counselling psychology is now much more established than it was in the
1990’s, however the relatively recent requirement (since 2005) that trainees undertake
doctoral level research suggests a continued desire to compete for such professional
recognition.
Counselling psychology training is commonly designed to encourage the student to
become both a ‘scientist-practitioner’ and a ‘reflective practitioner’ (Martin, 2010; Schön,
1983). However in order to achieve both aspects of such an identity, the trainee must
negotiate between a largely logical-empiricist knowledge base and a phenomenological
perspective on practice (Williams & Irving, 1996). Whereas some see this mix as a strength
which allows for the valuing of artistry in professional work (e.g. Strawbridge, 2003), others
such as Williams & Irving (1996) argue that it presents a ‘conflation of paradigms’ and is in
effect ‘a logical absurdity’ (p.6).
While it can be argued that counselling psychologists are caught between the values of
empiricism and humanism (Spinelli, 2001), for those working within such settings as the UK
National Health Service or Employee Assistant Programmes, there may be a particular
pressure to conform to the natural science model. For example, in recent years political and
economic pressures have encouraged a bias towards cognitive-behavioural therapy and
solution focused work, whereas pressure for accountability has further increased the demand
for evidence-based practice, encouraging the use of ‘diagnostic’ categories for deciding upon
‘treatment’ and obtaining outcomes measurement (Cohen, 2008). Medicalized psychological
discourse also maintains a powerful presence, as illustrated by the common usage of terms
such as ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental health treatment’. Such phrases pathologise the
experience of distress by treating human suffering as if it were a specific disease entity to be
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diagnosed, categorised and remedied. This clearly conflicts with the phenomenological
perspective counselling psychology originally espoused, whereby the description of conscious
experience is valued, without reference to whether it is objectively real (Spinelli, 2005).
A variety of postmodern perspectives provide further room for epistemological
conflict. For example, Burr (1995) notes that social constructionism is different from
traditional positivistic psychology because it is anti-essentialist (i.e. there are no innate
discoverable psychological essences such as ‘personality’) and anti-realist (i.e. all ‘reality’ is
socially constructed). However, the ontological differences between humanist and postmodern
perspectives have particularly significant implications for authenticity and the notion of an
authentic self; for while humanism proposes that the individual has an essential core that
might be actualized (see below), postmodernism suggests that the self is continually
constructed as a function of social interaction (McNamee, 1996). Indeed sceptical forms of
postmodernism dismiss the self altogether and while more affirmative varieties retain a notion
of self, its multiple or fluid form is radically different to the consolidated humanist version
(Hansen, 2005).
It has been said that postmodernism ‘attacks the ‘modernist’ ego-centric/person-
centred approaches of much of psychoanalysis, counselling, psychotherapy and psychology’
(Loewenthal & Snell, 2003: 1) and it certainly raises questions about the humanistic ideal of a
consolidated, congruent self as a goal of counselling (Gergen, 1995; McNamee, 1996). For
example, a postmodern critique suggests that counsellors need not assume that the client has
an authentic, essential self lying beneath their various social masks; instead relational and
cultural factors are understood to shape the construction of self, meaning that ‘multiple
identities become the norm rather than a sign of psychopathology’ (Hansen, 2005: 7).
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Such ideas stand in opposition to the dominant discourse of the self in Western society
(Wolputte, 2004), which pathologizes the notion of multiple selves via the application of
labels such as schizophrenia or multiple personality disorder. However, ethnographic research
has identified cultures where having a multiple self is actively promoted (e.g. Cohen, 1998;
Scheper-Hughes & Lock, 1987), and rather than being problematic, Gergen (1991) argues that
multiple selves are necessary for successful adaption to the numerous role demands of
contemporary society. Therefore from a postmodern perspective, the ‘humanistic self... is
exposed as an arbitrary, and perhaps even maladaptive, ideal’ (Hansen, 2005: 10).
In recent years postmodernism has influenced a move away from the one-person
psychology of the more traditional therapeutic approaches, towards a two-person psychology,
in which intersubjectivity and the co-creation of narrative is valued (Rizq, 2008); however,
the notion of a core self has been described as one of the ‘sacred cows’ of modern psychology
(Hoffman, 1993) and it maintains a powerful discursive presence. Modernist notions of self
are also likely to be reinforced by daily ‘reality’, i.e. people generally experience themselves
as integrated, intentional beings, and as Cushman (1990: 559) explains, ‘the self is a difficult
concept on which to get a perspective precisely because it is such as central aspect of the
horizon’. It has been argued that even psychotherapists who espouse philosophical or
theoretical positions that reject notions of objective ‘truth’ inevitably revert to realism once
engaged in actual interaction with clients (Downing, 2000; Held, 1995). Despite these
difficulties, it seems important to question the values that might inform the common
therapeutic projects of ‘self-discovery’ and ‘self-development’ and it is clear from the




As Starks & Trinidad (2007: 1374) note, discourse analysis involves ‘tracing the historical
evolution of language practices and examining how language both shapes and reflects
dynamic cultural, social and political practices’. This section therefore provides a brief
genealogical account of the concept of authenticity, before focusing in more detail upon its
place within existential philosophy.
3.4.1 A genealogical account of ‘authenticity’
The concept of ‘authenticity’ has a surprisingly short and rich history (Degenhardt, 2010),
traceable from its growth in importance in the 18th century, through significant transformation
in the 19th century, to its current status as a cultural ideal (Guigon, 2004; Taylor, 1991). The
following genealogy seeks to identify the ‘conditions of possibility’ (Foucault, 1980) which
have enabled people to speak of authenticity in different ways.
The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines authenticity as ‘the quality
of being real or true’ (2009: 97). Such definitions are often accompanied by examples
referring to the genuineness of documents or works of art, presupposing the existence of an
original item that makes possible a copy or forgery (Golomb, 1995). Lindholm (2008: 2)
observes that by extension, individual authenticity is generally understood in terms of whether
a person is ‘true to their roots or if their lives are a direct and immediate expression of their
essence’. However, Potter (2010) suggests that whilst the distinction between how something
seems and what it actually is has long been a topic of human fascination, to measure or
evaluate a person in terms of their ‘authenticity’ is a thoroughly modern and problematic
endeavour.
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Potter (2010) notes that the notion of authenticity is often used to link the Socratic
injunction ‘know thyself’ with the modern dictum ‘to thine own self be true’, however he
argues that such a claim of continuity is an anachronism. He reasons that Socrates lived in an
age when the world was thought of as an ordered ‘cosmos’, where to know yourself was to
understand your place in the world, whereas the notion of authenticity requires a distinction
between an inner true self and an outer self that has only been evident in Western culture
since the 18th century. This suggests that the concept of authenticity might more appropriately
be linked to the rise of individualism and the notion of personal identity.
Cushman (1990: 600) proposes that the demise of feudalism across Europe in the 15th
century led to the construction of an ‘increasingly bounded, masterful self’, as urbanization
brought a new awareness of ‘internal space’ and a growing focus on privacy and personal
identity. With the emergence of the centralized state, the 16th century Protestant Reformation
then established a religious tradition that directed individuals to look inward and make contact
with an inner truth (God within) so that guidance might be received. Authenticity might thus
be said to originate in the Protestant belief that full being and salvation can only be achieved
by examining one’s conscience (Guigon, 2004; Potter, 2010). As Taylor (1991: 26) observes,
the Reformation ‘is part of the massive subjective turn of modern culture, a new form of
inwardness, in which we come to think of ourselves as beings with inner depths’.
According to Trilling (1971), the term authenticity entered common usage in the 18th
century, having grown out of the simpler concept of sincerity. Trilling defines sincerity as ‘a
congruence between avowal and actual feeling’ (p.2) and suggests that it emerged as people
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increasingly lived amongst strangers (encouraging the potential for deceit). Sincerity was also
encouraged by the egalitarian ethic of Protestantism, which led people to wear plain clothing
and shun adornment in order to appear ‘as they really were’ (Lindholm, 2008). However
sincerity is problematic in terms of how a person might ensure that their self-interpretation is
not self-delusion. Therefore as the industrial revolution progressed and people began to
experience increasing alienation and self-fragmentation, sincerity was eclipsed by the notion
of authenticity. Trilling defines authenticity as a state in which the individual’s essential being
is in alignment with their sentiments, it being ‘a more exigent conception of the self and of
what being true to it consists in, a wider reference to the universe and man’s place in it’
(p.12).
The notion of authenticity builds upon early forms of individualism, such as
Descartes’ pursuit of disengaged rationality (Lindholm, 2008), however it is also strongly
rooted in the Romantic period and the works of both Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and
Johann Herder (1744-1803). Rousseau proposed that civilization had deformed the true nature
of humanity, making people slaves to appearance and competition; hence his famous
statement that ‘man was born free, and everywhere he is in chains’ (Rousseau, 1998: 5). He
argued for an egalitarian society ruled by the general will of the people, whilst also idealizing
introspection and the experience of one’s deepest emotions. This emphasis on self-contact
was further encouraged by Herder, who argued that each person has an original way of being
human which they are called upon to embrace. Herder’s ideas gave importance to the idea of
being true to oneself because they suggested that a failure to do so would result in missing the
point of one’s life (Taylor, 1991). The Romantic period therefore established two key strands
of authenticity discourse: firstly the notion of a true inner self (at this point still perceived as
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divinely gifted) and secondly the idea that to live authentically requires an ongoing filtering of
experience through deeply felt emotion.
As the Industrial Revolution progressed, so the concept of authenticity grew in cultural
force. The opportunities of a capitalistic wage labour market meant that occupation and
identity were no longer determined by heredity, whilst the new ideal of spiritual equality
implied that subservient work was not a calling from God but an imposition of power. Thus
the Enlightenment encouraged a belief in a sacred authentic self, existing beneath the social
framework. However, Richards (2002) argues that people were unsure of what their ‘true’
identities might be and in the spirit of Victorian rationality they desired a ‘scientific’ voice to
guide them. The result was an increasing involvement by psychiatry and psychology in
defining and creating modes of subjectivity, eventually leading to the emergence of general
personality theories such as Jung’s (1921) Psychological Types.
Fuelled by the increased compartmentalization of work and the fragmentation of local
communities, the Victorians conceived of a ‘deep, secret, instinct-driven, potentially
dangerous self’, which Cushman (1990: 600) suggests was ‘used by the state to justify its role
as official controller of selves’.  However, over the course of the 20th century and as a result
of both world wars, economic forces caused the mechanisms of social control to shift from the
restriction of impulse to the creation and manipulation of a need for continual consumption
(Cushman, 1990). The discourse of authenticity similarly shifted from a concern with striving
to become a better person (with divine help), to the project of discovering and reclaiming a
self that already existed; this to be achieved via the purchase of authentic experiences,
lifestyles and objects, soon obsolete. Potter (2010) proposes that the search for authenticity in
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contemporary society has become a status-seeking game, with people competing against each
other to be more authentic and live more authentic lives.
Guigon (2004) links the commodification of authenticity with the demise of religion
and a subsequent loss of tradition and shared meaning. He suggests that as Western society
became increasingly secularized, the notion of an external source of direction was lost and
‘God-within’ became thought of as ‘God being me’. However, the importance attributed to
knowing one’s ‘own self’ and seeking direction from within, met with the difficulties of
assuming that a core, pre-existent self exists. Guigon proposes that such problems have driven
the creation of a thriving self-help industry and explain the popularity of therapy today.
Russell (1999) also argues that counselling discourse is closely and powerfully related
to the social construction of self in the West. She notes that the development and use of
counselling as a form of social practice has occurred concomitantly with the development and
emergence of modernist notions of self, with high value being placed upon the concepts of
autonomy and authenticity. She cautions:
‘the propagation of these notions within selfhood may have some derogative
consequences to social relations, within communities and within society. It is
suggested that counsellors need to develop much more awareness of the
sociological perspectives of their profession before enthusiastically
propagating the authentic, autonomous self’ (p.339).
However, as will be argued below (see psychotherapeutic theory section), individualist
notions of authentic selfhood continue to inform many mainstream therapeutic approaches.
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One possible implication is that clients will be diagnosed as having a false or fragmented self,
without sufficient attention being given to the socio-historical context of the presenting
problem or cause of the fragmentation. Indeed Cushman (1990) argues that when
psychotherapy attempts to heal the modern self it usually does so by ‘reinforcing the very
qualities of self that have initially caused the problem: its autonomous, bounded, masterful
nature’ (p.601).
In today’s ‘post-modern world’ it might be expected that notions of authentic self-
hood would weaken. For example, Richards (2002) notes that later 20th century generations
are more accustomed to rapid change than their earlier counterparts, thus rendering the
possibility of identity change more acceptable. Furthermore, factors such as increased
globalization may make it more likely that such changes will occur. Indeed Jameson (1991:
26) argues that the alienation brought about by late capitalism has resulted in a ‘schizophrenic
self’ characterized by information overload and the absence of an overarching narrative.
However, Wolputte (2004) suggests that this results in a fundamental paradox whereby the
greater the recognition of fragmentation and decentralization, the greater the assertion of
hegemony and emphasis on the ideology that denies fragmentation. Not only does the desire
for a central, defragmented self remain, but it is reinforced by a political discourse which
seeks to represent the individual as indivisible.
Although it is possible that an ‘authentic-self’ repertoire may dominate authenticity
discourse, it is important to note that a range of different authenticity constructions are
available and continue to clash with each other. It is possible that the above account conveys
too linear a progression, for the concept of authenticity has emerged both slowly and
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unevenly. Existential philosophy in particular has approached the notion of authenticity
differently and this will be explored in further detail below.
3.4.2 ‘Authenticity’ and existential philosophy
Existential thinkers have raised many questions regarding the nature of authenticity and
whether it is possible or even desirable to achieve. Indeed Golomb (1995: 5) argues that ‘the
philosophical understanding of ‘authenticity’ is far more complex than its everyday use
suggests’. Existentialism was also an important influence upon the development of
counselling psychology and practitioners may draw upon it when constructing the notion of
authenticity for themselves.
Yalom (1980) traces modern existentialism to the writings of the nineteenth century
philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), and Earnshaw (2006: 3) suggests that it was
Kierkegaard who first ‘introduced the idea of authenticity and the idea of an authentic self for
which we alone are responsible’. Much of Kierkegaard’s work was concerned with
questioning the individual’s relationship to God and it is here that his concept of authenticity
is located; therefore his ideas might also be considered indicative of a spiritual discourse of
authenticity.
Kierkegaard proposed there are three hierarchical existence spheres or stages of self-
actualisation: the aesthetic, ethical and religious (Kierkegaard, 1959). In the aesthetic stage a
person is concerned with only the sensual, emotive and immediate; however, there comes the
realization that such a life is unfulfilling. This leads to the ethical stage (the ‘universal’),
which involves an acceptance of the significance of moral choice and social responsibility.
Both stages are characterised by inauthenticity because the individual is essentially
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conforming to society, albeit in different ways. Anxiety (angst) is then experienced as a
natural consequence of the growing awareness of possibility (freedom), i.e. that nothing is
certain and that life is founded on choices which in turn are based only on the values that the
individual has aligned themselves with. The struggle with meaninglessness creates despair,
through which the individual becomes aware of their existence before God and experiences
dread. Therefore in the religious stage, Kierkegaard invites the individual to commit a leap of
faith and enter into a relationship with God. He proposed that only then is it possible to
experience authentic being, balancing such tensions as the necessity of finitude with the
possibility of infinitude (Van Deurzen & Kenward, 2005; Earnshaw, 2006).
For Kierkegaard, authenticity is part of an ongoing process of taking responsibility and
renewing one’s spiritual relationship every day. In this sense he viewed the self as always
being a potential rather than a fixed entity, with authenticity as an open ended aim (Golomb,
1995). However, many later existentialists viewed authenticity as even more difficult to
achieve than this, and in his overview of Existentialism, Earnshaw (2006: 124) concludes that
‘the struggle for authenticity is ultimately fruitless, unless it is conceived within the
framework of a ‘leap of faith’. For example, in contrast to Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche
(1844-1900) believed the universe to be meaningless and chaotic, hence his famous dictum:
‘God is dead’. He therefore argued that authenticity might only be achieved by an
Ȕbermensch (an ‘overman’ or ‘superman’); this being an ideal person with a ‘will to power’;
someone unafraid to face up to the fundamental anxieties of living and able to accept reality
for what it is (Thompson, 2005).
Spinelli (2005) suggests that the work of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Jean-Paul
Sartre (1905-1980) may be particularly relevant to discussions about therapy, as both writers
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developed an inter-relational understanding of what it means to be human. For example,
Heidegger argued that human existence is always a ‘Being-in-the-world-with-Others’ and
Sartre proposed that awareness of ‘Others’ forms part of the structure of consciousness. Each
was greatly influenced by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and his method of phenomenology
(Spinelli, 2005).
Heidegger has been credited as the first to make authenticity ‘the backbone of his
philosophical perspective’ (Thompson, 2005: 144). He was interested in the ontological
structures which constitute how each ‘Dasein’ exists in relation to the world; ‘Dasein’
representing the kind of Being that belongs to people, literally translated as ‘Being-there’ (see
Wrathall, 2005). According to Heidegger, Dasein is ‘thrown’, meaning that although people
have no choice regarding the ‘facticity’ of their existence (gender, culture etc), they must still
decide who to be. This choice creates anxiety, which the individual attempts to mitigate by
complying with others (having a ‘they-self’). This ‘falling’ into inauthenticity allows them to
turn away from their responsibility.
As with Kierkegaard, Heidegger proposed that the inauthentic person experiences an
underlying disquiet and eventually discovers that their compliance is unrewarding; however,
to be one’s own person requires an anxiety provoking acknowledgment of both one’s freedom
and finitude. To some extent, everyday social life also demands inauthenticity, whereby
routinized patterns of communication and reaction override the freedom to speak openly
(Groth, 2008). Therefore to live authentically is no easy task and Dasein is ‘proximally and
for the most part’ fallen (Heidegger, 1962: 220).
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For Heidegger there is no vision of an authentic hero (as for Nietzsche); instead
authenticity may be found in a specific act or moment where the context of a situation has
allowed the individual to choose to behave authentically (Thompson, 2005). However when a
person acknowledges their own death, it ‘liberates him from possibilities which count for
nothing, and lets him become free for those which are authentic’ (Heidegger, 1962: 395). In
other words, the resolve to live authentically may be strengthened by an acceptance of one’s
mortality and the recognition ‘that shared conventions or norms will ultimately fail us’
(Wrathall, 2005: 69-70). While this does not change that Dasein is always a ‘Being-in-the-
world-with-Others’, it may allow for a more authentic mode of relationship (Heidegger,
1962).
Heidegger’s theory introduces several interesting new facets of authenticity discourse,
including the above outlined notion of accepting one’s death in order to live freely. Of
particular note is Heidegger’s argument that inauthenticity is ‘as much an ontological
structure of Dasein as the possibility of authenticity’ (Garza, 2006: 255). This idea stands in
contrast to the work of previous philosophers and Golomb (1995) suggests that it may offer a
more balanced and empathic view. It also has implications for the goals of therapy, for if
inauthenticity is understood to be part of the ontological structure of human being, then it may
be inappropriate to prescribe a code of ethics to it.
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) was arguably one of authenticity’s most influential
proponents; however he was also ‘deeply pessimistic about its viability’ (Golomb, 1995: 128).
Of central importance to his work is the idea that ‘existence precedes essence’ (Sartre, 1973:
27), which holds that both the world and the self are constituted via intentional acts of
consciousness. Anything considered to be a part of consciousness is really an object which
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consciousness directs itself towards, including the ego. Consciousness is Being; ‘a being, the
nature of which is to question its own being, that being implying a being other than itself’
(Sartre, 1943: 86). This means that for Sartre ‘there is no entity that is an original, authentic
self or ego’ (Golomb, 1995: 132) and there can be no self-referential ‘ownness’ as for
Heidegger. If ‘consciousness is intentional activity directed at what is not itself’ (Golomb,
1995: 133) then authenticity is not something found within, instead it is expressed via ‘the
created products of consciousness – it is the creative process itself’ (Golomb, 1995: 132).
To live in ‘good faith’ requires the individual to face the ‘nothingness’ of his or her
being and embrace their freedom, accepting full responsibility for their actions; however,
facing this freedom creates a sense of ‘nausea’; an anxiety that can be sufficiently unpleasant
to lead to inauthenticity instead (Quinn, 2010). To live in ‘bad faith’ is to flee from one’s
freedom by construing oneself as a ‘thing’; as a ‘Being-in-itself’ rather than a ‘Being-for-
itself’, and to deny that as human agents we must define and redefine ourselves through our
choices (Mills, 2003). There are similarities here with Heidegger’s notion of ‘fallenness’;
however, the terms ‘good-faith’ and ‘bad-faith’ are not synonymous with authenticity and
inauthenticity, since they are also used to signify how a person approaches the ontological
difficulties that ultimately make ‘authenticity an unattainable ideal’ (Golomb, 1995: 129).
The central dilemma of authenticity is that whilst it may be necessary to reflect on
one’s consciousness if one is to live in ‘good-faith’, the ‘me’ that makes authenticity possible
is the product of reflection and therefore inauthentic. All states, even authentic states
transcend consciousness and are open to doubt. Plus to regard the ‘I’ as having any rigid
features beyond the instantaneous moment is an act of bad-faith. ‘Bad faith is thus inherent in
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the epistemological features of consciousness’ (Golomb, 1995: 135). For Sartre, the solution
to these difficulties is to strive for authenticity not as essence but as freedom. He turned his
focus towards political action, arguing that whilst authenticity rooted in the ontology of
‘human reality’ cannot be attained, the impulse to act in bad faith might be subdued in
appropriate social frameworks (Golomb, 1995).
Space restrictions prevent further exploration of relevant existential thought (e.g. see
Buber, 2004 or Camus, 1982); however, whilst the above account provides only a selective
summary of relevant theory, it is clear that existential philosophy is a rich resource for
authenticity discourse. Not only does it link in such existential themes as death, freedom,
isolation and meaninglessness (Yalom, 1980), but it offers a range of alternative positions
from which to speak of authenticity. For example, it negates the culturally dominant discourse
of authenticity as the expression of a pre-existing inner self, offering instead a view of
authenticity as a lived process and an ongoing commitment to self-creation. To some extent it
also challenges the negativity attributed to inauthenticity, suggesting that such a mode of
living may be an inevitable aspect of what it is to be human.
3.5 Counselling psychology training and regulation
Being part of a critical-realist study, this review recognises that institutional power may act as
a material influence upon authenticity discourse (Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig, 2007). This
section therefore aims to explore how the professional socialisation of counselling psychology
trainees may lead them to appropriate particular ways-of-being in relation to authenticity. It
then addresses the increasing professionalisation of counselling psychology as a whole.
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3.5.1 Professional socialisation and ‘authenticity’
Although each counselling psychology training institution may emphasize a different
approach to therapy (be it relational, existential, cognitive-behavioural etc), they are all
embedded within the shared cultural and historical context outlined above, whilst also being
subject to the increasing professionalisation and regulation of the discipline (see below).
Therefore while it is acknowledged that differences in theoretical emphasis will result in a
variety of stances regarding the value of authenticity, it is arguable that all trainees in the UK
are exposed to a generic process of professional socialisation which merits attention.
According to Du Toit (1995: 164) professional socialisation ‘is essentially an
acculturation process during which the values, norms and symbols of the profession are
internalized’, thus transforming the novice into a professional. While some have likened it to
a process of indoctrination during which the student is moulded into a ‘good’ professional
(Sparkes, 2002), others have argued for a greater distinction to be made between compliance
and true conformity (Abrams, 1992). Clouder (2003: 220) suggests that although there is
scope for individuals to exercise personal agency, ‘the importance of regulation and control
within a profession cannot be underestimated’ and newcomers who choose not to subscribe to
the values of their profession are likely to be excluded. Professional socialisation is therefore
relevant to the discussion of authenticity because it suggests that although there is room for
resistance, counselling psychologists are likely to adopt the discourse and values most
consistently upheld by their profession.
Many of those who are accused of abuse or exploitation might be said to have
followed their ‘authentic’ desires (Pope & Tabachnick, 1993) therefore it is arguable that
training courses impose an ‘inauthentic’ framework (i.e. a set of external values) in order to
40
promote ethical client work, a kind of conversion to professionalism. Alternatively it could be
argued that the majority of individuals drawn to undertake counselling psychology training
already share the humanistic values that the profession promotes. Either way, having such
values it is likely that counselling psychologists will strive both to develop ‘authenticity’
within the therapeutic alliance and to increase the capacity for ‘authenticity’ within their
clients.
Counselling psychology training places great emphasis on the student developing a
‘high level of self-awareness’ (BPS, 2011a), with a minimum of forty hours of personal
therapy mandatorily prescribed. Research suggests that this therapy is ‘valued as a vehicle
for... [practitioners] to establish authentic emotional contact with themselves and their clients’
(Rizq & Target, 2008: 29). However whilst it may increase the capacity for self-reflexivity,
such therapy also acts as a vehicle for further socialisation, e.g. with the trainee viewing the
therapist as a professional role-model (Grimmer & Tribe, 2001). The compulsory nature of
the therapy also suggests a confessional culture (Taylor, 2003), whereby self-reflection
functions as a disciplinary practice and a discourse of expressing the ‘real’ legitimizes
professional activity.
Research suggests that training to be a therapist is a stressful experience which leads
to changes in identity and self-knowledge (e.g. Bischoff et al., 2002; Howard et al., 2006). A
modernist understanding of professional socialisation suggests that these changes may involve
the development of an inauthentic self, i.e. the process of professional socialisation dictates a
particular way of ‘being a therapist’ that is gradually internalized. Conversely, a postmodern
or social constructionist view of the self would counter that the professional self is just one of
many equally valid possibilities and thus no less authentic than any other self that the
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individual develops. Whichever ontological position is adopted it would appear that ‘students
very selves are subtly modelled around what the profession demands of its members’
(Clouder, 2003: 220).
It is possible that a trainee’s initial attempts to act as a counselling psychologist may
evoke a sense of being inauthentic with clients. Paradoxically, only once the new identity has
been taken up and they can ‘be in role’ more easily, might trainees feel themselves more
confident and ‘authentic’ again.  At the other end of the professional scale, anecdotal evidence
suggests that experienced therapists will sometimes defy aspects of their chosen modalities or
professional framework in order to ‘be more themselves’ and become more authentic.
However postmodernism leads to the consideration that this too may be a ‘script’, or in
discursive terms simply another subject position. For those who may report feeling
increasingly little or no conflict between their ‘everyday self’ and their ‘professional self’ it
might be argued that socialisation has been successful.
3.5.2 The professionalisation of counselling psychology
Lunt (1999) suggests that psychology in general has become increasingly professionalized
across Europe, citing lengthier requirements for education and training, greater specialization,
pressures for regulation and laws, the development of ethical codes, and increased
institutionalization. Each of these factors might also be applied to British counselling
psychology. Taking education as an example, the requirements for UK counselling
psychologists have steadily increased to the current level of a doctorate and training now
takes on average seven years to complete (BPS, 2011b). Furthermore, in order to gain a place
on a BPS accredited doctoral programme (necessary for later professional registration with
the Health Professions Council), trainees must first obtain a degree in psychology which
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meets the BPS ‘graduate basis for chartered membership’ (or undertake a BPS conversion
course). These restrictions indicate professionalisation in several ways, including high levels
of regulation and institutionalization.
The BPS is recognised as the representative body for counselling (and other specialist)
psychologists within the UK, having been awarded a Royal Charter in 1965 giving it
‘responsibility for the development, promotion and application of pure and applied
psychology for the public good’ (BPS, 2010b). The charter functions as a symbol of state
approval and by using such language as ‘for the public good’ the BPS is positioned as a
benign yet powerful authority. The BPS recognised counselling psychology as a Section in
1982, before making it a Special Group in 1989 and eventually a Division in 1994. The
evolving status of counselling psychology within the BPS is another key indicator of its
increased professionalisation.
Finally, it is of note that 2009 saw the introduction of state regulation for counselling
psychologists via the UK Health Professions Council. The transfer of practitioner registration
and disciplinary power from the BPS to the state is entirely in keeping with the
professionalisation of therapy as outlined by Parker (2002), which suggests that state
regulation further legitimizes the activities of a profession. For the many psychologists who
work in the NHS, state regulation may also shape their practice via the Improving Access to
Psychological Therapies programme, National Institute for Clinical Health guidelines and
Skills for Health competencies. It appears that counselling psychology is subject to high
levels of state observation and control.
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The professionalisation of counselling psychology has a number of implications for
‘authenticity’ in therapy, particularly with regard to the positioning of the therapist as an
‘expert’. For example, post-graduate training and other such symbols of expertise convey that
the psychologist possesses specialized knowledge of the human condition that clients do not,
potentially leading the therapist to impose their own moral vision or a normative discourse on
the client (Downing, 2004). Parker (2002: 342) similarly argues that an individual who has
taken up the identity of therapist by virtue of a lengthy professional training may equate
therapeutic learning with an educational process and thus ‘may turn the therapy itself into
machinery for manufacturing others like themselves’. Such consequences are clearly
antithetical to the notion of inwardly generated authenticity and this raises the question of
how counselling psychologists might negotiate their identity in terms of both expertise and
authenticity.
Whilst the notion of ‘expertise’ opens the way for an abuse of power (Hansen, 2006),
it may also function as a ‘container’ for anxiety by encouraging hope or a belief in the value
of therapeutic assistance. By taking up the role of ‘expert’, the therapist is armed with the
certainty of therapeutic truth-claims and immediately afforded more protection from the
demands and doubts of both the client and themselves. Support for this argument can be
found in the work of Menzies (1960) who made ‘the original proposition that work in health
and social care organizations entails significant anxieties for staff and that defences against
this anxiety are part of organizational life’ (cited in Lawlor, 2009: 524). Furthermore it is
possible that counselling psychologists may experience particularly high levels of such doubts
and anxieties because their theoretical foundation is so ontologically and epistemologically
conflicted. If authenticity is constructed in terms of honesty, transparency, equality and so
forth, with the therapist taking a more vulnerable position, expertise might similarly be
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understood as a defence against the anxieties of authentic meeting. However, such a function
of expertise could well be hidden via the socialisation process outlined above, whereby the
therapist may somewhat paradoxically develop an identity as one who is ‘authentic’, or as an
‘expert’ in authentic relating. Of course this is not to suggest that therapists are fixed within
the subject position of ‘expert’ and never engage ‘authentically’, it merely highlights a
possible conflict. It is also arguable that professionalism and expertise are concepts which
regulate therapist behaviour in accordance with important socially prescribed standards of
ethics (as noted above) and thus prevent ‘authentic’ acts of abuse.
Further implications of professionalisation for authenticity discourse include how the
notions of ‘science’ and ‘evidence-based’ practice (i.e. those favoured by the bodies that
regulate training and fund employment) may influence the ways in which the therapeutic
encounter is conceptualized. For example, medicalized discourse seeks to divide normality
from abnormality by locating the cause of any deviation from socially desired standards deep
within the individual subject (Parker, 2002). Therefore a medicalized discourse may
encourage talk of authenticity in terms of the ‘authentic self’ needing to be discovered.
Perhaps of most concern is the implication that greater professionalisation leads to the
exercise of increased institutional power, meaning that counselling psychologists may not be
encouraged to question critically their professional values because to do so may be to
challenge their potential role as agents of social regulation.
3.6 Counselling Psychology practice and ‘authenticity’
This section begins by exploring some of the different ways in which authenticity is
constructed within psychotherapy, making particular reference to person-centred,
psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioural schools of thought. Consideration is then given to
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the therapeutic relationship and related research. This is followed by a brief discussion
regarding the ethics of ‘authenticity’ within counselling psychology practice.
3.6.1. Psychotherapeutic theory
The concept of authenticity is considered essential to understanding the human condition
within a wide range of psychological traditions, these include the humanistic (e.g. Rogers,
1961), the existential (e.g. May, 1981; Yalom, 1980), the psychodynamic (e.g. Horney, 1951;
Kohut, 1971; Winnicott, 1965), the developmental (e.g. Harter et al., 1996) and the social
psychological (e.g. Kernis & Goldman, 2005; Lopez & Rice, 2006). As will be demonstrated,
it appears that authenticity is largely conceived of as desirable and ‘good’, although the ease
with which it is thought possible to attain varies.
Authenticity is arguably most visible as a value within person-centred counselling
(Rogers, 1951/1961) for the humanist vision upon which the model is founded places great
importance on ‘acting naturally and being authentic... the pursuit of a unique lifestyle and the
continuous search for self-realization’ (Messer, 2003: 142). From this perspective, human
nature is essentially good and ‘authenticity is a direct experience of the real self’ (Rowan,
2001: 44). As such, Tudor & Worrall (2006: 156) propose that for person-centred counsellors
‘authenticity is synonymous with congruence’, an observation that Rowan (2001) supports.
Congruence is characterised by genuineness and honesty, whereby the individual is
aware of his/her inner experiencing (without denial or distortion) and outward communication
consistently matches it (Merry, 2004; Tudor & Worrall, 2006). Being the expression of the
real self, congruence is considered a key aspect of healthy psychological functioning. Rogers
(1957) attributed great importance to it, identifying therapist congruence as one of six
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conditions ‘necessary and sufficient’ for therapeutic change to occur. He also proposed that
clients should be assisted to identify their ‘conditions of worth’ and reconnect with their
‘organismic valuing process’, so as to live more authentically.
Accepting a client’s choice to be inauthentic could be very challenging for a person-
centred therapist seeking to uncover the ‘authentic being’ of their client (Worsley, 2002). This
illustrates how congruence is an aspect of authenticity discourse which is distinct to that of
existential philosophy. Indeed Van Deurzen & Kenward (2005: 40) propose that although
both terms relate to truth, ‘congruence is concerned with psychological honesty... authenticity
is about acceptance of the degree of one’s responsibility and power as well as of one’s
inevitable existential limitations’. Golomb (1995: 10) goes further in his distinction, stating
that authenticity and sincerity (which he equates with congruence) are ‘fundamentally
opposed and should not be regarded as equivalent or synonymous’. For Golomb, to speak of
congruence between an individual’s inner convictions and their outer behaviour is to presume
a ‘static subject, while authenticity requires an incessant movement of becoming, self-
transcendence and self-creation’ (p.9).
As Golomb’s argument may indicate, the individualism prized in humanism (and
hence person-centred therapy) has significant implications for the concept of authenticity
because of its modernist conception of ‘an isolationist divide between self and other’ (Spinelli
2005: 184). However, perhaps reflecting the influence of the postmodern, the most recent
edition of Mearns and Thorne’s (2007) introductory textbook for person-centred counselling
concedes that ‘Rogers’ theory in this area is consistent with the unitary emphasis of his time’,
leading them to propose an alternative person-centred conceptualisation of the self as a range
of ‘authentic configurations’ (p.36).
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Psychoanalytic and psychodynamic therapies also contribute significantly to
authenticity discourse, not least because psychoanalytic notions of self and psychotherapeutic
self-work function as dominant forms of knowledge in Western culture (Parker, 1998). As
with humanism, psychoanalytic theory posits an internal authenticity (i.e. the unconscious);
however, this is less accessible and more dynamic than the inner self of person-centred
counselling. Indeed psychoanalytic therapy envisions obstacles to authenticity which make
any form of liberation / actualization far more difficult to achieve (Messer, 2003). Therefore
whilst a person-centred therapist is likely to accept most client feelings as authentic
expression, a psychoanalytic therapist is more likely to look for hidden meaning,
contradiction or paradox, and acting ‘naturally’ may even be viewed as narcissism.
Authenticity itself is not a commonly used technical term in psychoanalytic theory;
however, Thompson (2005: 144) argues that:
‘analytic patients and practitioners alike nevertheless allude to authenticity in
the way they oftentimes characterize the goals of treatment and the demands
that are made on both participants in the analyst-patient relationship’.
For example, it has been argued that Freud (e.g. 1997; 2002) conceived psychoanalysis as
enabling the analysand to ‘tolerate being resigned with respect to the inevitability of who she
was and had to be given her earlier life experiences’ (Groth, 2008: 82 - italics in original). In
other words, the aim was for the client to develop sufficient inner strength to be honest with
herself and live more authentically (with less need for neurotic defences), thus being able to
cope better with the difficulties of everyday life.
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A classical psychoanalytic view might also suggest that authenticity corresponds with
expression of the ‘id’, whereas inauthenticity may result when action is based on what one
‘ought’ or ‘should’ do, in accordance with the promptings of the ‘superego’ (Lemma, 2003).
The superego is understood to be inauthentic because it exists as an introjected morality, and
whilst at times it may be necessary or beneficial to choose an inauthentic course of action,
‘the analyst is concerned with those choices we make that are neurotic because the choices are
predominantly unconscious’ (Thompson, 2005: 154).
In terms of authenticity and the demands of psychoanalysis, the client may be
expected to free-associate; speaking without censorship so as to give the analyst access to
their (authentic) unconscious. For the therapist, the classical analytic stance is one of relative
detachment, the aim being to provide a ‘blank screen’ upon which the analysand might
project.  This ‘withholding’ approach has been subject to much criticism (e.g. Kohut, 1977;
Hoffman, 1983), and in writing of her experience as a client, Anna Sands (2000) describes
such therapy as inauthentic and highly damaging. However, the relational psychodynamic
models that counselling psychologists are more likely to adopt emphasise instead the
intersubjective nature of the therapeutic encounter, whereby each person is understood to
unavoidably influence the other. This perspective highlights the therapist’s
countertransference awareness (Gabbard, 2001) and has led Bader (1995) to argue that the
therapist’s authentic engagement is an essential component of therapy.
In line with post-modern thinking, psychoanalysis has experienced a move away from
the one-person ‘drive-defence-conflict’ model, towards the various two-person
‘developmental-deficit’ models that counselling psychology has been able to embrace (Rizq,
2008). There has been a shift in focus from repression to the relational construction of the
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authentic self (Bader, 1995). This change also appears to reflect the growing individualism
outlined in the socio-historical account given above. Of the theorists who have focused on the
development of the ‘true-self’, space restrictions dictate that only Winnicott (1965) will be
addressed in further detail here; however, the writings of Kohut (1971), Stern (1985) and
Fonagy et al. (2002) are all highly relevant.
Winnicott’s (1965/1971) relational theory centres ‘on ego defensive manoeuvres that
arise in response to environmental demands’ (Mills, 2003: 123). He proposed that an infant
needs its mother to recognise and reflect back what it initiates, allowing a world of shared
reality to be constructed. In doing so, the infant also requires the mother to survive its
destructiveness and provide a sufficient experience of omnipotence in order to build its ego. If
the mother fails to provide ‘good enough mothering’ (i.e. fails to adapt sufficiently to the
infant’s needs or responds in a retaliatory or rejecting way), then the infant has no choice but
to comply with her demands. This enforced attentiveness to the needs of the mother creates a
‘false self’ organisation. The ‘false self’ for Winnicott is ‘a self that lives in the mind, in an
intellectual register cut off from the living body of psychosomatic processes’ (Campbell,
2006: 4), whereas the ‘true self’ cannot be defined because it represents that which is original
or idiosyncratic about a person, is primary rather than reactive and is bound up in bodily
aliveness, leading to the feeling of being real (Winnicott, 1987). The ‘true-self’ is not a fixed
or single self, however it is characterised by a creative originality which implies an innate
authenticity (Phillips, 2007). Winnicott’s ideas may hold particular appeal to counselling
psychologists because of the relational emphasis and correspondence with a humanistic
approach to therapy (e.g. in terms of providing empathy, warmth, reflective
listening/mirroring etc).
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From a social constructionist point of view, the idea of an innate authenticity remains
problematic and much psychoanalytic theory appears to be incompatible with a discursive
perspective. However, Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, (2008: 94) observe that possibilities for
‘combining discourse with psychoanalysis were found in Lacan (1966) whose work
presupposes a decentred and divided subject’. According to Lacan, the ego is always an
inauthentic agency, functioning to conceal a disturbing lack of unity, and notions of
authenticity merely reflect the individual’s positioning within discourse.
Cognitive-behavioural therapies (CBT) tend to epitomize a modernist epistemology
within which problems are operationally defined and practical solutions sought. These
approaches are generally interested in the direct alleviation of distress and a rapidly achieved
positive outcome, rather than reflective self-exploration (Messer, 2003). Therefore it is
perhaps unsurprising that CBT has less to say about authenticity than the modalities outlined
above. It is possible that a CBT therapist may seek to ensure the development of rapport and
trust via means other than ‘authentic’ relating. It may also be that authenticity discourse is
particularly limited within CBT because any directive therapy interested in authenticity comes
up against the paradoxical problem of providing a prescription for a mode of living that by
definition rejects external dictates. In other words, if authenticity concerns a person’s relation
to the world, then it cannot be externally imposed or taken up by repeating a set of actions.
To the extent that a discourse of authenticity enables self-creation and the exploration
of values or relationships, it might be said that CBT misses out. However, cognitive-
behavioural therapists have increasingly acknowledged the importance of the therapeutic
relationship (Waddington, 2002). Furthermore, it might actually be argued that the
collaborative approach of CBT encourages a certain level of equality that permits the therapist
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greater freedom to self-disclose, perhaps enabling them to relate more ‘authentically’ than
those constricted by such notions as non-directivity (Smith, 2010).
3.6.2. The therapeutic relationship
As already noted, research indicates that regardless which therapeutic modality is employed,
it is the quality and strength of the client-therapist relationship that most consistently predicts
good outcomes (Cooper, 2004; Roth & Fonagy, 2005). Authenticity has been linked to this in
several ways. For example, Hammond et al. (2002) conceptualize authenticity as a clinical
skill which enhances therapeutic communication. They researched therapists’ use of
authenticity, empathy, respect, relating in the here-and-now, and confrontation; concluding
that authenticity was an advanced counselling skill, with the constructive sharing of feelings
in a ‘natural’ manner being an important aspect of a successful therapeutic relationship. Tudor
& Worrall (1994) similarly suggest that authenticity is a skill that develops over time as a
function of clinical experience and enhanced self-awareness.
Orange (2002) links authenticity with empathy, distinguishing between them yet
arguing that both are necessary for optimal therapy. Morstyn (2002) views authenticity as
equivalent to congruence, which he describes in terms of the therapist’s sincerity. Based on
interviews with clinicians, he proposes that manualized psychotherapy encourages therapist
inauthenticity with clients and argues that a greater focus on the relationship is essential.
Following an extensive review of research on successful therapy, Cooper (2008) has also
suggested that congruence, or the genuineness of the therapist, may be a key relational factor.
Similarly, Keijsers et al. (2000) name congruence as one of several variables essential to
developing and strengthening the therapeutic alliance.
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It would appear that the links between authenticity in terms of congruence and the
therapeutic relationship are strong; however, in a review of seventy seven studies Klein et al.
(2002) found that only a third indicated congruence and outcome were positively linked.
Similar results (thirty eight percent) were found in a review undertaken by Orlinsky et al.
(2004). Research by Grafanaki & McLeod (2002) may be helpful in understanding these
conflicted results; they conducted a narrative analysis of client and counsellor accounts of
congruence and incongruence within six separate cases of person-centred therapy, and found
that congruence was experienced as simultaneously relational and intrapsychic. They
concluded that ‘participants experienced congruence in a variety of ways, suggesting that the
construct does not describe a unitary phenomenon’ (p.20). It is clear that as with authenticity,
the term congruence holds a variety of meanings, the complexity of which is increased if post-
modern notions of ontology are considered.
Clarkson (2003) named five different types of therapeutic relationship: the working
alliance, transferential-countertransferential, reparative-developmentally-needed, person-to-
person and transpersonal. However, she described the person-to-person relationship as ‘the
dialogic relationship or core-relationship... [concerning] the authentic humanness shared by
client and therapist... the ‘real’ dimension of the therapeutic relationship’ (p.15). This notion
links to the earlier seminal work of Martin Buber (1878-1965), who wrote extensively about
the therapeutic relationship, arguing that growth or transformation could only be achieved by
the therapist entering as ‘a partner into a person-to-person relationship... never through the
observation and investigation of an object’ (1970: 179). He conceptualised these different
modes of relating as engaging in either an I-Thou (authentic) relationship or an I-It
(inauthentic) relationship. The suggestion here is that authentic relating involves mutual
participation in the process of therapy and allows for ‘real’ meeting, whereby at least some of
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what occurs is not an enactment of the past (i.e. transference) but is something created in the
present.  This moves authenticity discourse away from the notion of an inner self (as with
congruence) and towards a more intersubjective understanding.
Stern et al. (1998) also suggest that ‘real’ meeting is possible, indeed they propose that
it has a profound effect; however, they argue that it cannot be maintained for very long. They
suggest that ‘moments’ of real meeting occur when the therapist and client meet in a way that
‘creates a new implicit, intersubjective understanding of their relationship and permits a new
‘way-of-being-with-the-other’ (p.300). They suggest that the emergent moment in some way
challenges or threatens the stability of the ongoing initial state and in doing so offers a new
intersubjective context. If accepted by both parties, then the ‘moment of meeting’ acts as a
key element in bringing about change in implicit knowledge (procedural knowledge that is out
of awareness, such as how to act, feel or think in a particular relational context). They contrast
this with the effect of interpretation, suggesting that this brings about complementary changes
in explicit knowledge.
As an intersubjective perspective suggests that authenticity is something co-created
and relationally experienced, then perhaps it may also be located within the notion of
‘therapeutic play’.  For example, Winnicott (1971) spoke of psychoanalysis being analogous
to play, viewing the opposite as coercion or the imposition of something that was inauthentic
to the client. As Phillips (2007:142) explains:
‘it is in the overlap, the transitional space between analyst and patient, that
communication takes place. Playing stops when one of the participants becomes
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dogmatic, when the analyst imposes a pattern that is not a piece with the
patient’s material.’
Returning to Clarkson’s (2003) definition of the therapeutic relationship, the
transpersonal may also be of relevance to the concept of authenticity. She defines it as ‘the
timeless facet of the psychotherapeutic relationship, which is impossible to describe, but
refers to the spiritual, mysterious or currently inexplicable dimension of the healing
relationships’ (2003: 20). She points out that a large number of Eurocentric approaches to
psychological healing exclude the ‘transpersonal’ and ‘the religious’ dimension of people’s
lives, but that this does not reflect the beliefs of many communities elsewhere. Whilst the
work of Jung (1940) provides a significant exception, it would appear that Western
psychotherapies (and psychology in particular) have embraced a positivistic, empiricist
approach which dismisses the value of anything that cannot be scientifically tested or
rationally explained. In recognition of this, it is worth noting that ‘authenticity’ may signify
something transpersonal about which it is not really possible to speak (i.e. that exists outside
of discourse). However, it is equally possible to view this idea as a ‘spiritual discourse’ in
itself.
3.6.3. Ethics:
The above discussion suggests that authenticity is perceived within psychotherapy as
something ‘good’ and desirable to achieve. However, it will be argued here that the
relationship between authenticity and morality is ambiguous, with the potential for
authenticity to be both ‘good’ and ‘bad’. It may therefore be advisable for therapists to
develop an awareness of the potential for authenticity to function as a normative discourse.
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From a postmodern perspective, all values are socially constructed and thus culturally
influenced. For example Loewenthal (1996) notes that Western standards were once set
byChristianity, but have since been shaped by the scientific method and are now framed by
individualism. In terms of psychotherapy this means that theories reflect the context of a
society that prioritises individualism above group belonging. Similarly therefore for
authenticity the standard has become centred on the person and humanistic values have been
elevated. Such observations lead Russell (1999: 351) to caution that:
‘counselling propagates specific and individualist notions of selfhood, with full
attention given to internal processes, yet little to an external context. This
propagation is rarely made explicit, and may be based on false premises within
which authenticity and self-determination are idealised and the doctrine of
emotivism revered’.
It is notable that counselling psychologists work largely with individuals and with an intra-
psychic focus (Blair, 2009). Therefore Russell’s caution prompts the question of whether
‘authenticity’ functions as an ideological mask within counselling, being only ‘jargon’ that
can never be actualized (Adorno, 1964).
Taylor (1991) enthusiastically defends authenticity as an ideal, arguing that it is a
viable ethical norm with the potential to counter the ‘malaises of modernity’ (p.10), e.g. the
feared loss of meaning resulting from the fading of moral horizons. He suggests that
authenticity is currently used to justify a narcissistic or ego-centric individualism which
centres self-fulfilment on the individual, and argues that these self-centred modes of
authenticity are a distortion of the original ethic, which needs to be ‘reclaimed’. He further
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argues that the current interpretation of authenticity fails to acknowledge properly the dialogic
nature of self-construction and the ‘horizons of significance’ against which choices are made
meaningful. Taylor takes an anti-relativist stance but offers a thought provoking view of the
potential for authenticity to operate as a guiding ethic when based upon an intersubjective
understanding of the self.
The idea that authenticity requires the individual to put others first is one that finds
support in the work of Levinas (1989), who argued that subjectivity is formed in and through
subjection to the Other. According to Levinas, if people are ‘subject to’ putting the Other first
then it demands an ethical response. This involves recognizing that the Other is fundamentally
unknowable and therefore welcoming him/her without judgement.  Such ideas suggest that
aspects of authenticity discourse may function to encourage ethical behaviour, and it is
apparent from the above exploration of authenticity within the therapeutic relationship that it
is closely associated with such constructs as honesty, sincerity and warmth. However, there
are a number of possible difficulties with authenticity that are not as commonly
acknowledged.
Trilling (1971: 11) proposes that the concept of authenticity is widely used to justify
unethical behaviour. He states: ‘much that culture traditionally condemned and sought to
exclude is accorded considerable moral authority by reason of the authenticity claimed for it,
for example, disorder, violence, unreason’. This suggests that it is necessary for public ethics
or morality to place a limit on authenticity so that people can co-exist in a way that is
acceptable to them. Harter (2005) notes how easy it still is to move beyond the boundaries of
acceptable authenticity with others. She cites Lerner (1993: 15) as arguing that although truth-
telling may act as a foundation for authenticity, it is possible that ‘in the name of truth, we
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may hurt friends and family members, escalate anxiety non-productively, disregard the
different reality of the other person, and generally move the situation from bad to worse’.
Devereux & Coe (2010) argue that the therapeutic space is valuable precisely because
it offers a unique space in which the client may be free from the common experience of being
subjected to other people’s authentic feelings, expressed needs and self-interests. They further
argue that ‘allowing the ‘authentic’ self into the therapeutic space all too often means
appropriating or intruding into that space’ (p.35). Their views are unusual in that they are not
well represented in the psychotherapeutic literature; however, when consideration is given to
scenarios such as a therapist wishing to act on their feelings of sexual attraction towards a
client, then their point is clear. Furthermore, such ‘authentic’ behaviour may occur more often
than thought, as demonstrated by Pope & Tabachnick’s (1993) national survey of American
psychologists’ experiences of anger, hate, fear and sexual feelings for clients in therapy.
Amongst their many interesting results they found that twenty seven individuals (out of two
hundred and eighty five respondents) admitted to sexual involvement with clients.
Cohn (1993) proposes that authenticity is a goal that cannot be achieved because
inauthenticity is an integral part of life, i.e. in the sense that everyone is moulded by external
factors such as other people, circumstances, moral codes etc. His argument draws on the
existential philosophy discussed above, e.g. the work of Heidegger (1962) and Sartre (1943).
Waskul (2009) suggests that inauthenticity is not only inevitable but also a desirable feature
of everyday social life, arguing that people would otherwise find themselves incapacitated by
the ongoing need to define what is morally honest as opposed to socially right. However
despite such reasoning, it seems likely that inauthenticity is not something many people may
feel comfortable admitting to, certainly not without fear of being labelled as somehow
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immoral (e.g. dishonest/insincere) or even unwell (e.g. having a ‘false’ or ‘split’ self). From a
discursive point of view, this indicates that authenticity acts as a ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault,
1980: 132), whereby assumptions regarding the ‘goodness’ of authenticity constitute a
normative discourse, which not only encourages self-regulation but also serves to empower
those appointed by society to guide the ‘immoral’ or heal the ‘sick’.
A number of socio-political critiques of the values held by Western psychologists have
also highlighted the potential for unintentionally oppressive and Eurocentric practice (e.g.
Jenkins, 2001; Sinclair, 2007). This suggests that the needs of many clients within a pluralistic
society will not be met if humanistic values arising from a culture of individualism are
imposed. However the polemic of authenticity-inauthenticity may be powerfully reinforced by
the ‘realist, absolutist inclinations of the human knower’, whereby people exhibit a strong
‘tendency to assert the primacy – or truth – of either affirmation or critique’ (Downing, 2004:
138). In other words, it is difficult to hold on to the ambiguity of a value such as authenticity,
perhaps even more so as it is tied to notions of subjectivity and one’s own experience of
selfhood. However, it is arguably important to commit to an ongoing engagement with the
ethics and values that inform psychotherapeutic work, for in the words of Christopher (1996:
24):
‘Ultimately counselling is part of a cultural discussion about ethos and world
view, about the good life and the good person... the only real choice becomes
how honest we are with ourselves about our inescapable moral visions.’
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3.7 Summary
This review has sought to contextualise the research interest by demonstrating how
constructions of authenticity are more varied and contradictory than may be commonly
believed. Counselling psychology is based on conflicted notions of ontology and
epistemology, adding to the potential for confusion with regard to this value; however, a
socio-historical account of authenticity suggests there is a powerful discursive pull towards
individualistic and modernist interpretations. It appears that authenticity may be reified and
assumed good. As has been argued, if such a bias exists then it may be reinforced via the
mechanisms of professional socialisation and the increasing professionalisation of counselling
psychology as a whole. Attention has also been given to the place of authenticity within
psychotherapeutic theory and practice. Whilst it is not possible to examine all the ways in
with authenticity is conceptualized within counselling psychology, it is hoped that this
discussion supports the researcher’s view that authenticity discourse is worthy of exploration
and may have important ethical implications.
There is a distinct lack of research regarding authenticity within counselling
psychology and it is hoped that this review brings together a diverse array of authenticity
constructs in a manner that conveys their richness clearly. It is argued that practitioners have a
duty to examine the cultural, historical and discursive foundations of their practice,
particularly in terms of values that may be used to shape subjectivity.  This review is offered
in support of the research purpose, which is to explore how counselling psychologists
construct authenticity, to identify how such constructions may be used and to consider the
possibility of extra-discursive influences. By exploring the ways-of-being that authenticity
discourse makes available to therapists and their clients, it is hoped that the research will
contribute reflexive knowledge to the discipline and support ethical practice.
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3.8 Reflexive box 2
Writing the literature review:
The construction of this chapter was challenging in several respects, not least because the
notion of ‘authenticity’ raises many philosophical questions, which my previous training
and experience of quantitative research had not fully prepared me to engage with. Prior to
any attempt at writing, I therefore felt it necessary to undertake what might be described as
a process of philosophical education. Through reading and debate I discovered that I very
much enjoyed this thought-provoking area of study, however whilst I happily realised a
new area of interest, I became aware of how limited my understanding was in comparison
to the vastness of the literature that might be connected to ‘authenticity’.
My early attempts at writing this chapter were overly descriptive and ‘factual’;
reflecting both my desire to understand how authenticity might be located within the
literature and my consequent need to contain all the new information and ideas that I was
encountering (e.g. from existentialism, post-structuralism, postmodernism etc). My initial
attempts to adopt a discursive view of the psychological literature felt somewhat unnatural
and it took time to adjust to such a way of thinking. This difficulty might be conceptualised
as reflective of my socialisation into the counselling psychology profession or the field of
psychology in general. However, I hope that being thus socialised has not prevented me
from asking questions, exploring assumptions and achieving a more critical account of how
authenticity is represented in the literature.
The primary aim of the above literature review has been to provide a context for the
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research; however, the reader is reminded that it represents only my construction and
another researcher may well have focused on different things. This inherent subjectivity is
somewhat disguised by the use of a traditional third person academic writing style, as
absenting the author in this way implies that objectivity or impartiality is possible. I
acknowledge that my account is inevitably partial and simplistic; however, it could be said
that this acknowledgment functions as a rhetorical move to inoculate myself against any
criticism regarding my chosen material (Finlay, 2002a). Furthermore, whilst the academic
tone in the main body of the text might suggest scholarship or critical ability, the personal





In this study a discourse analytic approach known as ‘critical discursive psychology’ was used
to explore counselling psychologists’ talk of authenticity. Critical discursive psychology
addresses language use on several levels, allowing the researcher to consider how participants
construct and negotiate meanings (discursive practice), as well as how wider social and
institutional frameworks may shape these constructions and their availability (provide
discursive resources). It also enables the researcher to adopt a critical realist stance, through
which analysis can be extended to include the possibility of ‘extra-discursive’ factors such as
embodiment, materiality and institutional power (Nightingale & Cromby, 1999).
This chapter accords with Silverman’s (1993:1) distinction between ‘methodology’
and ‘method’, whereby the former identifies ‘a general approach to studying research topics’
and the latter refers to specific research design. Therefore the aim of this chapter is to clarify
the ontological, epistemological and axiological basis of the research and present the rationale
for utilizing a critical discursive approach. In so doing, it will also address the issue of
reflexivity and the question of whether it is possible to authentically study authenticity.
4.2 Qualitative research
Morrow (2007) suggests that the decision to use either a quantitative or qualitative method
should be guided by the nature of the research question. For example, if the researcher wishes
to establish occurrence rates, volumes or the size of associations between variables, then a
quantitative approach may be necessary, whereas if the researcher wishes to obtain rich,
descriptive accounts of the phenomenon in question, or to explore the meanings that people
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make of their experiences, then a qualitative approach is more likely to be useful (Smith,
2008). The exploratory aims of this study indicated that a qualitative research orientation
might be appropriate.
The term ‘qualitative’ encompasses a wide range of methods and a variety of
fundamentally distinct epistemologies; however, qualitative methodologies tend to share a
general interest in language and meaning. They are ‘concerned with the quality and texture of
experience, rather than the identification of cause-effect relationships’ (Willig, 2008: 8).
Instead of attempting a reductionist isolation of specific variables for measurement,
qualitative researchers usually undertake a detailed exploration of the interwoven aspects of
their topic, making analysis holistic and contextual (Yardley, 2000). Qualitative research is
therefore likely to be focused on the individuals participating in the study, rather than
concerned with discovering factors that might be generalised to large numbers of people. The
notion of the researcher taking a 'neutral' or transcendental position is understood to be
problematic, therefore reflexivity is also likely to be important and the potential for mutual
influence is acknowledged and addressed (albeit to varying degrees).
Ponterotto (2005) suggests that qualitative methodologies are particularly suitable for
counselling psychology research because they offer paradigms and methods that are more
closely related to clinical practice than traditional science. Several writers support this
argument and have noted parallels between the activity of qualitative research and therapy
(e.g. McLeod, 2001; Morrow, 2007; Yardley, 2000). However, qualitative research is not
without its detractors and some who hold a positivist view have criticised it as ‘merely
subjective assertion supported by unscientific method’ (Ballinger, 2006: 235). Finlay (2006)
argues that qualitative research is often inappropriately evaluated in terms of ‘reliability’,
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‘validity’ and ‘generalisability’ (see method chapter for further discussion). However,
Alvesson & Sköldberg (2009) write that the polarization of qualitative and quantitative
research is no longer as prevalent as it used to be. Hayes (1997) criticises the categorical
distinctions made between quantitative and qualitative research, pointing out that quantitative
research always involves some level of interpretation by the researcher and that analysis in
qualitative research has quantitative attributes, for example when either implicit or explicit
judgements are made about the strength or frequency of an identified category.
In order to decide upon a particular methodological approach, it is important to
consider the paradigmatic basis of the research, i.e. the epistemological and ontological
position that the researcher wishes to assume. As Morrow (2007) notes, the underpinning
paradigmatic stance of the researcher will shape the research question in the first place and
will determine the standards by which the research might be evaluated. For example, a
researcher who adopts a ‘scientific’ approach to knowledge acquisition is likely to shape their
research questions in the form of hypotheses, to design experiments which isolate the
variables of interest, and then evaluate the resulting data using statistical analysis. This
reduction of phenomenon to numerical values appeals to positivist notions of objectivity and
such research reflects the assumptions of empiricism and hypothetico-deductivism that the
field of psychology has traditionally been associated with (Coyle, 2007a).
Qualitative epistemologies may be differentiated by the extent to which they hold that
words accurately describe an experience and reflect ‘what is there’, or play a part in the
construction of the meaning ascribed to it. The importance placed on the role of language will
affect to what extent reflexivity is held to be a key part of the research and the degree to
which researchers will attempt to ‘manage’ their ‘subjectivity’ (Willig, 2008). This research
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recognises the ‘ambiguous, unstable and context-dependent character of language, the
dependence of both observations and data on interpretation and theory... and the political-
ideological character of the social sciences’ (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009: 1). In other words,
‘facts’ are understood to be theory laden and the result of interpretation. As Yardley (2000:
217) explains:
‘One of the primary reasons for adopting qualitative methodologies is a
recognition that our knowledge and experience of the world cannot consist of an
objective appraisal of some external reality, but is profoundly shaped by our
subjective and cultural perspective, and by our conversations and activities... thus
‘truth’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘reality’ are actively created by the communal
construction and negotiation of meaning’.
4.3 A critical-ideological paradigm
Qualitative researchers acknowledge that true objectivity is not possible (Morrow, 2007),
however there is great debate regarding the extent to which it might be approached. As the
previous quote illustrates, this has implications for what a researcher may claim they are able
to say about ‘reality’. Different paradigms assume different positions on what can be
understood as a continuum ranging from naive realism (which is akin to positivism), to
extreme relativism (which rejects notions such as ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ altogether), with
critical realists taking a variety of positions in between (Willig, 2008). This research might be
said to fall within a ‘critical-ideological paradigm’ (Guba & Lincoln, 1994) because although
it draws strongly upon social constructionism, it has a critical realist epistemology. In other
words, this research takes the position that language constructs social realities, but that the
limitations and possibilities of the material world will interact with and constrain these
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constructions (Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig, 2007). A critical-ideological paradigm allows
dominant social structures or meaning systems to be challenged (Haverkamp & Young, 2007)
and by taking a critical realist view it became possible for this research to consider not only
the use and implications of ‘authenticity’ discourse, but also whether such discourse is
constrained or shaped by ‘extra-discursive’ factors, (such as the material aspects of
embodiment or the effects of institutional power).
Critical realism originated in the work of Bhaskar (1975). As with social
constructionism, it proposes that language is central to the way that people perceive the world,
being constitutive of social ‘reality’ (Burr, 2003). However, it also posits that there is a
material dimension interwoven with social reality and that material practices accommodate,
(although do not determine), the discourses that arise within these material conditions. Critical
realism therefore ‘combines constructionist and realist positions to argue that while meaning
is made in interaction, non-discursive elements also impact on that meaning’ (Sims-Schouten,
Riley & Willig, 2007: 102). Non-discursive elements are understood to be underlying,
relatively enduring structures that may be biochemical, economic or social (Willig, 1999a).
However:
‘the approach is different to positivism, which seeks to establish predictable
patterns and the exact relation between cause and effect. To critical realists
relations are complex and causality can exist on different levels. They generate
tendencies rather than inevitable, specific and measurable conditions’ (Alvesson
& Sköldberg, 2009: 42).
67
As this quote suggests, the relationship between the material and social phenomena is
conceptualized as neither direct nor causal, but instead as a dynamic and dialectical
interaction that holds ‘many more potentialities than could ever be realized at any one time’
(Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig, 2007: 105).
Discourse analysis is a broad term which represents a variety of approaches, used
across a range of epistemologies (Taylor, 2001). For the purposes of this research, a ‘critical
discursive’ framework was chosen. Critical discursive psychology conceptualises people as
both the producers and products of discourse (Edley, 2001b) and is considered appropriate for
a critical-realist epistemology (Cromby & Nightingale, 1999; Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig,
2007).
Parker (1997: 296) has argued for the adoption of a critical realist position in
discursive studies, stating that it ‘runs alongside the social constructionist attacks on the
discipline while preventing a wholesale collapse into discourse idealism’, and furthermore
that ‘only by understanding how the discipline of psychology reproduces notions of
individuality and human nature –a realist endeavour – will it be possible to transform it’.
Others such as Burr (1999) & Willig (2000), support this view, arguing that critical realism
enables researchers to more fully theorize why people use certain constructions and not
others, and that it prevents the marginalization of experiences that may be out of the realm of
language (such as the embodiment of dance). Willig (1999a) also notes that although social
constructionist discursive studies have identified ways in which discursive practices may
impact on material practices, the reverse possibility has been effectively ignored.
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For the purposes of this research, it is argued that additional insight may be gained via
a critical realist lens; however, it is also acknowledged that any attempt to identify ‘the
material’ can only ever be just an attempt. As Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig (2007: 105)
point out, the relationships between the material and the social are dynamic, non-linear and
can ‘only be known through the phenomena that they generate’. This has led some to argue
that critical realism has no systematic method for distinguishing between the discursive and
non-discursive, and that any such decision will simply reflect the researcher’s political
standpoint (e.g. Potter, Edwards & Ashmore, 1999). In a classic paper, entitled ‘Death and
Furniture’, Edwards et al. (1995) further argue that the extra-discursive can always be
analysed from a relativist point of view; that even death is constructed (e.g. as a passage to the
afterlife, a stage in spiritual development, as natural, unnatural etc) and the act of hitting a
table in order to prove that reality exists is still a representation that draws on the discourse of
common sense. Such arguments lead Speer (2007) to conclude that critical realism involves
the combination of two essentially incompatible epistemologies, with the resultant danger that
analysis may veer inconsistently between the two. However proponents of critical realism,
such as Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig (2007), have countered that a systematic approach is
possible and whilst they accept that knowledge of reality will always be limited, they argue
for the utility of a reflexive critical realist methodology.
One of the alternative frameworks considered for this research was that of
phenomenology and the use of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). Such research
might have explored what authenticity means to counselling psychologists and how this
relates to their lived experience. However, whilst IPA presented an interesting possibility, a
more critical view of language use was felt to be appropriate, i.e. instead of addressing
‘authenticity’ as an explanatory resource (e.g. authenticity means...) a discursive approach
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allowed it to be treated as a topic in itself (e.g. what interests are served by the concept of
‘authenticity’ in this context?). This was considered to be particularly relevant for a term that
may form part of the ‘identity work’ of counselling psychologists and may be used to guide or
justify action within the therapeutic encounter.  The aims of this research were therefore to
consider what constructions of ‘authenticity’ may be linguistically available (and what
material factors may constrain them), what functions these constructions may serve (the social
interaction work they perform) and what the implications might be for subjectivity and ethical
practice.
4.4 The ‘turn to language’ in psychology
The starting point of all discourse analytical research is the claim of structuralist and
poststructuralist linguistic philosophy, that access to reality is always through language
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) and that language ‘is productive rather than (merely) reflective’
(Edley, 2001a: 435). These ideas emerged in a number of disciplines from the 1950’s onwards
and are widely understood to have prompted a major reconsideration of Western philosophy
(Edley, 2001a). This ‘turn to language’ was taken up by psychology in the 1970’s, when
social psychologists began to challenge the cognitivism inherent to the field at that time (e.g.
Gergen 1973), but it was not until the 1980s and 90’s, in a period sometimes referred to as the
‘turn to discourse’ (Parker, 2004), that the above ideas gained a serious foothold (Willig,
2008). As the development of these ideas inform this research, a number of key aspects will
be outlined below.
Edley (2001a: 434) notes a long history of philosophical debate between those who
have argued that knowledge is somehow grounded in reality (e.g. Locke and Hume) and those
who have understood it to be (at least in part) a product of human mental functioning (e.g.
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Kant and Nietzsche). However, the ‘correspondence theory of language’ (Gergen, 1999) was
a commonly held modernist epistemology which assumed that the order and structure of
language mirrored the world it described (Hansen, 2006). The challenge to this assumption
emerged from a number of disciplines, including (amongst others) the philosophy of language
(e.g. Austin, 1962; Wittgenstein, 1953), ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967), anthropology
(Geertz, 1973) and linguistics (Derrida, 1973; Saussure, 1974). Together, such theorists
prompted a radical questioning of whether language mapped onto reality in a straightforward
manner, resulting in what has been called the ‘crisis of representation’. Methodologically this
meant it was no longer possible to capture directly lived experience because data is always
interpreted via the researcher’s world view and social positioning (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).
The ‘turn to language’ is therefore said to have undermined a previous confidence in the twin
notions of Truth and Reality (Burr, 1995; Gergen, 1991).
All discursive methodologies share the premise that language is a dynamic form of
social practice, used to construct social reality and achieve social objectives. Therefore, rather
than providing a set of unambiguous signs which can directly describe internal states or
external reality, language is understood to be productive (Willig, 2008). Such notions draw
strongly upon the later philosophical work of Wittgenstein (1953), who argued that
psychological states should be understood as social activities, rather than manifestations of
deeper ‘essences’ (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Wittgenstein noted that language is used to
inform, affirm, deny, speculate etc and he named such practices ‘language games’. These
language games are embedded in ‘ways of life’ and individuals learn the relevant rules via
their training as members of a community (Grayling, 1996). From this perspective, the
meaning of a word such as ‘authenticity’ is its use within the many and various language-
games which constitute language. In other words, there is no single correct meaning which
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might be defined, because there is no essence lying hidden in discourse, language itself being
a vast collection of different practices for which no systematic account can be given.
Wittgenstein’s influence upon the relativist tradition of discursive psychology is particularly
easy to discern (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), however proponents of less relativist traditions
have criticised the degree to which he neglected the role of the ‘material’ in structuring
institutional power and therefore influencing language use (e.g. Parker, 1996).
Saussure (1974) and the field of structural linguistics that he inspired have also been
of great influence upon discursive methodologies, the main argument being that whilst
language is not determined by the reality to which it refers, it is still a structured system.
Saussure defined the linguistic sign as a dyad, with the ‘signifier’ on one side (the physical
sound or written word) and the ‘signified’ on the other (the mental concept). Perhaps his most
lasting contribution is the understanding that the relationship between the signifier and
signified is arbitrary (Burr, 1995), the bond between them only working because there is a
conventional relationship at play. However he also proposed that a sign gains its value by
virtue of its difference from other signs, which together form a network or structure of words.
This system of differences gives the signs their meaning, rather than the signs themselves.
Saussure therefore suggested that ‘langue’ (the structure of language) should be the focus of
linguistic study, because it acts as a stable system upon which ‘parole’ (situated language use)
is dependent. He also argued that once a signifier is attached to the signified, the relationship
between them becomes fixed. It is the stability and fixedness of this system that was
challenged by the poststructuralists of the 1970’s.
Derrida (1973) was a key poststructuralist figure who argued that the meanings carried
by language are always temporary and contestable. He proposed that the meaning of a
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signifier is context-dependent and does not become fixed to the signified, but is instead
always gained in reference to other words, i.e. by that which it is not. Meaning is therefore
constantly deferred from one signifier to another and when a person talks of something they
are also always implicitly referring to what it is not, what is absent from it, e.g. authenticity is
not inauthenticity. Derrida proposed that Western thought is founded upon the logic of such
binary oppositions and that the nature of things lies in the relations between them rather than
the things themselves (Burr, 1995). He further noted that meaning is a source of potential
disagreement and conflict, creating a site in which power relations may be acted out; such
ideas are central to the work of Foucault (1972), whose approach to discourse analysis is
discussed below.
Discursive methodologies draw on both structuralist and poststructuralist ideas.
Although some discursive approaches take a more poststructuralist view than others (see
below), they share the understanding that language is constructive, i.e. that it shapes the
meaning of experience, whilst acting as a site of conflict and potential change. This
understanding extends to notions of ‘the self’, resulting in an anti-humanism which rejects the
idea of the person as a ‘unified, coherent and rational agent’ with an ‘essential nature’ that
waits to be revealed (Burr, 1995).
In the last couple of decades, discourse analysis has had a considerable impact on
social psychology, particularly in Britain (Antaki et al., 2003). Examples of discourse analytic
research of relevance to counselling psychology include: Reeves et al.’s (2004) study into
counsellors’ preferred responses to suicide talk, Crowe & Luty’s (2005) analysis of the
subject positions made available to a depressed client receiving Interpersonal Psychotherapy,
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and Guilfoyle’s (2002) examination of power in therapeutic relationships; these being just a
few examples from a growing body of research.
The term ‘discourse analysis’ refers to a variety of research practices, with a number
of differing aims and theoretical backgrounds; however, broadly conceptualized they are each
concerned with the close study of patterns of language in use (Taylor, 2001). Wetherell
(2001) identifies as many as six different discourse traditions that she considers relevant to
social scientists, but two in particular have received wide recognition (Willig, 2008), these
being ‘discursive psychology’ and ‘Foucauldian discourse analysis’. As each of these is
relevant to the present research design, they will now be addressed in further detail.
4.5 Discursive Psychology
Potter & Wetherell’s (1987) book: ‘Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and
behaviour’ introduced discursive psychology to Britain, although the label of ‘discursive
psychology’ was only later attributed by Edwards & Potter (1992). The book provides a wide-
ranging critique of cognitivism and is generally credited with boosting the ‘turn to language’
within psychology (Willig, 2008). It outlines an approach which was inspired by the fields of
linguistics, hermeneutics and ethnomethodology. Drawing heavily upon conversation
analysis, discursive psychology is concerned with ‘the negotiation of meaning in local
interaction in everyday contexts’ (Willig, 2008: 95).
Discursive psychology attempts to identify how people ‘manage accountability and
stake in everyday life’ and to understand the ‘action orientation of talk’ (Smith, 2008: 167). In
other words, it is interested in how people use discursive resources and to what effect, i.e. the
performative qualities of discourse. It conceptualizes psychological phenomena (such as
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identity or authenticity) as discursive actions, being something that people do rather than have
or are. Wiggins & Potter (2008) outline three main principles of discursive psychology: firstly
that discourse is both constructed and constructive, secondly that discourse is action
orientated and thirdly that discourse is always situated (within both a particular environment
and a rhetorical framework). In recent years discursive psychology has also drawn
increasingly on the principles of conversation analysis, reflected in a growing preference for
‘naturalistic’ studies (Wiggins & Potter, 2008).
Drawing on the work of Gilbert & Mulkay (1984), Potter & Wetherell (1987)
developed the notion of ‘interpretative repertoires’, these being ‘clusters of terms organised
around a central metaphor’, which people draw on to perform various actions (Wiggins &
Potter, 2008: 74). Discursive psychology research seeks to identify interpretative repertoires
and the rhetorical functions they serve. Talk is expected to be contradictory because it is
constructed to serve particular interests and perform certain (not necessarily intentional)
functions (Edwards and Potter, 1992), whilst also demonstrating that the discursive resources
people draw on are inherently dilemmatic (Billig, 1991).
Discursive psychology has a social constructionist epistemology and subscribes to a
relativist ontology. It does not seek to produce knowledge of ‘things’ but of how they are
‘talked into being’ (Willig, 2008: 108). It is commonly conceptualised as an analysis of
language use on the ‘micro’ level (Parker, 1997) and it is arguably well suited to challenging
‘taken for granted’  psychological constructs (Burr, 1995). However, it has also been
criticized for what Langdridge (2004: 345) describes as ‘the lack of a person’, there being no
engagement with notions such as mental states or cognition. This means that despite having
an emphasis on the action orientation of talk, discursive psychology is unable to account for
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why particular individuals or groups pursue particular discursive objectives (Willig, 2008).
Whilst its proponents argue that they are interested in the discursive construction of
psychological concepts rather than hypothetical questions of subjectivity, discursive
psychology relies upon notions of stake and interest, which it then fails to theorize in terms of
motivation or desire (Willig, 2008).
Discursive psychology has also been criticised for the relativist assumptions which
limit analysis of discourse to the research text. Critical realists such as Cromby & Nightingale
(1999) argue that such an analysis fails to acknowledge the existence of extra-discursive
factors such as embodiment, materiality and power (as outlined above). However, Edley
(2001a) suggests that this is a misreading of relativism, which does not deny the ontological
reality of an extra discursive realm, only that there is no way of apprehending it outside of
language. In Edley’s view: ‘we should see that the realms of the material and the symbolic are
inextricably bound up with one another and that it is a pretty futile task to try to tease them
apart’ (Edley, 2001a: 439).
4.6 Foucauldian Discourse Analysis
Whereas discursive psychology considers how people use discursive resources, Foucauldian
discourse analysis is interested in examining which discursive resources are available and in
what ways discourse may serve to construct ‘subjectivity, selfhood and power relations’
(Willig, 2008: 95). A crucial aspect of the Foucauldian perspective is that discourse limits
what it is and is not possible to say with meaning (Parker, Georgaca, Harper, McLaughlin &
Stowell-Smith, 1995). Foucauldian discourse analysts are therefore interested in exploring the
discursive worlds that people inhabit and what kind of actions and experiences different
discourses make possible.
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As discussed above (see literature review), Foucault proposed that dominant
discourses ‘privilege those versions of social reality that legitimate existing power relations
and social structures’ (Willig, 2008: 113). Therefore researchers who use a Foucauldian
approach often examine the discursive construction of phenomena that might otherwise be
taken for granted (Parker, 1997). Consideration is given to the social, institutional and
historical frameworks within which discursive constructions are produced and power is
exercised. This may involve the researcher undertaking a ‘genealogy’; a historical study
which traces the development of the discourse in question and the identities that it may have
constrained or made available. Key examples include Foucault’s (1990/1976) study of the
history of sexuality and Rose’s (1985) study of the development of modern psychology. The
literature review of this thesis includes a brief genealogical account of ‘authenticity’.
From a Foucauldian perspective ‘discourse’ might be defined as ‘sets of statements
that construct objects and an array of subject positions’ (Parker, 1994: 245), whereas ‘subject
positions’ are understood to be ‘places in discourse which carry certain rights to speak and
specifications for what may be spoken’ (Parker, 1997: 291). The concept of subject
‘positioning’ (Davies & Harré, 1990) is significant because it enables the researcher to
develop a critical understanding of power within a culture.
Foucauldian discourse analysts generally agree that discursive constructions have
‘real’ effects in terms of how people experience the world, both psychologically and
physically, however there is disagreement regarding the extent to which material or social
reality may in turn constrain discourse (Willig, 2008). Therefore, whilst Foucauldian
discourse analysis is ‘social constructionist in orientation... the more realist versions of this
approach also aspire to an understanding of the underlying mechanisms that give rise to the
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conditions that make possible the formation of particular discourses’ (Willig, 2008: 126). In
other words, proponents of Foucauldian discourse analysis may adopt a critical-realist
epistemology (e.g. Guilfoyle, 2002; Parker, 1992; Willig, 1999a).
In contrast to discursive psychology, Foucauldian discourse analysis is commonly
conceptualised as acting on the ‘macro’ level (Parker, 1997), an advantage being that it is able
to address wider issues of subjectivity, ideology and power. Spong (2010) suggests that this
level of approach is useful in psychotherapeutic research because it is important to consider
what counselling discourse enables practitioners to say, plus in what ways it obliges them to
frame the difficulties that clients bring (e.g. as having a ‘false self’). As Spong argues, such an
analysis makes it possible to ask how clients are ‘constrained and liberated by their
engagement in counselling discourses’ and to question how ‘counselling discourses articulate
with the broader social discourses which position our clients’ (Spong, 2010: 68).
There are however several criticisms of Foucauldian discourse analysis, including
from a discursive psychology perspective the idea that it pays insufficient attention to the
local interactional context of language (Willig, 2008). The relationship between discourse and
‘reality’ is also a point of debate, involving the same arguments between relativism and
critical-realism as noted above. Furthermore, whilst there is agreement that discourse is
implicated in the construction of subjectivity, there is disagreement about whether something
more than discourse is needed for identity formation. The question of what motivates an
individual to choose or invest in one particular subject position over another has led several
writers to incorporate psychoanalytic concepts into their analyses, (e.g. Frosh & Saville
Young, 2008; Hollway, 1989; Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). However, Davies and Harré
(1999) argue that it is not necessary to invoke psychoanalytical constructs, suggesting instead
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that a preference for a certain position can be accounted for by an individual’s life
experiences, (such as having been frequently located in that position, or having related to
someone in that position). Critical realism offers an alternative perspective to this question, by
considering the role of the extra-discursive.
4.7 Critical Discursive Psychology
The methodology employed in this research was that of critical discursive psychology. This
third approach to discourse emerged in response to the disagreements that exist between
discursive psychology and Foucauldian analysis. It represents a synthesis between the two and
enables an exploration of both the micro and macro levels of discourse. A growing number of
researchers have made use of this combined approach, for example: Adams (2001); Harper
(1995); Wetherell (1998); Edley & Wetherell (2001). The originators of discursive
psychology, Potter & Wetherell (1995), also support a mixed approach and have advised
against distinguishing too sharply between discursive psychology and Foucauldian discourse
analysis. Harper (1995) similarly proposes that discursive research should focus on
interaction, social practices and dynamic processes, rather than create a false opposition
between explanations based either solely within the individual or social structures (Harper,
1995).
Both discursive psychology and Foucauldian discourse analysis are rooted in a
concern with the role of language and its productive potential (Smith, 2008). In combining
them, critical discursive psychology aims to identify patterns of language use and related
practices, demonstrating how these constitute people, whilst also drawing attention to the
historical and social origins of that which is taken for granted. Edley (2001b: 189) proposes
that ‘three concepts lie at the heart of critical discursive psychology: interpretative repertoires,
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ideological dilemmas and subject positions’. The following chapters will elaborate on the use
of these concepts within critical discursive research.
A critical discursive approach was arguably the most appropriate method to use for
this research for several reasons. By adopting a combined approach, it was possible to address
not only how ‘authenticity’ is constructed and used for interactive purposes, but also in what
ways the wider availability of ‘authenticity’ discourses might shape how counselling
psychologists position themselves and their clients. Furthermore, a critical discursive
approach is compatible with a critical realist epistemology, thus enabling the researcher to
consider the role of the ‘extra-discursive’ (as discussed above). A combination allowed for a
broad picture to emerge, relevant to the research questions of the study.
4.8 Reflexivity
Reflexivity is a defining feature of many qualitative studies (Banister et al., 1994),
particularly those influenced by social constructionism (Burr, 1995). It requires the researcher
to consider how their involvement in a study has influenced and informed it. There are several
different ways of approaching reflexivity (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), however Willig
(2008) identifies two main types: personal and epistemological. ‘Personal reflexivity’ requires
the researcher to reflect upon the ways in which their own values, beliefs, experiences and so
forth may have shaped the research. ‘Epistemological reflexivity’ requires the researcher to
consider the assumptions they have built in to the research design and how these may have
shaped the data. For example, epistemological reflexivity will involve thinking about how the
research question has defined or limited what was ‘found’ and how else the research topic
could have been investigated. By engaging in reflexivity, the researcher attempts to develop
an increased awareness of their role in the co-construction of knowledge.
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Hertz (1997) argues that researchers need to explicitly situate themselves within their
studies because their influence will permeate every stage of the research process; from the
formulation of questions and the choosing of participants, to the analysis and writing up. In
acknowledgement of such arguments, this thesis includes a reflexive preface and the use of
‘reflexive boxes’ throughout. Being a discursive study, reflexivity has also been central to the
analysis of data. As Fairclough (1995) argues, discourse analysts in particular will attempt to
develop a ‘critical language awareness’, which recognises that the words used to ask a
question will shape the response received. For example, if a participant is asked how they feel
about something (such as authenticity), then the category of emotion is invoked and their
reply is likely to orientate towards it, regardless of whether they previously ascribed
importance to this aspect or not (Willig, 2008).
In drawing upon social constructionism, reflexivity is focused on the intersubjective
nature of the research, rather than the management of the researcher’s subjectivity. Discourse
analysis therefore requires all of the dialogue within an interview to be analysed, i.e. both that
of the participant and the researcher. This is based on the view that each will actively and
passively invoke identities and shared understandings as a framework for their speech
(Yardley, 2000; Ochs, 1997). The research data is considered to be a co-construction. In a
similar fashion, this thesis is understood to be a discursive construction, which different
readers will interpret and engage with in different ways.
This research presents just one of many possible approaches to the topic of
authenticity in counselling psychology and although the analysis is grounded in the data,
another researcher’s interpretations may have led them to different conclusions. Whilst taking
a critical discursive perspective has enabled the researcher to tentatively speak of the ‘extra-
81
discursive’ and engage with the notions of power and material effects, it is acknowledged that
one can never step outside of discourse nor make claims to objectivity. This raises questions
about the value of such research findings, an issue that will be returned to in the following
chapters.
4.9 Is it possible to authentically research authenticity?
There are as many answers to this question as there are possible definitions of ‘authenticity’
and much depends on the particular epistemological and ontological viewpoint from which
the question is posed. It might be argued that authentically researching anything depends on
the researcher’s genuine interest, personal motivation and honesty; however, this answer
places authenticity solely within ‘the self’ of the researcher and this is problematic from a
postmodern or social constructionist point of view (see below). It may appear to fit well
within a positivist or post-positivist research model, however researchers working within
these frameworks are also those most likely to attempt to manage their subjectivity, not
wishing to ‘bias’ the research data with their personal feelings and opinions. Whilst honesty is
likely to be regarded as an important ethical consideration, the positivist/post-positivist
researcher’s personal interests and motivations may well be hidden in the name of objectivity,
(not just from participants, but also from the readers of a ‘scientific’ research account). Of
course the above definition may be contested, perhaps better captured by words such as ‘being
real’ or having a ‘personal engagement’, however the same critique may apply. This raises
questions regarding to what extent ‘authenticity’ may require ‘congruent’ expression and
communication, or whether something such as ‘intention’ might be considered a sufficient
‘measure’.
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Putting intentions aside for a moment, the question of how to research authenticity so
that it might itself be ‘authentic’ is perhaps far more problematic. Again from a positivist or
post-positivist point of view, the limiting of the research ‘variables’ will extend to the topic of
study and may lead to the use of a standardized measure, (such as the ‘dispositional
authenticity scale’ developed by Wood et al., 2008). The researcher may also be concerned
about whether the participants of a study feel able to give genuine and honest (hence
‘authentic’) answers to questions. Consideration may be given to whether results will be
‘skewed’ by participants wishing to present ‘authentic’ images of themselves and perhaps
being reluctant to speak of their own ‘inauthenticity’.  From a positivist / post-positivist
perspective there is therefore a sense in which the ‘authentic’ researcher must conduct their
research in a split off (‘objective’) manner, whilst also attempting to measure and control for
the ‘authenticity’ they are studying. This is problematic not least in how it appears to
contradict possible ‘meanings’ of authenticity, but also from a psychologically theoretical
point of view, whereby if ‘authenticity’ is tied to the notion of a ‘real’ or ‘true self’ that may
be hidden from personal awareness and external observation, then it becomes extremely
difficult to ‘measure’.
In light of the above restrictions and difficulties, it might be argued that a qualitative
method, such as a semi-structured interview, would allow more room for the participant’s
‘authenticity’. However, although an interview may enable more open and flexible data
gathering than a standardized scale, a single question can be extremely leading and there are
myriad ways in which a researcher may inadvertently guide a participant’s responses, (from
the giving of a smile or nod, to the exploration of a particular point which is of interest to
them). Therefore to at least some degree, this echoes the problems identified within a
positivist approach, whereby the researcher must ‘manage’ his or her influence.
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If ‘authenticity’ in some way requires the freedom to express an ‘inner truth’, and if
research means being systematic or managing one’s influence, then perhaps it is not possible
to ‘do’ authentic research. In other words, it could be argued that it is not possible to
authentically research authenticity because the concept of research itself gets in the way.
However, there are several methodologies that do not support the notion of an ‘inner truth’ or
require the researcher to ‘manage’ their ‘influence’, for example those that draw on social
constructionism.
Compared to the positivist perspective outlined above, social constructionism offers a
vastly different understanding of whether it is possible to authentically research authenticity.
Rather than having an essentialist focus on ‘discovering’ the ‘truth’ or ‘the self’, social reality
is understood to be a dynamic co-construction, redefining ‘authenticity’ from the beginning.
Participants are viewed not as ‘passive containers of knowledge, but as active participants
within the research process who construct, rather than report on reality’ (Speer, 2002: 511).
Furthermore, social constructionist epistemology holds that the researcher’s influence or
‘bias’ is both ‘unavoidable and theoretically interesting’ (Speer, 2002: 511), blurring the
traditional distinction between researcher and participant as both join in a ‘participatory
consciousness’ (Heshusius, 1994: 15). However, this perspective raises questions about the
usefulness of applying the word ‘authenticity’ at all. For example, if authenticity in research is
not about the expression of a separate ‘authentic self’, revealing (or not) its ‘true nature’, but
instead refers to the intersubjective, lived experience of research, then all research might be
understood to be ‘authentic’ in some moment by moment sense, e.g. whether it is
authentically ‘boring’, ‘exhilarating’, ‘uncomfortable’ or whatever is co-created. Whilst this
does not mean that the word ‘authenticity’ and its use is of no interest, the question of whether
one can authentically research authenticity may be misleading.
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An alternative perspective to that outlined above ties the researcher’s ‘authenticity’ to
the issue of power and ethics. If speech is taken to be an act of communication intended to
have specific effects (as opposed to a revelation of inner feelings or beliefs), then the
relationship between the researcher and participant becomes a key concern (Leudar & Antaki,
1996). Whilst social constructionism indicates that the researcher cannot prevent their
expectations ‘infiltrating’ the research, this does not mean that all is equal or that such
‘influence’ should be ignored. It has been argued that there is an inevitable power imbalance
in every research relationship, regardless of the researcher’s intellectual or emotional
commitment to those who are participating (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995; Richards &
Schwartz, 2002). Furthermore, the well documented phenomenon of ‘researcher allegiance
effects’ acknowledges that the expectations, values and experiences of the researcher can have
a substantial impact on every stage of a study (McLeod, 2010). This raises questions about
whose agenda the study most serves and in what ways the researcher might acknowledge their
inevitable influence upon it. From this perspective, it may be desirable to treat ‘authenticity’
as an open-ended ethical guideline (rather than an achievable goal for ‘the self’), whereby the
researcher seeks to empower participants, whilst reflexively acknowledging their impact upon
the co-created research text.
A researcher who attends to the relationship between themselves and their participants
is likely to place significant importance on reflexivity. A central aim of the reflexive process
is to increase awareness of the researcher’s inevitable influence and thus enable a more
‘authentic’ account, (although this is done with the acknowledgement that there is no ultimate
‘truth’ to be arrived at). This reflexive ‘authenticity’ may extend from the motivations for
conducting the research (see preface and reflexive box 3) to the analysis and discussion. Such
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an approach might be considered ethically important because as Alvesson & Sköldberg (2009:
12) point out:
‘interpretation does not take place in a neutral, apolitical or ideology-free
space... various paradigms, perspectives and concepts, as well as research and
other political interests all bring out certain types of interpretation possibilities, at
the same time as they suppress others, often under the guise of what it neutral,
rational, right and correct’.
Acknowledging the role of power within qualitative research suggests that extra care
might be taken to ensure that participants have the opportunity to say whether they feel they
have been misrepresented or taken out of context, (perhaps via invitation to comment on their
transcripts, as with this study). However, difficulties remain in proposing that some methods
allow for more authentic research than others. For example, Potter (1996) has suggested that
‘naturalistic methods’ (such as observation) are preferable to other approaches, arguing that
interviews and focus groups provide highly contrived data that is ‘flooded by the expectations
and categories of social science agendas (p.135). However, Speer (2002) argues that such a
distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘contrived’ data runs contrary to a social constructionist
understanding of bias as a feature of all interaction, worthy of exploration in itself. Speer
points out that even when participants are taking part in a purely observational study, the
simple act of giving informed consent can change their behaviour, (an effect otherwise known
as ‘observer reactivity’, see Heppner et al., 2008).
Once again it might be concluded that conducting ‘authentic’ research is either
impossible, or that all interaction is authentic in a situated sense (i.e. it is authentic interview
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talk etc). However, for the purposes of this research it is worth noting that a critical realist
perspective on whether it is possible to authentically research authenticity may differ to the
above in certain respects. For example, although critical realism draws heavily on social
constructionism in terms of ‘the self’ and social reality, it also allows for consideration of
‘material practices’, which are ‘given an ontological status that is independent of, but in
relation with, discursive practices (Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig, 2007: 102).  This opens up
the possibility that ‘authenticity’ might be thought of as at least partially non-discursive, e.g.
in relation to embodiment or the constraints of institutional power (Cromby & Nightingale,
1999).
It has not been possible to give an exhaustive account of whether one can authentically
research authenticity in this short space (and perhaps an exhaustive account is itself not
achievable); however, it is hoped that this exploration of the issues has added clarity to the
rationale and the emphasis that is given to reflexivity throughout this thesis. The question of
whether it is possible to authentically research authenticity will be returned to in the
discussion chapter.
4.10 Summary of rationale
The aim of this research was to open up the taken-for-granted value of ‘authenticity’ within
counselling psychology, to explore the ways in which it is constructed and to consider the
implications of these constructions for ethical practice. There has been little previous research
on ‘authenticity’ in counselling psychology, therefore it was hoped that this study might
usefully contribute to relevant debate, particularly at a time when national economic pressures
may once again increase the need for counselling psychology to define itself and its values.
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Discourse analysis was identified as an appropriate conceptual framework for
addressing questions about the construction of values and professional knowledge (Burr,
2003). This study was therefore designed to explore counselling psychologists’ talk of
‘authenticity’, using data gathered from qualitative interviews. The rationale for focusing on
‘talk’ lies in a number of methodological assumptions, as informed by a critical-ideological
paradigm. As discussed above, this paradigm draws strongly on social constructionism and
post-structuralism, emphasising the role of language in creating social reality and a sense of
‘self’, whilst taking a critical-realist stance.
The rationale for choosing the particular discourse analytic approach of critical
discursive psychology was that it allowed a multi-level analysis, making it possible to
consider not just the situated ways in which ‘authenticity’ is constructed and used by
counselling psychologists, but also how these constructions may relate to wider socio-political
factors. A combined approach acknowledges that people are both the products and producers
of discourse (Billig, 1991). The use of a critical discursive framework thus enabled a more
comprehensive exploration of the ethical implications of ‘authenticity’ for counselling
psychology practice than other methods. A critical discursive approach also enabled tentative
consideration to be given to the ‘extra-discursive’, e.g. the material effects of institutional
power (Parker, 1992). However, there is much ongoing epistemological debate regarding
whether identification of the ‘extra-discursive’ is achievable (e.g. Edley, 2001a; Sims-
Schouten, Riley & Willig, 2007), therefore a further aim of this research was to explore the
methodological feasibility of using a critical realist approach within a discursive study such as
this.
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4.11 Reflexive box 3
Is it possible to authentically research authenticity whilst training?
Yardley (2000: 223) suggests that reflexivity should include ‘consideration of how the
work was influenced by external pressures or constraints (e.g. the priorities of funding
bodies, or the difficulty of involving certain people in the research process)’. The
institutional context for this research is therefore a relevant issue.
As a trainee counselling psychologist there are a range of institutional bodies which
call for the completion of a doctoral level piece of research, (although as discussed in the
literature review, this level of qualification is a relatively new requirement within
counselling psychology).These regulatory organisations include the training institution (i.e.
in my case, Roehampton University), the Health Professions Council and the British
Psychological Society. The quality of the research project will ultimately decide whether
the student will qualify, having undertaken a therapeutic training that has frequently cost
them many thousands of pounds, in addition to much personal time and investment.
Together these factors create an element of external pressure which may not be
problematic while the student has an ‘authentic’ desire to engage with the research, but in
my experience (dare I say it?) this may fluctuate! It may therefore be difficult to
authentically research authenticity whilst training because of the pressure to meet xternally
set criteria in order to ‘pass’.
At the commencement of my training I was uncertain about the research direction I
wished to take, however as I engaged with some of the philosophical issues inherent to
counselling psychology, an area of interest became apparent and my enthusiasm grew from
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there. As I became immersed in the various discourses surrounding research
(epistemology, ontology and so forth), it could be said that I took up the subject position of
‘researcher’ alongside that of ‘trainee’. Alternatively, this might be described as my having
been successfully ‘indoctrinated’ into a powerful, professionalisation process. It is
therefore possible to view my engagement with the research as both authentic and
inauthentic. For example, the research interest could be understood as an authentic co-
creation between myself and the university (in terms of both individuals and culture),
through which I positioned myself as a researcher. In contrast, an array of powerful
regulatory organisations predetermining that I take up such a subject position, suggests
inauthenticity. It seems that both terms could apply.
A further difficulty that might be attributed to authentically researching authenticity
while training is that the researcher is fully immersed in the discourse and culture that is
being critiqued. On the one hand the research might be considered more authentic because
it comes from ‘within’ the culture that is being examined. However, on the other hand ‘it is
difficult, if not by definition impossible, for the researchers to clarify the taken-for-granted
assumptions and blind spots in their own social culture, research community and language’
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009: 9). Discourse analysis goes some way to addressing such
concerns because it does not require the researcher to attempt a false separation between
themselves and their research topic; the researcher’s talk is analysed alongside that of the
participants. Furthermore, reflexivity is used to aid consideration of contextual factors and
enable new perspectives. However, whilst this makes interpretation possible, the above
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limitations still apply. Perhaps therefore the findings of this study reflect the particular
research culture encouraged in my training institution, or of my supervisors; an expression
of forces external to me and hence lacking in ‘authenticity’. However, if all is ‘co-
construction’, then neither the label of authenticity nor inauthenticity seems particularly
applicable. As argued above, it depends on your paradigmatic view of the question.
One final difficulty of note in researching ‘authenticity’ whilst in the midst of
training was balancing the construction of a counselling psychologist identity with the
deconstruction of counselling psychology values. This difficulty was most salient in the
third year of my training, when the teaching of CBT and such modules as ‘assessment and
diagnosis’ stood in stark contrast to the social constructionist and post-modern interests of
my research. However, while this was somewhat unsettling at times and may have shaped
the research design (see preface), I believe that this conflict reflects the epistemological
and ontological tensions that counselling psychology embodies. I therefore hope that by





This chapter provides an account of the research design. It details how the study was
conducted and discusses the standards by which it might be evaluated. The following sections
address ethical considerations, the participants and the research procedure, the use of semi-
structured interviews, the analytic strategy and the issue of evaluative criteria in discursive
research. It is acknowledged that ‘the researcher is a central figure who influences the
collection, selection and interpretation of data’ (Finlay, 2002b: 531), therefore this chapter
also contains two reflexive boxes with a focus on the research process.
5.2 Ethics
This study was designed and undertaken in accordance with the British Psychological
Society’s Code of Ethics and Conduct (2009), the Division of Counselling Psychology’s
Professional Practice Guidelines (BPS, 2005) and the Division of Counselling Psychology’s
Guidelines on Confidentiality and Record Keeping (BPS, 2002). Approval was obtained from
the Ethics Committee of Roehampton University prior to the research commencing. This
involved submitting an ethics application and undertaking recommended amendments until
agreement was reached.
Adherence to the above named ethical guidelines helped ensure that the well-being of
the participants in this study was prioritised. Consideration was given to the possibility that
talking about ‘authenticity’ might challenge a participant’s established values and ontological
assumptions, or that the exploratory nature of the research questions might inadvertently lead
to a discussion that provoked anxiety. Although it is not possible to eliminate such risks
92
entirely, these issues were addressed via the obtaining of informed consent, the sensitive and
role-boundaried conduct of the interviewer and the provision of an appropriate debrief (see
below). It was also acknowledged that research generally involves an imbalance of power,
with the investigator tending to hold more information about the study and at least to some
extent directing the research proceedings (Richards & Schwartz, 2002). Being a critical
discursive study, such power dynamics were given detailed consideration throughout the
research process and analysis (see reflexive box 4).
Informed consent is an important ethical requirement for most research. In this case it
was obtained via the provision of a ‘recruitment information’ sheet (Appendix A), which was
given out as part of the recruitment process (see below) and further discussed prior to the
commencement of each interview.  Key points were reiterated in a ‘participant consent form’
(Appendix B) which participants were requested to read and sign before beginning the
interview. This assured participants of their right to withdraw from the study at any time and
outlined the provisions for ensuring confidentiality. Additional time was allocated at the end
of each interview in which to debrief and discuss any concerns that may have arisen. A
‘debriefing information’ sheet (Appendix C) was issued with details of how to obtain further
support if necessary. At this point, participants were also invited to feedback on the research
process, and if satisfied, to sign an agreement that the interview was conducted in an ethical
manner (included in Appendix C).
For the purposes of confidentiality, each participant was allocated an identification
code consisting of letters/numbers chosen at random. All identifying information (names,
dates, places etc) was excluded from transcription. All recordings and transcripts were
securely stored in accordance with British Psychological Society guidelines (BPS, 2002) and
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care was taken when choosing transcript excerpts to avoid those that might lead to the
possible identification of participants or their clients.
5.3 Reflexive box 4
Power and ethics in the research design:
Prior to commencing this study I considered a variety of ways in which to address the
potential power imbalance between myself as researcher and my participants, this being
important both for ethical reasons and the ‘usefulness’ of the research findings (see
discussion chapter). For example, Finlay (2002a) suggests that the unequal power
dynamics of research may be lessened by co-opting ‘participants’ into the study as ‘co-
researchers’. This might take the shape of a ‘co-operative enquiry’ (e.g. Ellis et al.,
1997), whereby the researchers are simultaneously participants in their own research and
‘engage in cycles of mutual reflection and experience’ (Finlay, 2002a: 218).
Unfortunately however such an approach seemed inappropriate for a project undertaken
so that one person might be assessed for qualification as a psychologist. I was also aware
that co-opting carried the impracticality of recruiting busy professionals who might
perceive such involvement as too time-consuming. I decided instead to offer each
participant a copy of their interview transcript, thus at least providing an opportunity for
them to make comments and give feedback. I also used a flexible interview style (see
Reflexive box 5: ‘conducting the interviews’) so that participants might be empowered to
take discussion forward as they wished.
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The above noted restriction of researcher and participant to more ‘traditional’
roles might be considered one way in which the ‘authenticity’ of the participants’
contributions was limited. Furthermore, in practice I found that few participants actually
chose to receive a copy of their interview transcript and so feedback was limited. Again
this may have been a reflection of the time that participants felt they had available to
contribute, or it may be that I could have been more encouraging or persuasive; however,
to do so would perhaps have risked abusing researcher power in a different way. It is also
arguable that whilst co-optive ‘tactics’ may appear to reduce unequal power dynamics,
the problem of an essentially unequal relationship could remain in disguised form, with
the continuing risk that multiple voices might be subsumed into one authorial account
(Finlay, 2002a).
Mehan (1996) suggests that participants may attribute particular power and status
to researchers with professional titles such as ‘psychologist’. I hoped that this concern
might be mitigated by the fact that I was a trainee psychologist interviewing already
qualified psychologists, (my feeling being that the participants were more experienced
than I); however, I was conscious that interviewers may be attributed power because they
are viewed as the ‘expert’ on their research subject. I was also aware that I was the one
who would gain the most benefit from others participating. Once I undertook the
interviews, I found that my sense of the power dynamic varied, with some participants
appearing to be more concerned about the ‘correctness’ or ‘usefulness’ of their answers
than others. A discursive research design encourages sensitivity to such variations in talk
and I have attempted to address these differences within my analysis.
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Whilst critical discursive psychology requires that the speech of both researcher
and participant is analysed, the interpretative nature of the analysis means that it will
inevitably be influenced by the researcher’s preconceptions, theoretical commitments and
personal characteristics (Richards & Schwartz, 2002). As Stenner (1993) argues, research
always involves the issue of having power over other’s words. Therefore whilst the above
text and other reflexive accounts in this thesis are intended to increase the transparency
and accountability of the research, it is necessary to acknowledge that another researcher
may well have come to different conclusions.
5.4 Participants
Eight individuals took part in this study, all of whom had completed a British Psychological
Society accredited training in counselling psychology and were employed as practising
counselling psychologists in England. Seven of the participants were female, one was male.
Five identified themselves as White British, three as White Other. All held positions as
counselling psychologists within the NHS, one via a private sector organisation. Five were
also working in private practice. Reported clinical experience ranged from three-and-a-half to
twenty-three years, with a mean average of 7.4 years. (See Appendix D for a summary table
of the demographics). All of the participants stated that they were influenced by more than
one theoretical orientation. A variety of therapeutic approaches were named including the
humanistic, person-centred, psychodynamic, cognitive-behavioural, schema-based, eclectic
and integrative.
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Willig (2008) notes that the selection of participants should be informed by the
research question, although numbers will also be guided by time and pragmatic
considerations. The rationale for interviewing practising counselling psychologists was that
they would be sufficiently socialised in their role as ‘counselling psychologist’ to draw upon
the discursive resources commonly available to such professionals. The decision to use
counselling psychologists rather than other psychotherapeutic professionals was based on the
researcher’s positioning and questioning of the counselling psychology field (see preface),
plus the view that counselling psychology’s conflicted epistemological and ontological
foundation creates a useful arena for critically examining the constructed nature of therapeutic
values.
It could be said that a ‘purposive sampling strategy’ (Polkinghorne, 2005) was used
for this research, i.e. those who fell within the category of practising counselling psychologist
were purposively selected; however, the term ‘sampling’ carries misleading connotations of
statistically based research. In quantitative studies participants are selected because they fulfil
the representative requirements for generalizing results to other contexts, whereas in
discursive research the participants are chosen because they can provide substantial
contributions to exploring the use of language in a situated context and in relation to specific
bodies of knowledge. As Starks & Trinidad (2007) argue, the concept under study is the unit
of analysis (i.e. talk of authenticity), not the individual participant. This means that ‘variables’
such as gender or ethnicity are not ‘controlled’ unless they are directly relevant to the research
question; although participants may be selected on the basis that they share a particular
‘culture’ or belong to a limited ‘category’ (Taylor, 2001).
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In terms of participant numbers, Morse (2000) suggests that the number required in a
qualitative study for it to reach ‘saturation’ (the point at which key areas will have been
covered) depends on several factors, including the quality of the data, the scope of the study
and the choice of method. Discourse analysis is by nature an iterative and time-consuming
method, which limits the maximum number of participants it is practical to study within a
limited timeframe; however, this is balanced by the potential for obtaining extremely rich
data. Turpin et al. (1997) argue that five participants is the minimum for postgraduate
discursive research.
5.5 Procedure
An invitation to participate was distributed via the Division of Counselling Psychology’s
fortnightly newsletter, after which further participants were obtained by word of mouth and a
process of ‘snowballing’ (Polkinghorne, 2005). Interested individuals were emailed a copy of
the ‘recruitment information’ sheet (Appendix A) and the ‘participant consent form’
(Appendix B). Arrangements were then made to meet for the interview, which was held at a
time and place of convenience to the participant. Participants were interviewed individually
and in privacy, in a quiet location of their choosing. The majority of the interviews took place
in participants’ homes, although some took place in their work settings and where this was not
convenient the researcher arranged a suitable alternative. Prior to the commencement of each
interview, the researcher talked through the ‘recruitment information’ sheet and invited the
participant to ask any further questions that they might have. The participant was then asked
to read and sign a copy of the ‘participant consent form’. The interviews lasted on average
approximately an hour and were recorded using a digital recorder. Having completed the
interview, a debriefing was given (see Appendix C) and any further questions were discussed.
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5.6 Data collection
Semi-structured interviews are commonly used within discursive research (Willig, 2008).
They allow the respondent to answer in their own words and the interviewer to clarify their
understanding and adapt to new developments or issues by probing for further information.
Smith & Osborn (2008) argue that the advantages of semi-structured interviews include that
they facilitate rapport, allow the researcher flexibility and tend to produce rich data. Semi-
structured interviews were chosen as a method for this study because they are well suited to
exploring complex issues and they provide an arena in which available discursive resources
and interpretative repertoires might be utilized. It is however important to note that some
discourse analysts have strongly objected to the use of interviews in discursive research (e.g.
Potter, 1997), arguing instead for the use of naturalistic methods such as observation. The
main disadvantage attributed to semi-structured interviews is that the participants will orient
themselves towards the interview situation, resulting in an analysis that reflects the
participant’s discursive actions within the interview context rather than everyday life (Willig,
2008).
Whilst the above point is acknowledged (and will be returned to later), this research
draws on a number of counter arguments concerning the distinction between ‘contrived’ and
‘natural’ data. For example, Silverman (2001: 159) argues that since ‘no data are ever
untouched by human hands... the opposition between naturally occurring and researcher
provoked data should not be taken too far’. Speer (2002) further notes that a preference for
‘natural’ data contradicts the discursive premise that ‘context effects’ are a feature of all
interaction, to be explored rather than controlled, and that ‘the status of an interaction as
‘natural’ or ‘contrived’... may only be discernible by viewing participants’ orientations to it as
such’ (p.518).
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Consideration was given to the use of focus groups for collecting discursive data;
however, such groups may be dominated by a few participants, potentially transforming the
data from an analysis of the research topic to that of group relations (Taylor, 2001). By the
same argument, minority discourses may be overridden and the group may simply present the
researcher with an agreed version. While it might be argued that focus groups allow for more
‘natural’ discourse, the same counter arguments apply as previously outlined. This study
therefore used semi-structured interviews as a means to explore talk of authenticity, hopefully
enabling some insight into the discursive resources available to counselling psychologists and
how they might be used; the purpose being to open up questions about authenticity as a taken-
for-granted value.
Having decided upon the use of semi-structured interviews, a pilot interview was
conducted (see Appendix E). The aim of this was firstly to test the interview questions and
secondly to provide the researcher with some concrete experience of interviewing. The pilot
was helpful in choosing questions and highlighted that it was not necessary to ask many in
order for rich data to emerge. The final interview schedule consisted of five questions in total,
starting with a general introductory question which asked the participant (i) what authenticity
meant to them, followed by (ii) what authenticity brought to mind in terms of their experience
of counselling psychology training and (iii) what place authenticity has in practice.
Participants were then asked (iv) whether there were any barriers or difficulties relating to
authenticity and (v) how they might describe when authenticity is present. The order of
questions was provisional and participants were given the opportunity to raise issues at any
point in the interview. Participants were also encouraged to elaborate on their answers,
without breaking confidentiality, with examples from clinical experience. The interview
schedule was conceptualised as a guide, rather than a strict set of questions, meaning it was
100
used consistently but with flexibility. The interviewer contributed a range of responses such
as paraphrasing or probing questions in order to clarify. At the end of the interview, the
participant was asked if there was anything they would like to add or discuss further.
The chosen interview questions and their variants set the discursive environment,
whilst introducing both descriptive and evaluative discursive tasks for the participants (Edley
& Wetherell, 2001). The questions were designed to explore the interpretative resources that
counselling psychologists might have available with regard to authenticity and the possible
subject positions such discourses provide. It was assumed that the participants responses
would be both occasioned (i.e. produced for the particular context of the interview) and yet
indicative of collectively shared discursive constructions of authenticity within the profession
of counselling psychology.
5.7 Reflexive box 5
Conducting the interviews:
As a novice interviewer, I was conscious of Hermanowicz’s (2002: 479) caution that
‘great interviewing is deceptively difficult, partly because it is an acquired ability that
takes time to develop’ and I had several concerns which may have impacted on the data
collection process. These included the risk of inadvertently flooding the interviews with
the research agenda (see discussion chapter) and the worry that I might not gather
sufficiently rich data for the analysis to be of interest.
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Holstein & Gubrium (1995) suggest that researchers should develop an ‘active
orientation’ to interviewing which recognises the co-construction of meaning, and Potter
& Wetherell (1987) similarly propose that discursive researchers should embrace an
‘active’ role by questioning the assumptions of participants and offering contradictory
views. Whilst in agreement with the intersubjective premise underlying these
suggestions, I was mindful of the ethical risks noted above and I wished to empower
interviewees as much as possible. I therefore chose not to adopt a ‘challenging’ interview
style, preferring to be more reflective instead (e.g. as with Edley, 2001b). I hoped that
this would enable participants to feel at ease and draw more freely on the range of
discourses available to them. This means that while I did ask questions and seek to
explore participants’ views, I did not intentionally introduce contradictory opinions. One
possible consequence is that I may have missed opportunities to explore conflicting
discourses and the implications that they carry, another is that it limited the ‘authenticity’
of my own contribution to the interviews.
If the above text suggests that I sought to achieve some form of neutrality, then it
should be noted that I believe this is impossible to achieve. As Dickerson (1998: 33)
argues, ‘the interviewer cannot possibly avoid shaping the interaction’ and even minimal
responses such as ‘mmm’ or ‘yes’ will have an influence. Although I was keen not to ask
‘leading’ questions, simply asking something such as ‘are there any difficulties?’ will
introduce the idea that difficulties exist and therefore set a particular frame for the
participant to orientate to. This is why Potter & Hepburn (2005) argue that participants’
comments should not be analysed out of context, but always in relation to the specific
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question posed. While care may be taken to not dominate an interview, no question can
be viewed as ‘neutral’. Discourse analysis therefore addresses the contributions of both
the researcher and the participant, viewing the researcher’s influence as both unavoidable
and theoretically interesting (Speer, 2002).
An acknowledgment of my influence as researcher may suggest a need to further
clarify my views for the present reader. In addition to the information given in the
preface, I might perhaps position myself as ‘a critically informed humanist’, i.e. someone
who embraces an ethical framework based upon humanist principles tempered by a
critical and social constructionist view of ‘the self’. The problem with such an
explanation is that it assumes the possibility of a fixed and knowable subject position,
something that reflexive analysis tends to dispute (Finlay, 2002a). For example, the
analysis in this study demonstrates that diverse and shifting positions were mutually
adopted (see results chapter) and in recalling my agreement with competing notions of
‘authenticity’, I am reminded that values, meaning and identity are not fixed (Potter &
Wetherell, 1987).
5.8 Transcription
Each interview was audio-recorded and transcribed (see Appendix F for a complete
example). For reasons of confidentiality, names and identifying locations were removed from
the text and the interviewees are referred to as ‘participants’ in all transcriptions and extracts.
All utterances were transcribed, including pauses and interruptions. Pauses were measured in
seconds, although a comma was used to code pauses of less than one second. The researcher
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took the position that the current research would not gain from measuring pauses of lesser
duration (as might be the case in a study focused solely on the level of discursive psychology
or conversation analysis).
The transcription notation system (see appendix E) was derived from those used in the
critical discursive psychology studies of Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig (2007) and Wetherell
(1998), which were in turn primarily based upon the transcription conventions developed by
Jefferson (1985). Jefferson’s notation system was developed for conversation analysis and has
since been widely adopted in discursive psychology (Wiggins & Potter, 2008). It has allowed
for the standardisation of transcription symbols, each of which is intended to represent a
feature of talk that research has suggested participants treat as relevant in interaction, e.g.
pause length, intonation and emphasis (Jefferson, 2004). Transcribing at this level of detail
makes clear ‘the jointly constructed, socially engaged nature of what is going on’ (Potter &
Hepburn, 2005: 289); however, it is acknowledged that transcription is a ‘messy and
imperfect process that constructs a textual version of the original interaction’ (Nikander,
2008: 226) and while care has been taken to provide an ‘accurate’ representation,
transcription will always entail the ‘selective rendering of the data’ (Atkinson & Heritage,
1984: 12).
5.9 Data analysis
Discourse analysis can be understood as a particular type of informed reading (Dickerson,
1998), which requires the researcher to ask what the text is doing rather than simply what it
might be saying (i.e. to read for action orientation as well as meaning). It is often described as
a sensitivity to language instead of a ‘method’ (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Willig, 1999 b), and
whilst a number of leading discourse analysts have suggested procedural guidelines (e.g.
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Billig, 1988; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), each cautions against following them too rigidly. As
detailed below, the researcher in this study loosely followed the guidelines proposed by
Willig (2008), whilst also drawing on the more specific critical discursive psychology
framework outlined by Edley (2001b).
Dickerson (1998: 30) identifies four key resources for undertaking a discourse
analysis, all of which were utilised within the present study: the previous literature (whereby
an awareness of different perspectives may enable greater sensitivity to features of speech and
their functions); the text itself (e.g. noting contradictions or variation within the text so as to
explore the constructed aspects of discourse); the ‘analytic imagination’ (e.g. questioning how
something might otherwise have been formulated in order to see what is distinctive about a
particular construction); and the researcher’s intuitive or tacit skills as members of a
linguistic community (whereby the researcher’s intuitive awareness of language-use can help
to identify areas of interest, such as knowing that a long pause may signal a problem).
The analytic process described in this account arguably began with the transcribing of
the interview recordings, as the process of adding detailed notation assisted in developing a
familiarity with the data. Once the transcribing was complete it was followed by several
straight-through readings of each transcript, so that the researcher could experience and
further note some of the discursive effects of the text. The next task was to identify the
different ways in which the discursive object (i.e. ‘authenticity’) was constructed. This was
achieved by highlighting all the instances of reference to authenticity, both implicit and
explicit. A repeated reading and coding of content, with a focus on the differences between
constructions, then enabled recognition of distinct discourses and allowed for selection of
relevant material for further analysis, i.e. sections of text that demonstrated consistent and
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variable patterns of language use in the construction of ‘authenticity’. It is important to
acknowledge that as coding is guided by the nature of the research question, the analysis will
not address all aspects of the text (Willig, 2008).
The data was organised into a form of ‘thematic’ categories, with extracts often
included under several headings. Consistent with a critical discursive approach, each category
was conceptualized as representing an ‘interpretative repertoire’ (Potter & Wetherell, 1987),
this being ‘a recognisable routine of arguments, descriptions and evaluations distinguished by
familiar clichés, common places, tropes and characterizations of actors and situations’, the
existence of which becomes apparent via its repetition throughout the research text (Edley &
Wetherell, 2001: 443). The analysis then progressed to a more detailed examination of the
functional dimensions (i.e. action orientation) of the interview talk and the subject-positions
taken up within it. This enabled a broader level of analysis whereby the local deployment of
interpretative repertoires and the availability of particular subject positions may be taken to
indicate something of the wider ideological context. By locating authenticity constructions
within wider discourses and power relations it was possible to consider both the implications
for subjectivity and the possibility of extra-discursive constraints and influences. The final
stage of analysis therefore involved considering the implications of the identified repertoires
for the counselling psychology profession in relation to the broader social and institutional
frameworks within which the research material was produced.
5.10 Evaluative criteria
Yardley (2000) notes that qualitative research is often misjudged via the use of evaluative
criteria meant for quantitative studies, e.g. in terms of reliability and validity. These criteria
draw upon a positivist scientific discourse and are inappropriate for discourse analytic studies
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because they assume an objective reality in which the researcher and the participant are
separate (Taylor, 2001). A variety of alternative criteria have been proposed (e.g. Henwood &
Pigeon, 1992; Lincoln & Guba, 1985), which instead give recognition to the situated,
relational and intersubjective context of qualitative research. Finlay (2006: 319) suggests that
these criteria are encompassed by the notions of ‘rigour, ethical integrity and artistry’. She
notes a shared concern for research to be coherent, logical, systematic and relevant; where
relevance includes both the contribution of the research and its impact on the reader.
When specifically evaluating discursive research, the above points might be addressed
in several ways. For example, Starks & Trinidad (2007) suggest that the credibility of a
discursive study may be judged by the coherence of the analytic argument and the evidence
offered to support it. Nikander (2008) similarly argues that extracts should be offered as a
central means of increasing transparency and demonstrating the rigour of the analytic process.
The interpretations in this account are thus all supported by referenced extracts from the
interview transcriptions and readers are encouraged ‘to make their own checks and
judgements’ (Potter & Edwards, 2001: 108).
Antaki, Billig, Edwards & Potter (2003) also provide useful guidance for evaluating
discursive research, having identified six ways in which a discourse analysis may fall short.
These include: ‘under-analysis through summary’ (i.e. merely to summarise the participant’s
talk in the researcher’s own words, thereby losing information but adding none); ‘under-
analysis by taking sides’ (i.e. taking a position towards the text, rather than providing a
detailed examination of rhetorical and discursive strategies, plus potentially distorting or
oversimplifying the data to fit the researcher’s position); ‘under-analysis through over-
quotation or through isolated quotation’ (i.e. referring to quotes rather than analysing them);
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‘the circular identification of discourses and mental constructs’ (i.e. using quotes to identify a
descriptive term and then using the descriptive term to explain the quotes rather than examine
the details of the talk); ‘false survey’ (i.e. extrapolating from the data to the world at large and
assuming that findings are true for all members of the same category); and ‘analysis that
consists in simply spotting features’ (i.e. merely identifying established discursive features).
As Antaki et al.’s (2003) guidelines suggest, discourse analysis requires a close
engagement with the research text, meaning that researcher reflexivity is an essential aid in
evaluation. As researchers ‘make public their own stances, motivations, assumptions, and
biases, the research gains a level of honesty that contributes to the trustworthiness (rigor) of
the study’ (Morrow, 2007: 216). Public scrutiny of the research is also facilitated by the
offering of an account of the research decisions (Finlay, 2002a). Both these aspects of
reflexivity have therefore been addressed in the preface and reflexive boxes of this thesis.
Finally, it is important to distinguish between the evaluative criteria of
‘generalisability’ and ‘transferability’, for as Finlay (2006: 321) explains:
‘qualitative researchers do not seek to extrapolate statistically findings from a
specified sample to the wider population. Instead, they are concerned to show
that findings can be transferred and may have meaning or relevance if applied
to other individuals’ (italics in original).
Critical discursive psychology recognises the intersubjective and co-constructed nature of the
research interview and is interested in exploring the complexity and multiplicity of contested
meaning in the social world, therefore to speak in terms of generalisability is inappropriate.
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However, in having a critical-realist epistemology and in drawing upon Foucauldian notions
of discourse, it becomes possible to tentatively and without determinism speak of the possible
transfer of findings. Again, the researcher’s openness and reflexivity aids in deciding whether
results may be in some sense transferable to other individuals or contexts; nevertheless the
overall purpose of the research remains not to generalize, but to add to the existing discourse




As outlined in the previous chapter, this analysis draws upon the guidelines offered by Willig
(2008) and Edley (2001b). These guidelines indicate three concepts of particular interest to
critical discursive psychology: interpretative repertoires, subject positions and ideological
dilemmas. This chapter therefore begins with a brief explanation of these terms, before
moving on to present the research findings. The implications of the findings and the
limitations of the study will form the topic of the final chapter.
The following analysis represents the researcher’s interpretation of the data and this
may differ from that of the reader, however quotes are offered throughout in order to increase
transparency and demonstrate the rigour of the analysis. It is important to recognise that
discourse analysis does not presume to have access to the intentions of research participants,
nor does it seek to ‘reveal’ intentionality by exploring rhetorical function. It is therefore
understood that language use may have consequences that the language user did not intend
(Coyle, 2006; Pugh & Coyle, 2000).
6.2 Discursive terms
Potter & Wetherell (1987: 149) define interpretative repertoires as ‘systems of terms used for
characterizing and evaluating actions, events and other phenomena’, often categorized by
‘metaphors and figures of speech’. In other words, they are culturally familiar and habitual
lines of argument, which individuals draw on flexibly in order to perform different actions
(Wetherell, 1998). Edley (2001b) suggests that interpretative repertoires are important within
critical discursive research because by looking at the different ways in which people talk
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about a given topic, it is possible to gain some understanding of how such talk both enables
and limits the construction of the self and others. The term ‘discourse’ is also used within
critical discursive research, however it is more closely linked with Foucauldian notions of
power, the construction of institutions and the ways in which people may be ‘subjectified’.
‘Discourse’ is therefore a particularly useful term when extending analysis beyond the
immediate linguistic context in order to consider how available forms of language may limit
or shape what it is possible to say, think or do (Burr, 2003). However, despite these
differences the concepts of ‘discourse’ and ‘interpretative repertoires’ are closely linked, and
as Edley (2001b: 202) notes, both terms share ‘the same major implication; namely, that in
becoming native speakers, people are enticed or encultured into particular, even partial, ways
of understanding the world’.
Two further concepts of central importance to critical-discursive research are ‘subject
positions’ and ‘ideological dilemmas’. A subject position can be understood as ‘a location for
persons within a structure of rights and duties’ (Davies & Harré, 1999: 35). Different subject
positions can be said to offer different identities, in accordance with whichever particular
interpretative repertoire or discourse is being drawn on at the time, (one important implication
being that identity is fluid). The notion of an ideological dilemma was developed by Billig et
al. (1988) and refers to the idea of ‘lived ideology’, this being the inconsistent and often
conflicted common sense beliefs, values and practices of a culture. Critical-discursive
research is generally interested in exploring how ideological dilemmas offer conflicting
subject positions and what may influence an individual to identify with one position over
another.
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6.3 The ‘authenticity ideal’
All but one of the participants in this study generally constructed authenticity in extremely
positive terms and the sub-sections below will address the range of interpretative repertoires
through which this was achieved. The following table provides a brief outline:
Interpretative repertoire Brief description
The authentic self
The notion of an inner self that one can be true to or
not. Often drawn upon in terms of self-awareness
(knowing oneself) or self-expression (being honest
about one’s true nature).
Authentic emotion
Attributes importance to emotions and may be used to
qualify strength of feeling. May also be drawn on in
terms of being honest (or not) with oneself and others.
The authentic relationship
Places authenticity outside of the self and offers a way
of speaking about and qualifying the value of
relationships, e.g. in terms of having a ‘genuine
connection’ or a relationship that is freely chosen.
Authenticity as a therapeutic goal
The notion that both client and therapist should strive
to achieve authenticity. Furthermore, that therapy
provides an ideal environment for doing so.
Counselling psychologists as
distinctly authentic
The idea that counselling psychologists are especially
authentic in comparison to other mental health
professionals. May be drawn upon to support the
construction of a distinct professional identity (e.g. as
relational, non-pathologising etc).
Table 1: The interpretative repertoires found for ‘authenticity’.
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It is suggested here that when taken together, these repertoires form an ‘authenticity
ideal’ which may function as both a normative and moralistic discourse within therapy (see
discussion chapter). The participant who most problematized authenticity also drew on such
repertoires as the ‘authentic self’ and ‘authentic emotions’ (primarily constructing it in terms
of self-disclosure), but appeared to give greater weight to an ideology of professionalism and
boundaries (section 6.4 below).
As will be demonstrated, the majority of participants used the following repertoires
both to establish their identity and legitimize their work with clients. When consideration is
given to the humanistic value base of counselling psychology and the participants’
embeddedness within an individualistic Western society (see literature review), it is somewhat
unsurprising that authenticity was constructed in such positive terms. However, one finding of
particular interest is that in doing so, the participants repeatedly positioned themselves as
authentic and their clients as inauthentic. Such positioning might be considered ethically
problematic, but it appeared that in drawing upon various psychotherapeutic and humanistic
discourses, the participants in this study were distanced from their power in positioning
clients this way.
6.3.1 The authentic self
All of the participants drew on this particular repertoire at some point in their interview.
Again, such a finding might be expected, for writers such as Guigon (2004) and Potter (2010)
have argued that the authentic self is a primary ideal within Western culture. This repertoire is
also supported by much psychotherapeutic theory e.g. Rogers’ (1951/1957) person-centred
notion of being congruent or Winnicott’s (1965) object-relations notion of having a true-self
(see literature review). It may also be said to reflect counselling psychology’s traditional
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interest in honouring the subjectivity of clients, as opposed to pathologising via diagnostic
categories (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010). Different aspects of the repertoire were drawn on
depending on the purpose of the talk, for example whether the participant was establishing
their identity in terms of their inner-self awareness or their honest self-expression with clients.













um so my first question was, what does authenticity mean to you?
Well I guess it’s a sense of, genuineness and, a sense of realness within who we
are =
= mhm.
As I said I, haven’t done any reading, about it, relevant to counselling
psychology but from my experience and how I understand the term it’s a sense of
realness and, sort of being connected to, (.hhh) a genuine sense of yourself.
The researcher’s opening question places emphasis on the word ‘first’, indicating to the
participant that more will follow, taking account of the context it is possible that this also calls
attention to the expectations being put upon the participant, who begins to respond by
providing a list but then stops and issues a disclaimer (line 5). A disclaimer (Hewitt & Stokes,
1975) is a verbal device that pre-empts potentially negative interpretations, so by saying ‘I
haven’t done any reading...but’ the participant defends their comments from possible
criticism. The emphasis on the word ‘my’ (line 6) acts in a similar way, however it might also
be said to position the participant as authentic by her own definition, i.e. that her answer is
coming from her experience rather than from a second-hand and therefore possibly more
questionable source. The stress on the word ‘sense’ in line 2 and its repeated use in line 7 adds
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a phenomenological aspect to the account, with authenticity being located ‘within’ (line 2)











If you’re gonna be authentic, you need to know who you are.
Mm hm.
And you need to know where your stuff, ends and theirs begins and vice versa
and all of that (.hhh) yeah, um because again it’s th- that use of self and, I
always say to people it’s not that therapists don’t have crap they just know what
it is.
Here the participant places emphasis on certain key words in order to make the account more
persuasive.  Authenticity is linked to the notion of self-awareness and an extreme case
formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) is used to strengthen the role that the self plays (lines 5 and 6).
This sentence is also interesting because it can be read as positioning therapists as authentic
and clients as inauthentic, i.e. that therapist’s ‘have crap’ to deal with too but unlike other
people they ‘know what it is’ (line 6), thus knowing themselves better and being more
authentic (lines 1 and 4). By extension the participant establishes her identity as someone who














= I’m not being, um, I’m not hiding behind something I’m not um {cough} I’m
not, wearing a mask, or, um, yeah I suppose I’m ○ not hiding behind something
um ○
This quote indicates use of the ‘authentic self’ repertoire in terms of relating to others and the
participant aligns authenticity with the moral discourse of ‘honesty’, thereby adding rhetorical
persuasiveness to the account. The word ‘dishonest’ (line 2), with an emphasis on the ‘dis’,
provides an extreme case formulation which functions to support the argument via the
provision of a negative contrast. By placing emphasis on the word ‘dishonest’ rather than
‘honest’, the participant may also be using a form of emotive association (e.g. being
‘dishonest’ may be linked to being untrustworthy, misleading or fraudulent), again
highlighting the value of its opposite term. In line 4 the talk becomes more symbolic as the
participant speaks of ‘wearing a mask’, and as with the word ‘dishonest’, the use of such
imagery may be an attempt to provide a rhetorical account that leaves the speaker impervious
to doubt (Sacks, 1995).
6.3.2 Authentic emotion
This repertoire fits with Lindholm’s (2008) observation that one of the dominant discourses
operating in Western society today is that of ‘emotivism’; this being the idea that feeling is
the most important or real aspect of the self. As with the ‘authentic self’ repertoire outlined
above, the ‘authentic emotion’ repertoire was commonly used by participants and was drawn
on both in terms of people being honest with themselves and with others. However, the
majority of participants also qualified the expression of authentic emotion with regard to the
restraint considered appropriate to the role of a professional psychologist. This indicates an















Um, I guess for me it probably has a lot to do with sort of going right back to
basics to, with, with congruence I guess, (.hhh) and so, being, real um, in in the
room whether that’s, I suppose applies to both the client and therapist and I
guess I’m, thinking more about it from (.hhh) my point of view =
= yeah =
= um, really, um, and um, yeah being, being real and I guess, sharing what is
coming out for you, (.hhh) um sharing what is, sort of what you’re thinking
maybe, but also the kinds of feelings and emotions evoked and, how they might
(.hhh) um relate to, what the client has just brought up I guess.
The participant responds to a question regarding what authenticity means to them by
employing the person-centred term ‘congruence’ (line 2). This can be seen as use of the ‘psy-
complex’ (Parker, 1999), whereby psychotherapeutic language imbues the speaker with
expertise and in this case positions the participant as one who is qualified to speak of
something she has just described in terms of going ‘back to basics’ (lines 1 and 2).
Interestingly the participant then names both the client and therapist as having the potential to
be authentic, but goes on to speak in terms of just the therapist and legitimizes this move by
emphasizing that the account reflects her own point of view (line 4). However, whilst this
may indicate that the therapist is more easily attributed an authentic subject position than the
client, it is also possible that the participant was orientating to the context of the interview and
the perceived expectations of the interviewer. For example, the participant was aware that the
research title included: ‘training and practice in counselling psychology’ and the interviewer
appears to confirm the participant’s choice by stating ‘yeah’ in line 5. The repetition of the
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word ‘sharing’ in lines 6 and 7 indicates a communicative aspect to the ‘authentic emotions’














Par: she told me about something horrible in her life, and I said, I you know I feel
quite affected by what you’ve just told me, and erm, and erm, you know she,
she sort of looked at me and I said you know I’m fine but you know, that’s quite
you know (.hhh) anyway I made a joke with her once and I sort of said you
know when you, tell me that, some of the, very bad things about your life (.hhh)
erm, you do it in this like really matter of fact way (.hhh) and, for me, you know
that there is there’s a sort of lack of congruence I think, you know between, the
content and the delivery, and I’m often quite confused by that, d- do other
people say that? And she said ↑ oh yes ↓ (.hhh) but one of the things she said
helped was, because she did feel deeply sad about certain things upsetting her,
and she said she thought I’d helped her sort of normalise, the feelings she has
inside but doesn’t show to the world.
This participant uses active voicing (Wooffitt, 1992) to present a version of talk as it was. One
could argue that this strategy is used in order to create a legitimised and vivid account, which
then strengthens the argument that authenticity is related to emotions and plays an important
role in therapy. In terms of subject positioning, the participant begins by locating herself as
one who authentically expresses her feelings with clients (lines 1 and 2), but then
qualifies this by stating (still in an active voice) ‘I’m fine' (line 3), which may function to
maintain her professional footing. The client is then positioned as inauthentic and it is notable
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that this powerful move is framed firstly as ‘a joke’ (line 4), then legitimized via the use of
psychotherapeutic language, i.e. ‘a lack of congruence’ (line 7), and followed by an account
of the client’s agreement (line 9). The participant is further inoculated against potential
criticism via an account of the client thanking her for having normalized her emotional
experience (line 11). While it is important to reiterate that the purpose of this analysis is
neither to discern the participant’s motivations nor deny the client’s experience of being
helped, it is arguable that this extract highlights a common discursive move whereby
psychotherapeutic language may act to distance therapists from the implications of a

















I was thinking about it with a particular patient that I’m seeing at the moment
who, is so sort of split from her feelings that she could quite, easily sit for a
session and just talk, and (.hhh) she’d talk about very moving things, but
actually her feelings are so split off that actually, it almost feels dishonest =
= ○ mm ○ =
= the way she talks because, she just, because there’s no connection, there’s
there’s nothing there, so you hear the story, and, there’s something very
inauthentic unauthentic about, her telling of it, because, she’s telling about her
brother dying, but actually, there’s no feeling and so you you, it it does feel
like, ○ you know ○, something is missing, so authentic then for me,
authenticity it’s something about, (.hhh) being very real, and connecting and
presenting things, honestly.
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This extract provides another example of psychologised language being used to make an
account of a client’s inauthenticity more persuasive. In other words the participant draws on
the ‘psy-complex’ (Parker, 1999), particularly in terms of psychodynamic language (lines 2
and 4), in order to legitimise her account. The participant’s argument is given rhetorical
power through the extreme case formulation of a family member’s death (line 9) and the
inferred ‘common sense’ expectation that emotion should be displayed when speaking of it.
The word ‘actually’ is used twice and emphasized (line 4) in order to invoke the moral
discourse of honesty, whereas the participant’s use of the word ‘almost’ (line 4) can be read as
distancing her from the labelling of her client as dishonest. Again, emotive language is
evident in the word ‘dishonesty’, which may be connected to the discourse surrounding the
‘authentic self’ as well as ‘authentic emotions’, as indicated in lines 11 and 12.
6.3.3 The authentic relationship
This repertoire offers an intersubjective or relational way of talking about authenticity, which
was also commonly drawn on by the participants. This may reflect the fact that counselling
psychology is often defined in terms of its relational approach, with great importance being







Par: coz obviously you also have to deal with, it’s not uncommon that have people
have said well, you’re just being paid to be nice to me, and it’s getting past
that, so they know that I, I actually do wanna be in a room with them, and I I














because I’m getting my salary, yes I have to do a job, to pay my mortgage
[but], I’m not in that room with them because somebody’s giving me money to
[○ yeah ○]
do it, I’m in that room with them because I want to be (1.0) I think that’s just a
very gradual thing that builds up and people, you can just kind of then feel it
it’s a mutual thing.
Yeah, yeah.
Almost feels like you can’t be authentic one sided, I don’t know.
Here the participant uses active voicing (line 2) and list construction (lines 3 to 5) to persuade
the interviewer about the legitimacy of their desire to be in the room with their client and
hence the authenticity of the therapeutic relationship. The list construction is used to provide a
two-sided argument (Abell & Sokoe, 1999), with the participant first emphasising a genuine
desire to be with the client and secondly the reason why they need to get paid. The admission
of needing to pay the mortgage (line 5) can also be understood as a show concession (Antaki
& Wetherell, 1999), which protects the speaker from attack or misunderstanding. The
interviewer encourages the discussion by providing a ‘yeah’ (line 7) and a double ‘yeah yeah’
(line 11), with the speaker repeating their point about wanting to be in the room (line 8) and
then explicitly linking this to the notion of a ‘mutual’ sense of authenticity (line 10). This
relational repertoire is interesting for it suggests that the therapist and client might be
positioned on a more equal footing than indicated above. However, it is notable that the
participant ends her argument with the disclaimer ‘I don’t know’ (line 12), and it is arguable
that the commodification of authenticity works against this equality, by attributing additional


























I think, yes it’s something about being (1.0) open to looking at what’s going
on for both the therapist and the patient or client (1.0) yes, so it is that sense of
looking at yourself in relation to the other person, I think, and you’re
encouraging, the client to look at their process in relation to working with you,
(.hhh) so I was thinking of somebody that I’m working with, who is um she
she actually works as a prostitute, and for her to tell me that was incredibly
difficult =
= ○ mm ○ =
um she really struggled to tell me but she wanted to tell me coz she’d been to
some therapy before and hadn’t told the therapist (.hhh) and it just meant that
they couldn’t do anything because it was such an important part of her
identity, and the things it brought with it, the shame it brought, the
embarrassment, that she carried, meant that she just couldn’t work with this
therapist because there was this huge part of her that was missing, and when
she told me, it meant that I, in a sense and we, talked about her feeling of
shame, and embarrassment, and her expectation of being judged and it really
made me, think about, my own thoughts about her work, and what she’s doing
and, her difficulty telling me and, you know am I judging her, was I judging
her, what was I thinking about it, my preconceptions and my, stereotypes and
the feelings for her, and feelings about the kind of work that she’s doing.
In this example, the participant follows up their argument about the relational element of
authenticity by narrating a story of working with a prostitute.  This functions as an extreme
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case formulation, which is interesting in that it attempts to create a vivid contrast between a
profession that may not elicit notions of authenticity and the ability for an individual who
works in that profession to be authentic in the room.  One might argue that this positions the
speaker as a powerful figure who helps raise the client from their inauthentic role as a
prostitute to an authentic being in the relational encounter. There is also reference to a
confessional element of authenticity, as the client could not be whole (line 14) without
confessing her profession as a prostitute, and the speaker’s ‘authenticity’ is established by
confessing to the interviewer that they had to question whether they were being judgemental.
When linked to the previous quote, it is interesting to note the inauthenticity that might be
attributed to a commodified sexual relationship, in comparison to the authenticity that might
be assumed of the commodified emotional relationship that a person pays to have with a
therapist.
G39:
Here the participant presents a three-part-list construction (Jefferson, 1990) which formulates








Par: there’s also, the extent to which we allow originality (1.0) both parties, both
speakers, both roles, but I think (1.0) (.hhh) yeah when one is allowed to be
authentic, that means that the other end is also, genuine in themselves, that’s
how I understand, maybe I’m wrong, maybe this is another, trap, and you think
that you’re authentic and that this is, corresponding to someone else’s
originality but in fact they’re trying to trap you or, but I don’t think so (1.0) I
don’t think so
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other to be authentic by providing a mutual space for ‘originality’); however, the participant
then changes their footing and appears less committed to this concept of authenticity, stating
‘maybe I’m wrong, maybe this is another, trap’. This is what Goffman (1981) refers to as
multiple activity footing, and it demonstrates one of the ways in which talk becomes
convoluted and variable (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). After the change in footing the participant
briefly expands on the alternative formulation (line 6) but then follows this with a disclaimer
(‘but I don’t think so (1.0) I don’t think so’). The disclaimer may function to distance the
participant from the more ominous explanation and position them as someone who is not
being deceived.
6.3.4 Authenticity as a therapeutic goal
Recurring regularly throughout the interview transcripts was both the implicit and explicit
assumption that therapists and clients should strive to achieve authenticity. Furthermore, that
therapy was the ideal vehicle for realizing such a goal. Participants often spoke of personal
therapy having aided the development of their authenticity (indeed this could have been
identified as a repertoire in its own right – see discussion chapter), enabling them to help their







Par: (.hhh) I mean (1.0) I think it’s very important, hugely important, and I think, I
think it’s so important on many different way-, I think I think, you role model,
it, so you want your clients to be congruent, and they, are not going to know
about congruence unless you are being congruent with them, um, I think it’s to




something that that’s, um, rather than one that’s, that’s um, (1.0) that’s made up,
or or false.
The participant offers two extreme case formulations which leave no doubt about the position
they give to authenticity in therapy, (i.e. authenticity is ‘very important, hugely important’).
They then suggest that therapists model ‘congruence’ for their clients (line 2), the aim being
for them to become similarly congruent (line 3). As noted in the above repertoires, therapists
are therefore positioned as authentic and their clients as inauthentic, a positioning that is
further demonstrated by the statement that ‘clients are not going to know about congruence
unless you are being congruent with them’ (lines 3 and 4). It appears that the person-centred
term ‘congruence’ functions to make such a statement acceptable, arguably by drawing on a
humanistic discourse of self-development which distances the practitioner from the power
differential and value judgement involved. There is also the suggestion that congruence and










Par: I think you can, give the appearance on the surface of being honest and
authentic, and actually prob- perhaps something that a lot of us do, and
actually, what’s underneath isn’t, and actually I think to be very authentic, both
at the surface level and at a deeper level you, do need quite, a good, ○   I don’t
know if good’s the wrong word ○, but you need, to understand your internal
world I suppose your inner world, your emotional world, your unconscious
world as well, you or you need to be, in the process of examining that ○ I
think, and I think, I mean that’s ongoing I guess, as well ○.
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This participant constructs authenticity as involving a ‘surface level’ of honesty supported by
a ‘deeper level’ of self-awareness (line 4), the latter to be achieved via an examination of
one’s ‘inner world’ (line 6). A three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) of internal, or core parts of the
self (line 6) is used to rhetorically strengthen the idea of an inner authenticity and reference is
made to the psychodynamic notion of the unconscious, again implying that therapeutic
exploration might be necessary. However, it is possible that the participant is drawing on the
psy-complex as a way of appealing to the interviewer, who as a trainee psychologist might be
expected to share an immersion in such discourse. It is also notable that this participant
appears to position the therapist and client as more equally inauthentic by stating in line 2 that
it’s ‘perhaps something a lot of us do’ and adding that the process of examining one’s inner
world is ‘ongoing’ (line 8). However, this last line is spoken very quietly, suggesting less
conviction. Furthermore, if authenticity is constructed as requiring therapy and counselling
psychologists are obliged to undertake personal therapy as part of their training, the
implication remains that the therapist will be more authentic than the client.
6.3.5 Counselling psychologists as distinctly authentic
Whilst all the participants can be seen to have regularly positioned the therapist as authentic,
several also appeared to draw on a repertoire which identified counselling psychologists as
especially authentic in comparison to other mental health professionals. Again this may reflect
the ‘relational’ identity of counselling psychology, one that has previously served to
distinguish it from that of clinical psychology in particular (Pugh & Coyle, 2000).
A86 – extract 1:















word authenticity bring to mind?
(.hhh) I definitely think it was there and probably more than, as I’ve heard of it,
more than perhaps on say the clinical trainings, [(.hhh)] because I think,
[mm]
maybe indirectly in the sense of, there was quite a strong sense of the use of
self, you know right from the start, you were thinking about how you were in
the room, you know, taping yourself and watching yourself and all those
horrible things [you] have to do.
[yeah]
















I don’t wanna be too {laugh} stereotyping about clinicals and counsellings
but, (.hhh) I think that’s what I valued yeah, that it’s more, reflective
counselling psychology, and it’s all that use of self and process and actually I
believe that’s, you know and a lot of the research shows that anyway when you
look at sort of, over all the studies, the sort of things that are, seem to be most
therapeutic, are things like, you know, empathy [and] instilling a sense of hope
[○ yeah ○]
[and] being listened to, and so it’s fine to, to use the technical stuff, as well as,
[○ yeah ○]
but not instead of.
In both the above extracts, participant A86 constructs counselling psychologists as more
authentic than clinical psychologists, whilst also drawing on the ‘authentic self’ repertoire
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outlined above. In extract 1 the participant begins their turn by providing an extreme case
formulation (‘I definitely think it was there and probably more than’), before distancing
herself from her ensuing criticism of clinical psychology via the use of a disclaimer (‘as I’ve
heard of it’). The description of ‘all those horrible things you have to do’ (lines 8 and 9)
further constructs the identity of a counselling psychologist as one who has earned their
authenticity via a distinct and difficult training. In extract 2 the participant begins with a
disclaimer (‘I don’t wanna be too stereotyping’), before again claiming greater authenticity
for counselling psychologists because of their reflexive use of self. The participant then
claims legitimacy for her argument by drawing on a wider discourse of ‘research’ and
‘studies’ (lines 4 and 5), before switching to a more phenomenological framework. This latter
part of the extract might be considered an example of counselling psychology’s conflicted
epistemological foundation working well for a practitioner, who is able to draw flexibly upon







Par: um, and I guess, in the sort of the trainings, where you don’t have a personal
therapy I would say that is, that is a a barrier to au- authenticity in that individual
and those professions, I mean I don’t want to, sort of make a sweeping statement
about all, professions who don’t have therapy, you know psychological
professions but (.hhh) there’s something I think there’s something in that.
As in the above extracts, this participant also uses a disclaimer (‘I mean I don’t want to, sort
of make a sweeping statement about all, professions who don’t have therapy’) prior to arguing
that counselling psychologists are in fact distinctly authentic. This argument is founded on the
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premise that counselling psychology trainees must undertake personal therapy, which by
extension positions other professionals and clients who have not had previous therapy as
inauthentic. It might even be argued that such rhetoric establishes counselling psychologists
as doubly authentic, by virtue of having become authentic through personal therapy, whilst
also being a dispenser of authenticity to others via the provision of therapy.
6.4 Authenticity and professionalism / boundaries as an ideological dilemma
As noted above, the majority of participants constructed authenticity as a guiding ideal for
practice and personal development, however to varying degrees all also indicated a
problematization of authenticity in terms of therapist authenticity and the need for
professionalism and boundaries. This conflict indicates an ideological dilemma which
participants sought to resolve in a variety of ways, for example by emphasising the role of
self-monitoring and awareness, whilst limiting permitted ‘authentic’ action in accordance with










Par: There are boundaries to it, you know, and I suppose the way I, am thinking
about authenticity is about, being able to respond in ways as a therapist that I
think are you know, helpful, um, but it, there are differences, s- so I won’t self
disclose exactly, well, yeah, there are different kinds of self disclosure of course,
wouldn’t self disclose about personal matters, but I would give more of myself
and of what I’m thinking, and feeling, so I do self disclose more in that sense,




you know, badly, you know delivered, it can be risky, I think, yeah, you can go
too far with it, get carried away, erm I, yeah, yeah.
In this extract, the participant distinguishes between the authenticity permitted of the client
and that permitted of the therapist (line 3). He draws on the notion of self-disclosure to
demarcate the limits on the therapist, distinguishing between revelations of personal
information and the sharing of thoughts and feelings. However, having established he would
self-disclose in the latter sense, he then changes footing and appears less committed to the
idea (lines 7 to 9). This is another example of multiple activity footing (Goffman, 1981),





















= I struggle with, for example, ○ like OCD, I find difficult, coz it just annoys
me a bit ○ [{laugh}]
[{laugh}]
You know, like for goodness sake stop doing it, (.hhh) and so then it’s hard to
stay, in my, empathic, congruent, place, coz I just get a little bit irritated.
Coz there’s that bit of you saying {laugh} =
= yeah =
= stop it [{laughs}] =
= [{laughs}], God, yeah =
= {small laugh}
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This extract demonstrates the use of affect displays by both participants, and there is an
appeal to emotion discourse (Edwards, 1999) with the participant’s admission of irritation. It
appears that both parties laugh in order to mitigate the difficulty and potential
inappropriateness of the participant’s confession. The interviewer’s laughter and comments in
line 6 can also be understood as collusive encouragement for the participant to continue. This
indicates the taboo involved in admitting such annoyance. The ideological dilemma is made
particularly clear in lines 4 and 5, where the participant identifies that their irritation may


















when things come up that are difficult, you need to have sorted that lot out for
your- out for yourself, or at least put it, be able to put it to one side, erm (1.0)
and, it’s like, I remember there was somebody on our course, you had a feeling
that they wanted, there was a secondary gain they were after, (.hhh) which was
about, people, admiring them more, whatever it is, or um, there was one person
I know who, had her clients ring her and ringing her up all the time which
seemed very, a- across the borders to me, um, ○ she actually failed the course
which is interesting ○, but but it’s that sort of thing, it’s knowing, it’s knowing
why you’re doing what you’re doing and having the boundaries very firm there
=
= ○ mm ○ =
= that it’s not about, it’s not about your stuff it’s, definitely about their stuff,
and your own opinion isn’t really what, what it’s about at all.
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The participant’s use of an active voice in this extract creates a sense of the narrative serving
as a warning. The suggestion is that in order to manage authenticity appropriately you must
have ‘sorted’ yourself out (line 1).  The story appeals to another shared taboo within therapy
culture, namely boundary breaking, and the example is given of a therapist whose ‘authentic’
needs and desires eventually lead to her eviction from the profession (i.e. her failing of the
training course). The emphasis given to particular words in lines 12 and 13 reiterates the
professional stance deemed ethically acceptable. When linked to earlier observations
regarding professional socialisation (see literature review) it might be argued that only those
who are willing to conform to a particular version of authenticity will receive the necessary
state approval to take up the role of therapist. Such conformity may at times create
inauthenticity; however, this reflects an ideological dilemma which suggests that
inauthenticity may sometimes be more ethical than authenticity.
6.5. Indications of the extra-discursive?
Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig (2007: 107) argue that the understanding people have of
themselves is ‘structured both by the available discourses in their social milieu and the
material conditions in which they find themselves and which offer a range of possible ways-
of-being’. In line with such a critical-discursive approach, this research was interested in
whether the material conditions involved in training and employment might offer a range of
possible ways-of-being in relation to ‘authenticity’. The analysis firstly indicated that
institutions may play a role in both opening up and closing down particular forms of
authenticity discourse, and secondly that embodiment may act as another ‘extra-discursive’
influence. The following quotes are used to illustrate these findings. It might be argued that
they simply represent a range of further interpretative repertoires, however a critical-realist
view counters that although a particular phenomenon may be socially defined and produced,
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that does not make it any less real (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). The relativist-realist debate
is an ongoing area of contention within discourse analysis and this issue will be discussed
further in the next chapter.
6.5.1 Training and authenticity
As noted in the commentary for the previous quote, it is arguable that training institutions
may shape acceptable authenticity discourse quite significantly. This may occur both as a
result of the trainee adopting favoured psychotherapeutic theory, or in relation to the






Par: I think once I’d stopped studying it and finished and come out the other end
(.hhh) I think I went back to being more authentic, but I think, that three years
changed me, (.hhh) and when I first started doing it, it felt like a sort of, bolt on
or something and it doesn’t now.
This extract seems to suggest that the ‘process’ of authenticity is stifled through training, and
that at least for this participant there was a sense in which their ‘authenticity’ could only
remerge once the training was complete. Referring to authenticity as a ‘bolt on’ is interesting,
as it suggests that authenticity is ‘thingified’ (Tillich, 1988) and approached as a tool to be
developed while training. The participant’s comments might also be interpreted as indicative
of a successful professional socialisation process, e.g. in terms of having ‘changed’ the







Par: Yes, I think, yeah there, there’s something about, trying to, (.hhh hhh) (1.0)
trying to fit ,or trying to fit yourself to the situation, um and so in your training
in university that’s perhaps, um you know whether that would be in a lecture or
in an essay in a piece of written work for example.
This extract again suggests that the trainee’s subjectivity is adapted to fit with the educational
institution and the participant’s sigh in line 1 may be indicative of the potential for this to be
oppressive. A three-part list construction (Jefferson, 1990) is used in lines 3 and 4 to add
credibility and persuasiveness to the idea that the university requires the student to meet its
demands on many levels. Positioned within the wider authenticity discourse of the interview,
this extract is suggestive of the process of authenticity not being something that comes from














I can give you um the worst example I can think about myself, being
inauthentic if you like, when I had my one of my clinical examinations which
I did really well, I presented the piece of work, blah blah blah, and I got a
good mark, not perfect, good mark, (.hhh) I was in during the examination I
was, so tuned into the examiners’ characters which I knew both of them very
well =
= ○ mhm ○ =
I was so tuned into their own if you like, stance, that all of my responses were











and how I saw my client.
○ Mm mm ○
So when I was exploring my client with them, in a way I knew what they
wanted to hear, so that’s what I gave them, and I got a very good mark, but I
was thinking, did I deserve this mark? Probably because it ticked their boxes,
but did it tick my boxes? It was because I knew what they like to hear, I knew
what their hot topics were.
This extract once again demonstrates a trainee’s adaptation to their training institution, whilst
clearly illustrating the power differential that makes such an external imposition likely (i.e.
the need for a good examination grade). The speaker begins with an extreme case formulation
(Pomerantz, 1986) before presenting a scenario in which their authenticity is stifled. Through
the use of active voicing, the institution is positioned as a dominant presence that imposes its
own beliefs about what authenticity should mean and takes no account of the speaker’s
authentic position.  The possibility of feeling guilty is identified (‘did I deserve this mark?’),
perhaps functioning to defend the speaker from potential criticism and enabling them to offer
a defence of the grade obtained.
6.5.2 Employment and authenticity
Many of the participants spoke of the restrictions imposed on their practice by employment
institutions. These commonly included policies and procedures which clashed with the wish
to give clients more sessions or to provide a different therapeutic approach. A number of
participants also suggested that the increased favour currently bestowed upon cognitive-
behavioural therapy (CBT) within the NHS limited opportunities for developing client
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authenticity. This was attributed to factors such as CBT having a generally short time-frame,
practical focus and lesser emphasis on relational learning and personal insight.  However,
other participants suggested that blame should not be attributed to the CBT model per se, but

















so you find pro- professionals who are quite authentic, genuine, (hhh) um kind-
hearted people, who are in touch with with themselves, who are real, who are,
congruent if you like =
= ○ yeah ○ =
= (.hhh) and they would likely respect the client and what the client’s bringing
but then, there’s a barrier there because of the service and the rules of the
service =
= ○ yeah ○ =
and that’s a general guideline I think, we’re not paying attention to clients,
we’re paying attention to the context and the targets, hence CBT.
The participant starts by using two three-part lists (Jefferson, 1990) in a row in order to
present a persuasive rhetorical account of what an ‘authentic’ practitioner looks like.  This is
then drastically contrasted with what is considered the ‘inauthentic’ reality of the NHS,
whereby targets are the only measure used, and not authenticity.  This argument uses radically
contrasted pictures to evoke emotive imagery, e.g. by presenting the authentic as ‘kind-













Par: she talks very openly about, finding it virtually ○ impossible to think about any
of these feelings ○, and (.hhh) is slowly very gradually beginning to, sort of let
herself feel some of them in our sessions, um, and that kind of raises the
question well what what is, you know what’s the aim of it, is the aim, you
know, to produce this person who, oh produce, I mean to, to help her, you
know, connect with them so that she then can present this pers-, herself to the
world who is, one self rather than these two and I suppose that is part of the
aim, but I guess (1.0) thinking about it in the context of primary care and and
short term work that, that is quite difficult it’s just ○ perhaps about raising
awareness of of what it ○ means to be honest with yourself.
This extract begins with the participant drawing on the ‘authentic emotions’ repertoire to
position the client as someone who is inauthentic but is gradually increasing in authenticity
via the therapeutic work.  Interestingly, the participant then uses the word ‘produce’ (line 5),
before quickly correcting herself and using the word ‘help’ instead, this perhaps being
indicative of a more benevolent therapist role. The word ‘produce’ is suggestive of the notion
that the psy-complex produces modern day subjectivity (Parker, 1998), and its use may
unintentionally indicate something of the discursive or institutional powers at work in shaping
‘authentic’ identity. The participant similarly uses the phrase, ‘she can then present this per-’,
which she also quickly corrects with a replacement notion that the client can be ‘herself’ (line
6), thus indicating a more humanistic pre-given subjectivity (as opposed to one that is
constructed).  The participant then draws on the psychodynamic notion of the split self before
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noting that institutional time constraints are likely to prevent therapists from fulfilling their
aim of helping the client to become more authentic. This would suggest that short-term work








Par: sometimes in your, with your work hat on you have to say, well, I’m sorry about
that, we can only offer, ten sessions, ○ and then you know you can request to
have more ○, and, you don’t necessarily, agree that that’s the right, decision but
you have to, erm, implement, what the organisation, erm, >  has funding for, has
resources for <, whatever, so, it can sometimes be, erm, more difficult I think
than, you’d like it to be.
This extract clearly illustrates one of the material ways in which an employer may constrain
the authenticity of a therapist, i.e. by limiting the permitted number of sessions for a client.
The hushed speech in line 2 might be taken to indicate the speaker’s difficulty with not being
able to offer the client what they may need from the outset, and the rushed speech on lines 4
and 5 may similarly indicate a sense of unease in having to justify the prioritization of the
organization over the client.
6.5.3 Embodiment
Cromby & Nightingale (1999) argue that the ‘extra-discursive’ includes embodiment and at
least half of the participants in this study indicated the possibility of an embodied material








Par: it’s a sense, for me the knowing something is authentic or somebody is being
authentic with me is very much about feeling that they are, and it’s not
necessarily something that I could kind of put into intellectualize, but it is kind
of a gut response I suppose, that something’s not, hidden or cut off from you, I
think.
Here the participant is making a clear distinction between the cognitive and embodied aspects
of authenticity (lines 2 and 3), but at the same time it appears as if they are linked, i.e.
‘knowing’ authenticity is achieved through ‘feeling’. This may be indicative of what Uhlmann
and Uhlmann (2005: 95) refer to when they state that ‘corporeal reality and its construction in
practice are enmeshed within the lived experience of the...body. The construction is neither
abstract nor neatly conceptual.  It is rather practical and infra-discursive’. These issues will be
discussed further in the next chapter, however it is important to note the argument that even
corporeal experiences such as the ‘gut feeling’ this speaker refers to may be constructed via
social learning and discursive interpretation.  For example, in the case of this speaker one
could argue that the notion of authenticity as an embodied entity is related to discourse









Um ok so my last question [is] could you describe how you might know when
[mm]
authenticity is present?’










you, (.hhh) can just kind of relate to someone, can be completely, I think it’s,
mainly non-verbal to be honest with [you], you know it’s just a sense you get,
[right]
you know when you get a sense that you feel comfortable with someone, or
that you can relate to someone, um so it’s, yeah, it’s I’m very intuitive that
way, with people, um, but I can’t describe it anything other than a sense.
In this extract the participant assuredly constructs authenticity as something that is related to
an embodied and non-verbal felt-sense (Gendlin, 2003). However, it is highly possible that
this response was evoked by the particular phrasing of the interviewer’s question, whereby the
word ‘present’ may imply some form of physical or experiential presence and thus call for
just such a description.  As with the above quote, it is also possible to argue that a discourse of
embodied authenticity is in operation, with the participant also drawing on discourse
surrounding such notions as intuition (line 9).
6.7 Reflexive box 6
Analysing the data
Analysing the research data was both an interesting and challenging experience. While it
was rewarding to discover that the interviews held useful data, I initially felt somewhat
overwhelmed by the large volume of material gathered and the task of organizing it all.
Further difficulties related to the fact that not only is discourse analysis an extremely
time-consuming approach, but as Spong (2010: 72) notes, it ‘requires the researcher to
adopt a ‘subtle set of assumptions... which are not necessarily those we would reach
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intuitively as counsellors’. In other words, the psychologist’s habitual orientation towards
the interior psyche (e.g. in considering beliefs, attitudes, feelings etc), has to be put aside
in favour of examining the action orientation of talk. I found that the difficulty of this
adjustment was exacerbated by the lack of specific procedural guidelines for conducting a
discourse analysis, however as I became more familiar with the data and patterns began to
emerge this ceased to feel problematic.
It is arguable that the complex and abstract nature of the term ‘authenticity’ added
further challenge to the analysis. Plus at times it felt unnatural or uncomfortable to be
critical of a value so strongly associated with notions such as honesty and truth. This
highlights my own embeddedness in a cultural and professional discourse which views
authenticity as almost unquestionably ‘good’. Indeed it is possible that my immersion
within counselling psychology prevented me from identifying discourse that others may
have seen more clearly, i.e. perhaps I am too close to the subject matter. However,
determining the different discourses at work within a text is never simple, for as Hoskins
(2000: 63/64) notes: ‘discourse is not a tangible entity that is readily accessible for
interpretation – it is elusive, contradictory, and always in motion’. By acknowledging my
own positionality, my reflexive accounts have hopefully helped the reader to locate me
within the discourses that have framed my seeing (Hoskins, 2000).
Discourse analysis recognises that ‘language use may have consequences that
the speaker or writer did not intend and may invoke discourses and ideologies of which
they may not even have been aware’ (Pugh & Coyle, 2000: 87). However to identify such
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consequences or ideology carries the risk that participants may feel their views have in
some way been misrepresented. An ongoing concern throughout the analysis was therefore
to ground interpretation strongly within the data and to evidence decisions via transparent
accounting. However, it must be recognised that ‘analysis is inherently subjective because
the researcher is the instrument for analysis’ (Starks & Trinidad, 2007: 1376), and another




The goal of this research was to explore counselling psychologists’ ‘authenticity’ talk at both
the micro and macro levels of discourse (Parker, 1997), whilst also attending to the possibility
of ‘extra-discursive’ influences or limitations upon it (Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig, 2007).
As such, a critical discursive psychology framework was utilized, the effectiveness of which
will be evaluated below. Firstly, however, this chapter expands on the detail of the results
chapter and explores the ethical implications of the research findings. This is followed by an
assessment of the research limitations, a return to the question of whether it is possible to
authentically research authenticity and a discussion regarding possible future research. The
chapter ends with a final reflexive account and subsequent review of the overall conclusions.
7.2 The ‘authenticity ideal’ and counselling psychology
This section will address the interpretative repertoires identified within the present study. It is
important to reiterate that these cannot be said to demonstrate the ‘truth’ about authenticity
discourse within counselling psychology, only the researcher’s interpretation of the talk that
occurred within the local context of the research interviews. However, when considered
alongside existing research (e.g. Minnillo, 2008; Vannini & Williams, 2009), the results
suggest that an authenticity ideology may operate within the counselling psychology
profession, whereby the notion of authenticity is reified and attributed the status of an implicit
therapeutic goal.
Following a detailed critical-discursive analysis of the interview texts, five primary
interpretative repertoires were identified with regard to the construction of authenticity. These
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were labelled: ‘the authentic self’, ‘authentic emotions’, ‘the authentic relationship’,
‘authenticity as a therapeutic goal’, and ‘counselling psychologists as distinctly authentic’. As
outlined in the previous results chapter, these repertoires were commonly used to construct
‘authenticity’ in extremely positive terms, with only one participant placing greater emphasis
on the main ideological dilemma of authenticity versus professionalism and boundaries (see
below). These repertories were also frequently drawn upon in order to establish the therapist’s
identity as one who is authentic, whilst similarly functioning to legitimize therapeutic work by
placing the client in the opposite position, i.e. as one who is inauthentic and thus in need of
transformation or assistance (see below for a discussion of the ethical implications of this). In
light of these points, it is suggested that these repertoires act as an ‘authenticity ideal’ within
counselling psychology, or at least within the talk of those who participated in this study.
The repertoire of ‘the authentic self’ was drawn upon by all participants and would
appear to reflect one of the primary categories of authenticity identified within Minnillo’s
(2008) grounded theory study of therapists and authenticity, i.e. that of ‘personal values and
characteristics’. Participants spoke of the importance of self-awareness, of knowing oneself
and of being honest about who one was. However, whilst this view of the ‘authentic self’
reflects the current Western culture of individualism (Guigon, 2004), it presents something of
a problem for counselling psychology in terms of ontology. For example, if the relational
nature of human existence is acknowledged, then there can be no authentic selfhood that is
purely ego-regarding (Craig, 2009). Indeed as McLeod (2001) observes, the emphasis that
traditional counselling perspectives have placed on individual autonomy is challenged by the
view that people are intersubjective beings, who are at least partly shaped and limited by
available discourses. This conflict was represented by the availability and use of a separate
‘authentic relationship’ repertoire, which offered an alternative ontological view of
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authenticity as something co-created or experienced with another person. However, whilst
evident in the talk of most participants, this repertoire was less frequently utilized than that of
the ‘authentic self’. The choice of repertoire appeared to depend on the action orientation of
the participant’s talk, e.g. whether the participant was seeking to establish their own
‘authentic’ identity, the client’s ‘inauthentic’ identity, or the potential of the ‘authentic’
therapeutic relationship.
The ‘authentic emotions’ repertoire was also commonly used by participants and
drawn on both in terms of people being honest with themselves and with others. It might be
said to correspond to Minnillo’s (2008) category of ‘authentic meaning making’; this being
based on authentic emotional experience and communication. Again, such a repertoire is
unsurprising given that ‘emotivism’ (the notion that feeling is the most important or real
aspect of the self) is arguably a dominant discourse within Western society (Lindholm, 2008).
However, critics of such emotivism have argued that sincerely expressed sentiment may not
be ‘authentic’, for whilst authentic emotion must be sincere in the sense of being
psychologically real, sincere emotion might not be considered authentic if it does not fit with
internally justified values and beliefs (Salmela, 2005). Lindholm (2008: 66) further notes that
not only are emotions often ambivalent and contradictory, but ‘turning inward to discover
one’s true inclinations has become increasingly difficult as emotions themselves have become
marketable items’. Whilst these difficulties were not acknowledged within the interviews, the
majority of participants did however indicate the need for some form of limit on the
expression of the therapist’s authentic emotion. This indicates something of the ideological
dilemma that will be addressed in further detail below
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The notion that therapists and clients should strive to achieve authenticity featured as
both an implicit and explicit assumption throughout much of the participant’s talk. In fact, the
repertoire ‘authenticity as a therapeutic goal’ is intimately bound up with the subject positions
made available by the repertoires discussed above. As such, this repertoire is arguably less
distinct in its own right, however in the researcher’s view it warranted separate consideration.
For example, many of the participants explicitly attributed great importance to clients
becoming more authentic and there was a distinctive thread of discourse which suggested that
therapy was an ideal, perhaps even necessary vehicle for doing so. Most of the participants
also spoke of their own personal therapy enabling them to grow in authenticity, the
implication being that having experienced such growth they were then positioned to assist
clients with the same task. Indeed if space restrictions had allowed, it would have been
possible to consider the participants’ personal therapy as a separate repertoire, however for
the purposes of this study, it is believed to be sufficiently represented here.
Four of the participants also drew on the repertoire ‘counselling psychologists as
distinctly authentic’, there being an emphasis on the therapeutic relationship rather than
technique, plus reference to the fact that personal therapy was an integral aspect of training.
As previously noted, this may reflect the ‘relational’ identity that counselling psychology has
fostered in order to distinguish itself from other mental health professions such as clinical
psychology (Pugh & Coyle, 2000), particularly as each of the participants was employed
within the NHS for at least some of their working week. The assumed desirability of
authenticity might also be said to reflect a dominant cultural discourse (Potter, 2010) and
much psychotherapeutic theory (Wood et al., 2008). Therefore to construct one’s identity in
terms of authenticity may be to add credibility and strengthen one’s position as a plausible
alternative to a more medically-orientated profession.
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7.3 The ‘authentic’ therapist and the ‘inauthentic’ client
As noted above, the participants in this study drew on the repertoires of the ‘authenticity
ideal’ to establish their identity and legitimize their work with clients; however, in doing so
the therapist was often positioned as authentic in contrast to the client whose ‘inauthenticity’
placed them in need of the therapist’s expertise. Such subject positioning is ethically
problematic in several respects, indicating the operation of a normative and moralistic
discourse within therapy.
The positioning of a person as either authentic or inauthentic might first be questioned
in terms of the fixed inner subject that it implies (i.e. the ‘real’ self that is being expressed or
not). As discussed in the literature review, such a view relies heavily on the notion of
individualism and this has been critiqued for its decontextualised and alienated understanding
of the self (Russell, 1999). It is also highly questionable how an evaluation of someone’s
authenticity might be justified when an action that is authentic for one person may be
inauthentic for another. This is further complicated by the fact that it may not be possible for
an individual themselves to know if they are acting ‘authentically’. As Thompson (2005: 148)
observes:
‘how can we ever know whether we’re being true to our selves or just acting
from a convoluted strategy of compliance, on the one extreme, or a not-so-
subtle form of narcissism on the other?’
If authenticity cannot be reliably recognised or identified then its use as an explicit
value is ethically dubious (Golomb, 1995). Furthermore, it is argued here that to position a
client as ‘inauthentic’ is problematic because it identifies them as somehow less acceptable
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than the therapist. As Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine (2008: 102) explain, positioning ‘offers
not only a perspective from which to view a version of reality, but also a moral location
within spoken interaction’. Therefore if authenticity is deemed to be good and inauthenticity
vice versa, the ‘authentic’ therapist may be imbued with considerable moral authority. The
client may be further disempowered because their ‘inauthenticity’ places them in need of the
authentic therapist’s guidance and expertise, rather than giving them footing as an equal co-
narrator of the therapeutic encounter. Authenticity discourse may then serve a normative
function, as the self of the client is shaped in accordance with a socially approved standard.
The positioning of the therapist as authentic and the client as inauthentic suggests that
counselling psychology may function as a ‘technology of subjectivity’ (Foucault, 1980),
whereby psychological knowledge and practice are used to constitute a self that can be
internally and externally regulated (Heenan, 2006). However, in drawing upon various
psychotherapeutic and humanistic (self) discourses, the participants in this study appeared to
be distanced from their power in positioning clients this way. While it is suggested here that
this is a cause for concern, such a finding is somewhat unsurprising, for it seems unlikely that
therapists would knowingly choose to place their clients in a disempowered or normative
position. It must also be remembered that discourse is not ‘applied’ to clients in a one-way
fashion; there is always room for discursive resistance and both parties will draw on a variety
of competing available repertoires as they negotiate their relationship together. It is equally
possible that clients draw on authenticity discourse and position themselves as inauthentic in
order to communicate their distress in a way that makes sense to them. The discourse that the
therapist has absorbed throughout their training and career may then act as filter for the
client’s speech and enable the therapist to locate the client’s distress in relation to existing
categories within established theories. As such it might be argued that a discourse of
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authenticity creates a notion of self that is then able to make use of therapy. However, the
normative and moralistic aspects of authenticity discourse suggest that it may be ethically
advisable for therapists to develop a greater reflexive awareness of ‘authenticity’s’
constructed nature.
7.4 Authenticity and boundaries – the professional’s dilemma?
Throughout the research interviews, authenticity was constructed as a guiding ideal for
practice and personal development; however, it became apparent that this ideal often
presented participants with an ideological dilemma (Billig et al., 1988) in terms of boundaries
and professionalism. Whilst one participant argued that authenticity was so important it
should always be prioritised, another suggested that this was not desirable within the
structured short-term cognitive-behavioural therapy that she offered. The remainder of the
participants appeared to favour authenticity whilst still experiencing the dilemma as a
significant conflict.
As discussed in the literature review, the notion of authenticity might be said to
encourage the therapist to relate in a way that is spontaneous, honest and genuine, this being
the common perception of authenticity as a guiding ethic. However, whilst less often
acknowledged, it is equally possible that authenticity may encourage behaviour that is selfish,
intrusive and demanding. The following quote from Devereux & Coe (2010: 35) neatly
summarizes the potential for authenticity to be unethical and sets out a consequent argument
in favour of boundaries:
‘Seen from the perspective of the client’s wellbeing, there is a clear danger that
the privileging of authenticity is simply narcissistic. Excessive self-disclosure,
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expressed sexuality / emotionality, abrupt termination, the imposition of values
and the encouragement of dependency are all examples of intrusion into the
therapeutic space; whether they are also ‘authentic’ for the practitioner is
immaterial. In fact, strong therapeutic boundaries provide the client with a
protected space in which anything can be said, safe in the knowledge that the
therapist will not act on it’
Viewed from the professionalism/boundaries end of this polemic, it could be argued
that inauthenticity is at times more ethical than authenticity; however, it is unlikely that a
therapist would wish to position themselves as inauthentic. Indeed it was notable that the
participants in this study constructed their approach to such ethical dilemmas (e.g. feeling
negatively towards a client) in terms of psychotherapeutic theory (e.g. using the
‘countertransference) and self-regulation (e.g. in terms of self-monitoring and awareness),
whilst limiting ‘authentic’ action in accordance with established codes of ethical practice.
Thus far it has been argued that the authenticity-boundaries dilemma occurs as a
function of ethical debate, however the participants’ talk also indicated that such a dilemma
may occur as a result of the therapist’s positioning as a professional or expert. For example,
on the one hand authenticity discourse permits the therapist to give a client feedback on their
way of relating, in a manner that other relationships may not allow, whereas on the other hand
the professional role of the therapist indicates that they are not ‘free’ to react to the client as
others might, somewhat regardless of provocation. This presents a dilemma that was similarly
illustrated in interview research conducted by Morstyn (2002), who concluded that therapists
experienced significant pressure to fake sincerity, particularly if they were struggling to feel
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empathy for a client. In this sense it could be said that professionalisation legitimizes therapist
inauthenticity, whilst the perception of inauthenticity in clients is simply taken to indicate
dysfunction.
It is possible that the increased professionalisation of counselling psychology (see
literature review) adds further tension to the dilemma between authenticity and boundaries via
the positioning of the therapist as a state-regulated expert. For example, while authenticity
discourse might indicate that ‘expertise’ disempowers the client by positioning them as a
sufferer in need of professional assistance, boundary discourse might suggest that the
therapist’s ‘authenticity’ violates the client’s space.  Boundary discourse also has a powerful
presence within psychotherapy for as House (2003: 52) observes:
‘as soon as ‘boundary-mindedness’ becomes institutionalized within the
‘legitimate’, taken-for-granted discourse of therapy, it becomes extremely
difficult even to think in other, non-boundary-obsessed ways about the
therapeutic process’.
It is suggested here that authenticity discourse presents one such alternative way of thinking
and indeed House (2003) appears to draw upon it himself. However, just as House argues that
‘boundary-mindedness’ is an unproblematized discourse within therapy’s ‘regime of truth’
(Foucault, 1980), this research argues that ‘authenticity’ is the same. This illustrates the
powerful yet taken-for-granted nature of this ideological dilemma and suggests the need for a
dialogic awareness, as neither discourse offers an unproblematic solution.
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7.5 The ‘extra-discursive’
The majority of participants in this study spoke about the difficulty of balancing ‘authenticity’
with the demands of training and employment organisations. Several also talked about there
being a physical aspect to their experience of authenticity. Whilst a relativist view would hold
that such talk was merely indicative of further interpretative repertoires, a critical-realist
perspective suggests that institutional power and embodiment may exist as ‘extra-discursive’
influences and constraints upon discourse (Cromby & Nightingale, 1999). Taking the latter
view, this research was interested in how the participants might construct authenticity both in
terms of the discourse available to them and the ways of being made possible by the material
conditions in which they found themselves (Sims- Schouten, Riley & Willig, 2007).
The interview data suggests that training institutions may exert a powerful material
influence upon authenticity discourse, not only because they encourage particular ways of
speaking about authenticity (e.g. psychotherapeutic terms such as congruence), but also
because they wield the power to exclude anyone who does not conform to the expectations of
the ‘authentic’ therapist role. Ironically, the process of professional socialisation might
therefore be said to result in therapist ‘inauthenticity’, this being particularly clear in several
participants’ accounts of having to hide their confusion or anxiety when first taking on the
role of professional psychologist. Personal therapy was sometimes identified as a separate
arena for more ‘authentic’ learning; however, it is also possible to view mandatory personal
therapy as part of the professional socialisation process (see literature review).
The present findings also indicate that employment institutions may impact upon the
nature and utilization of ‘authenticity’ discourse. For example, several participants proposed
that when policy dictates a small number of sessions per client then it limits how much the
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work will orientate towards developing the client’s ‘authenticity’. A number of participants
similarly referenced the fact that they were paid to offer particular types of therapy and to
meet certain outcome targets. It was suggested that government guidelines and funding
criteria lead the NHS and other affected organisations to impose external dictates upon the
therapeutic relationship. For some this resulted in a less ‘authentic’ therapeutic position,
however, for others it appeared that such policies and procedures enabled a ‘rebellious’
stance, with several participants speaking of their attempts to engage authentically despite
being unable to work with clients for as long as they wished or within their preferred
modality.
In their defence of a critical-realist epistemology, Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig
(2007) argue that it enables the researcher to consider why people may draw on particular
repertoires because ‘the extra-discursive provides the context from which the use of certain
discourses is more or less easily enabled’ (p.103). For example, it might be said that training
institutions greatly enable the discourse of the ‘authenticity ideal’ and the subject positioning
of the ‘authentic therapist’, whereas certain employment settings may increase the likelihood
of discourse which reflects the authenticity-boundaries ideological dilemma.  However, such
an interpretation must be approached tentatively, for acknowledging the complexity of causal
relations and the role of language in constructing social reality means that one can only ever
speak in terms of tendencies, not measureable facts (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009).
The relativist-realist debate is an ongoing area of contention within discourse analysis
(see methodology chapter); however, it is arguable that the present findings support the notion
that institutional power acts as an extra-discursive influence and constraint upon authenticity
discourse. The results also suggest that embodiment might be considered an extra-discursive
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factor, in line for example with Gendlin’s (2003) argument that bodily experience is a
concrete sensing which informs and corrects the words that people choose to express it.
However, the interview data is less persuasive in this respect (see results chapter) and if the
body is understood to be simultaneously material and textual (Burns, 2006; Merleau-Ponty,
1962; 1968) then it may be inappropriate to privilege it as somehow fixed or separate, as this
implies a Cartesian split. Whilst embodiment is itself a contested construct (Wolputte, 2004),
Wilde (1999: 28) argues that ‘understandings of lived experiences are believed to be separated
from our conscious understanding and, thus, require a phenomenological method to reclaim
them’. Therefore it is possible that discursive research, at least in the format utilized here, is
too disembodied to engage usefully with embodiment as an extra-discursive possibility.
7.6 Limitations
Whilst discourse analysis enables an exploration of the constructive and functional aspects of
interview dialogue, there is much debate regarding the extent to which it is actually possible
to access anything outside of the text and speak of the ‘real’ or ‘extra-discursive’. Researchers
such as Edley (2001a: 437) have pointed out that ‘as soon as we begin to think or talk about
the world, we necessarily begin to represent’, meaning that in epistemological terms ‘reality
cannot exist outside of discourse’. Others, such as Nightingale & Cromby (2002: 705) counter
that ‘language is never a perfect mirror of materiality. But this need not entail that we
consider it autonomous, transcendent, free-floating and wholly self-referencing; instead
language performs flawed, incomplete reference.’ Having assumed the latter, critical-realist
perspective (see methodology chapter), it is important to acknowledge that the research is still
limited by the difficulty of determining exactly what might be considered indicative of the
non-discursive or not, (as illustrated by the above discussion regarding embodiment). Speer
(2007) in particular has argued that critical-discursive research lacks a systematic method. She
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suggests that it suffers from a ‘simultaneous pull towards two essentially incompatible
epistemologies’ (i.e. realist and constructionist) resulting in a tendency for the analysis to
‘veer inconsistently between the two’ (p.129). The reader must judge to what extent this
appears true for the present study.
It is also important to note that the space limitations of this report mean that a number
of potential interpretative repertoires identified within the interview data have not been
explored in as much depth as possible. More specifically, it may have been interesting to
consider ‘personal therapy’ as a repertoire in its own right or to examine authenticity talk in
relation to each of the particular psychotherapeutic modalities. For example, several
participants drew on a repertoire of cognitive-behavioural-therapy as pragmatic and time-
focused (see results chapter), with some using this to position the cognitive-therapist as less
authentic (i.e. less focused on relational learning), whereas others used this repertoire to
position the cognitive-therapist as more authentic (i.e. free to ‘be themselves’ and to share
motivational or explanatory examples from their own experience). Although such references
to psychotherapeutic theory were analysed as part of the ‘authenticity ideal’ (e.g. the
‘authentic relationship’ and the ‘authentic self’), it would be possible to re-analyse the data
specifically in terms of how the different modalities were used. One of the participants also
drew on a repertoire of ‘mindfulness’ and two spoke in terms of ‘energy’, the latter indicating
a possible transpersonal experience or discourse. Again, whilst such talk was subsumed under
the ‘categories’ of the ‘authenticity ideal’ and ‘embodiment’, it might be interesting to
reanalyse the data and distinguish between them.
Other limitations include general methodological difficulties arising from the use of
semi-structured interviews (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). For example, it is possible for the use of
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questions and prompts to result in a researcher inadvertently flooding an interview with
psychological categories previously deemed of interest. Whilst discursive research holds that
interviews always result in a co-constructed account, such flooding may simply lead to the
creation of a refined or inverted version of that which was offered in the first place. It is
therefore important for the researcher to be mindful of their power in setting the research
agenda and the potential for leading participants to adopt a subject position they might not
otherwise have held. Such concerns were taken seriously within this study and the reader is
directed towards ‘reflexive box 4: power and ethics in the research design’ and ‘reflexive box
5: conducting the interviews’ (see method chapter).
It is hoped that the reflexive accounts within this report have enhanced the ‘validity’
of the research results by contextualizing the researcher’s interpretations (Potter & Wetherell,
1987); however, the participants’ talk must also be contextualised in terms of the interview
setting. In other words, it is acknowledged that the participants’ talk will have been
unavoidably shaped by the discursive context of the interviews (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). For
example, participants’ responses to the interview questions may have included their readings
of what might be appropriate for a counselling psychology doctoral research project. This
limits the possible transferability of the research findings and suggests that a more
‘naturalistic’ research design may be preferable.
7.7 What now for authentically researching authenticity?
In light of the limitations outlined above, it might be argued that ‘naturalistic’ methods
(Potter, 1996) allow for more ‘authentic research’ than approaches based on interviews. For
example, whilst a social constructionist view suggests that bias is an unavoidable feature of all
interaction (Speer, 2002), ‘naturalistic’ methods, at least to some degree, may reduce the
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influence of the researcher upon the gathered data (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). This is not to
say that interview data is itself ‘inauthentic’, but that it may be highly reflective of the
interview setting, and by giving participants greater power to direct the discourse under study
the transferability and usefulness of the research findings may increase.
Polkinghorne (2005: 144) observes that ‘over the years, counselling psychology has
accumulated a vast number of recorded psychotherapy and counselling sessions... [creating] a
reservoir of data that can serve counselling researchers’. Whilst such research would require
careful ethical consideration, a number of discursive studies have successfully made use of
recorded therapy (for a review see Avdi & Georgaca, 2007) and this would provide a
naturalistic method as argued above. The study of authenticity talk within counselling
sessions would also allow exploration of whether the ‘authenticity ideal’ is actually prevalent
within the discourse of the therapeutic encounter, thus increasing the ‘validity’ of the present
study’s claims about the ethical implications of authenticity discourse within therapy.
Taking into account the findings of this study, it might also be argued that in order to
authentically research authenticity the researcher needs to address the possibility of material
constraints upon authenticity discourse within the research design. For example, reflexivity
was used within the present study to acknowledge the ‘extra-discursive’ influence of
institutional power upon the researcher, (such as in reflexive box 3: ‘is it possible to
authentically research authenticity within training?’). A similar approach might be taken to
embodiment, with both the researcher and the participants perhaps reflecting on their bodily
reactions within each interview. Indeed, as Burns (2006: 6) suggests:
‘Within this type of reflexivity, the body and embodiment can be centralized, and
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research interviews (and other interactive qualitative data-gathering activities)
can be re-theorized as embodied exchanges involving continual interplay.’
It might be argued that such an approach would change the disembodied nature of discursive
research (see above) by adding a phenomenological focus; however, if embodiment ‘precedes
objectivation and representation and is intrinsically part of our being-in-the-world’ (Csordas,
1994 cited in Wolputte, 2004: 258), then to even speak of it potentially changes it. In other
words, once embodiment becomes an object of classification it becomes a part of the ‘non-
self’, again implying that the impact of embodiment on authenticity discourse may be
extremely difficult to discern.
7.8 Future research
This study focused on exploring how authenticity is constructed and discursively managed;
however, building upon the above suggestions, it may be of interest to employ a methodology
such as interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) to explore the ‘lived experience’ of
authenticity. IPA involves ‘the use of thick description and close analysis of lived experience
to understand how meaning is created through embodied perception’ (Starks & Trinidad,
2007: 1373). Although it may be impossible to fully access that which is pre-reflective (as
argued above), such research might still richly illuminate the meaning that people give
authenticity in relation to their personal and social experiences.
IPA might also be used as a way of triangulating the findings of the present study. The
aim of triangulation is to increase reliability and validity via the application of different
research strategies to the same topic of investigation (Polkinghorne, 2005). Whilst
triangulation cannot serve to ‘verify’ a particular conclusion, it may enable the researcher to
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broaden their perspective and move beyond a single type of interpretation (e.g. in this case
discursive). In other words, it may help to achieve a more ‘rounded, multilayered
understanding of the research topic’ (Yardley, 2000: 222).
In several respects the findings of this research are very similar to those of Minnillo’s
(2008) grounded theory study of authenticity; however, the present results provide a
‘snapshot’ of discourse as utilized within a particular context. In contrast, Minnillo used his
findings to develop a theory of authenticity that might broadly explain its development and
use within therapy. One of Minnillo’s suggestions was that as therapists spend more time in
practice they became ‘more receptive to authentic experiences and confident in expressing
their impressions with clients’ (p.77). This ties with the idea that experienced therapists may
find a way to ‘be more themselves’ and to manage their anxiety about clients’ reactions more
effectively; however, as previously noted (see literature review), this raises the question of
whether experience functions to move therapists away from the technologizing of theory
towards a more embodied approach, or whether it serves as a vehicle for further professional
socialisation and the more wholesale uptake of the ‘authentic therapist self’. For example, it is
possible that as therapists become more experienced, the ideological dilemma of authenticity
versus boundaries becomes less evident because the ethics of professionalisation are
internalized. A longitudinal research design might be used to address such issues, although it
may also be interesting to examine the experience of trainees or the discourse that they draw
on at various stages of their professional development (e.g. prior to the commencement of
training and at the end of their final year). Whilst it is the epistemological view of the author
that caution must be applied in terms of making generalizations, such comparative research
might illuminate therapist authenticity in new and interesting ways.
159
7.9 Reflexive box 7
Reflections on reflexivity
It could be said that the purpose of reflexivity is to make more explicit the links between
knowledge claims, personal experiences and social context; however, it is often difficult
to know how much of oneself and one’s experience to include (Hoskins, 2000). For
example, when writing the preface (a relatively lengthy reflective piece) I found myself
caught between the wish to increase transparency and the fear of providing what may be
deemed unnecessary or ‘self-indulgent’ information (DeVault, 1997). I was conscious of
Finlay’s (2002a) observation that whilst reflexivity is an important tool for understanding
the ‘impact of the position, perspective and presence of the researcher’ (p.225), such
benefits must be balanced against the risk that undue privileging of the researcher’s
position may act to block the voice of participants or ‘skew findings in undesirable
directions’ (p.541).
Perhaps one of the greatest difficulties with reflexive analysis is that it must take
into account the fact that ‘our experience is invariably complex, ambiguous, ambivalent’
(Finlay, 2002a: 541) and reconstructed in its telling. The writer cannot therefore hope to
offer a ‘true’ or ‘complete’ account; however, such an acknowledgment invites the
previously noted danger of an infinite regress within reflexive writing, i.e. the possibility
of spiralling reflection upon reflection, resulting in a meaningless account (Heron, 1996).
Difficulties have also been noted with the idea that reflexivity implies the researcher has
unproblematic access to his or her motivations and feelings, for if the self is socially
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constructed it cannot be pinned down in terms of ‘self-awareness’ (Seale, 1999).
However, whilst acknowledging the unavoidably partial and provisional nature of any
reflexive analysis (Finlay, 2002a), I believe that by engaging with the research in this way
I have gained new perspectives on the research process and broadened my understanding
of the intersubjective dynamics within it. I further hope that the provision of an ongoing
reflexive account has added richness to this report and will thus assist the reader in
assessing the value of the research.
7.10 Conclusions
This research suggests that ‘authenticity’ is far more complex, contradictory and context-
bound than might commonly be assumed, with the results illustrating some of the ambiguity
that lies beneath the surface of its apparently simple virtue. Practitioners are thus invited to
raise their awareness of the cultural and historical construction of this taken-for-granted value
and its role within counselling psychology practice. It is also suggested that authenticity
discourse is used to construct subjectivity in such a way that therapists’ may unintentionally
disempower and even pathologise their clients. As such, a reflexive awareness of authenticity
discourse might be considered essential for ethical practice. However, it is important to
reiterate that the comments of the participants in this study were consistent with a range of
accepted theoretical and practical guidelines for therapeutic practice, therefore critique falls
not on the individuals involved but on the reification of authenticity within the therapeutic
industry and the wider society in which it exists.
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This research might be considered particularly relevant at the present time, as the
widespread implementation of the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies programme
may once again require counselling psychologists to define their profession’s ‘unique-selling-
point’. Indeed, it is possible that authenticity discourse may currently hold a strong appeal for
counselling psychologists because of the professional niche that a ‘relational’ identity may
provide. Authenticity discourse may also be attractive to counselling psychologists because
the profession’s theoretical basis is so epistemologically and ontologically conflicted, which
added to the anxieties inherent to therapeutic work may fuel a desire for stable ground. The
idea that one can ‘know’ and understand the ‘true’ nature of oneself and the other is ethically
questionable (see literature review) but it supports protective notions of expertise.
Authenticity is a construction that may be used in myriad ways, many of which are
arguably of benefit to the therapeutic project. For example, in drawing on the ‘authenticity
ideal’ the individual is encouraged to be honest with themselves and others, whilst striving to
actualize their potential. Indeed, the authentic self is a theory which could be said to provide a
location for moral agency, enabling self-reflexive discourse and encouraging personal
accountability. It is unlikely that any therapist would argue with the positioning of the
individual as unique and valuable in their own right and Hansen (2006) suggests that if used
flexibly, theoretical notions (such as authenticity) can helpfully provide clients with different
vantage points from which to ‘re-story’ their experience (p.293). However, the notion of
authenticity firmly locates therapeutic action within a humanistic moral discourse of self-
unity, leading critics to argue that ‘striving for authenticity overemphasizes the value of the
self relative to community and consequently narrows peoples’ lives by making them poorer in
meaning’ (Lewin & Williams, 2009: 66).
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This research resonates with Christopher’s (1996) argument that Western counselling
theories so greatly presuppose individualism that it operates implicitly and functions as
‘disguised ideology’ (Fowers, 1993). This holds several ethical dangers for it is arguable that
an emphasis on the individual authenticity of clients may detract attention from social and
cultural problems, allowing the state to escape responsibility for alienation and inequality.
Indeed, Proctor (2006) suggests that psychotherapy can find itself an unwitting accomplice,
mopping up the mess left behind when powerful state forces make choices that damage
people. As Cushman warns (1990: 599):
‘if psychologists do not recognise the ethnocentric nature of psychology’s discourse
about the current Western self, we commit several errors. In particular, we participate in a
culturally disrespectful and damaging psychological imperialism... [and we] perpetuate the
discourse of self-contained individualism and its attendant miseries.’
By taking a critical position this research challenges the contemporary regime of
psychological truth and invites practitioners to think differently about authenticity. It suggests
that therapists may do well to acknowledge their own inevitable ‘inauthenticity’ and it calls
for caution regarding the ‘inauthentic’ positioning of the client. It is argued that authenticity is
an evaluative term, with a culturally assigned meaning that is open to different kinds of
interpretation; however, this research also indicates that authenticity discourse may be shaped
by institutional power and possibly the embodiment of the individual. It is concluded that this
holds implications for training, not only in terms of acknowledging the above points, but also
in emphasising the importance of teaching students about the historical and cultural context of
psychological theory. It may also suggest a greater role for developing embodied awareness.
Ultimately however this research calls for greater reflexivity regarding the values that
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underpin counselling psychology practice. It supports House’s (2003) argument that ethical
practice demands an ongoing and deconstructive interrogation of therapy, its ‘professional’
ideologies and clinical activities. It is not suggested that current values are without worth, or
that therapists might somehow step outside the influence of their culture, rather this thesis is
offered as an attempt to critically reflect upon a particularly taken-for-granted value, arguing




Research Title: Authenticity, training and practice in counselling psychology.
Thank you for expressing an interest in this research. I hope that the following information
will help you in deciding whether or not you wish to participate. If you have any questions
that are not answered here, please do not hesitate to contact me.
What is the purpose of this research?
This research aims to explore counselling psychologists’ views on authenticity, with reference
to both training and clinical practice. There is much current debate regarding the nature of
counselling psychology as a profession, this research aims to contribute to that debate by
exploring the use of this well-known yet ambiguous concept.
What are the potential benefits of taking part?
I am hoping that by talking to you it will be possible to understand more about the concept of
authenticity and its place within counselling psychology. By participating in this research you
will have an opportunity to reflect on what authenticity means to you, to discuss your training
and development as a therapist, and to contribute to debate regarding the values that underlie
our profession. Out of this I hope to write up the findings for my doctoral dissertation.
What will taking part involve?
I would like to interview you for approximately one hour. I will arrange to visit at a time and
place convenient to you. The interview will be audio-recorded and transcribed. The
transcription will then be read and explored using a qualitative methodology and the findings will
form part of a doctoral thesis, which will be a publically available document. The data may also be
used in part or as a whole in future publications. This study has been approved by the Ethics
Committee of Roehampton University.
What about anonymity and confidentiality?
I will ensure your anonymity by coding your transcript with letters chosen at random and by
excluding all identifying information (names, dates, places etc) from the transcription, using
pseudonyms where necessary. The anonymity of any clients you discuss will also be
respected. My research supervisors and/or examining board may request to read the coded
interview transcripts, however I will be the only individual with access to any
identifying/contact details provided. At the completion of the project there will be no
reference to your identity in any of the findings.
You will also be given the choice to receive a copy of your transcribed interview to look over
and approve before I begin the analysis. This is to ensure that you agree with the transcription
and will provide an opportunity to revisit what was discussed in the interview if you wish to
do so.
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All data and documentation from the interview will be securely stored in a locked cabinet to
which only I have access. In accordance with University policy, data will be kept for six
years, after which time it will be destroyed. Confidentiality will be maintained in accordance
with the British Psychological Society’s Code of Ethics and Conduct (2009).
What difficulties may arise from participating?
During the course of the interview it is possible that you may uncover sensitive issues which
you would like to discuss further. There will be time available after the interview in which to
debrief and following this you are free to contact me by telephone or email with any
additional questions you may have. I will also provide you with details of organisations you
can contact if you do experience any emotional distress as a result of the research process.
Right to withdraw:
The interview will be semi-structured and you may choose not to answer any question that
you are uncomfortable with. You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time during
or after the interview, without needing to give a reason. At the end of the interview you will
be given a debriefing information sheet containing the ID number allocated to your data. This
number can then be quoted if you wish to withdraw from the study in future. Withdrawal
means that all individual quotes and examples provided by you will be removed and your
interview recording and transcript will be destroyed. However, please note that the composite
nature of the data analysis process means that the later a request for withdrawal is made, the
more difficult it will be to remove the essence of a contribution, which may result in some
data remaining in aggregate form.
I would like to participate, what do I do next?
Please contact me, preferably by email. We can then agree on the practical arrangements, such
as when and where to meet. I will also be happy to answer any questions you may have. I will
then email you a Consent Form outlining how I will use your material, which I will ask you to
sign and return on the day of the interview.
Many thanks for your time; I look forward to hearing from you.
Investigator Contact Details: Supervisor Contact Details:
Lucy Ryan Dr James Davies
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
Roehampton University Roehampton University
Whitelands College Whitelands College
Holybourne Avenue Holybourne Avenue
London, SW15 4JD London, SW15 4JD
ryanl12@roehampton.ac.uk jp.davies@roehampton.ac.uk
Tel: 07824 734686 Tel: 0208 392 5761
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Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other queries
please raise them with the investigator, or the Director of Studies. However if you would like
to contact an independent party please contact the Dean of School.
Director of Studies Contact Details: Dean of School Contact Details:
Professor Del Loewenthal Michael Barham
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
Roehampton University Roehampton University
Whitelands College Whitelands College
Holybourne Ave Holybourne Ave
London, SW15 4JD London, SW15 4JD
d.loewenthal@roehampton.ac.uk m.barham@roehampton.ac.uk




Research Title: Authenticity, training and practice in counselling psychology.
Brief Description of Research Project: This research aims to explore counselling
psychologists’ views on the concept of authenticity, with reference to both training and
clinical practice. The intention is to consider what positions counselling psychologists take
regarding authenticity and what implications these might have for practice. It is hoped this
will contribute to debate on the nature of counselling psychology as a profession. Interviews
will last an hour and will be audio-recorded for later transcription and analysis.
Investigator Contact Details: Supervisor Contact Details:
Lucy Ryan Dr James Davies
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
Roehampton University Roehampton University
Whitelands College Whitelands College
Holybourne Avenue Holybourne Avenue
London, SW15 4JD London, SW15 4JD
ryanl12@roehampton.ac.uk jp.davies@roehampton.ac.uk
Tel: 07824 734686 Tel: 0208 392 5761
Consent Statement:
I have read and understood the Recruitment Information sheet and I agree to take part in this
research. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw from the
interview or the study as a whole, at any time and without giving a reason. I am aware that the
composite nature of the data analysis process means that a late request for withdrawal may
result in data remaining in aggregate form.
I agree to the recording and transcription of interview data. I understand that in order to
ensure my anonymity the investigator will exclude any identifying details and use
pseudonyms. I give my permission for anonymous quotations to be used in the final research
report and any subsequent publications.
I understand that the information I provide will be treated in confidence by the investigator. I
confirm that I have had the opportunity to ask questions and that these have been answered. I
understand that the research is being conducted in accordance with the British Psychological





Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other queries
please raise them with the investigator, or the Director of Studies. However if you would like
to contact an independent party please contact the Dean of School.
Director of Studies Contact Details: Dean of School Contact Details:
Professor Del Loewenthal Michael Barham
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
Roehampton University Roehampton University
Whitelands College Whitelands College
Holybourne Ave Holybourne Ave
London, SW15 4JD London, SW15 4JD
d.loewenthal@roehampton.ac.uk m.barham@roehampton.ac.uk





Research Title: Authenticity, training and practice in counselling psychology.
Investigator Contact Details: Supervisor Contact Details:
Lucy Ryan Dr James Davies
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
Roehampton University Roehampton University
Whitelands College Whitelands College
Holybourne Avenue Holybourne Avenue
London, SW15 4JD London, SW15 4JD
ryanl12@roehampton.ac.uk jp.davies@roehampton.ac.uk
Tel: 07824 734686 Tel: 0208 392 5761
Debriefing Statement:
Thank you for participating in this research. Your time and input is much appreciated.
I’m aware that speaking about authenticity may be challenging and could provoke difficult
feelings. Therefore I would now like to offer some time in which we can discuss anything that
has arisen for you. Please feel free to comment and ask questions. If you should think of
anything later, I will be available by telephone or email (details as above).
If you feel distressed or wish to discuss in greater depth any issue that has come up within the
course of the research, then you may wish to raise the issue in your next personal therapy or
supervision session. Alternatively you could contact one of the following organisations for
support, (each website provides a list of therapist contact details):
The British Psychological Society:
www.bps.org.uk or 0116 254 9568
The British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy:
www.bacp.co.uk or 01455 883300
The United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy:
www.psychotherapy.org.uk or 0207 014 9955
This research is of a qualitative design and interview transcripts will be explored using
Discourse Analysis. It is anticipated that the completed thesis will be accessible via The
British Library and Roehampton University library later this year. If you would like to be
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informed of the research findings, let me know and I will be happy to provide a summary
once available.
You have the right to withdraw from this study at any time without giving a reason. If you
would like to withdraw please contact me as detailed above and quote the ID number given at
the top of this form. I will then remove all individual quotes and examples provided by you
and your interview recording and transcript will be destroyed. However, please note that the
composite nature of the data analysis process means that the later a request for withdrawal is
made, the more difficult it will be to remove the essence of a contribution, which may result
in some data remaining in aggregate form.
Declaration:
I confirm that the interview was conducted in an ethical and professional manner and that I







Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other queries
please raise them with the investigator, or the Director of Studies. However if you would like
to contact an independent party please contact the Dean of School.
Director of Studies Contact Details: Dean of School Contact Details:
Professor Del Loewenthal Michael Barham
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
Roehampton University Roehampton University
Whitelands College Whitelands College
Holybourne Ave Holybourne Ave
London, SW15 4JD London, SW15 4JD
d.loewenthal@roehampton.ac.uk m.barham@roehampton.ac.uk
Tel: 0208 392 361 Tel: 0208 392 361
Many thanks again for your time and assistance.
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Appendix D:
SUMMARY TABLE OF PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS
Gender Ethnicity Place of work
Clinical
experience
Female White British NHS 7 ½ years
Female White British NHS + private practice 7 ½ years
Female White Other NHS + private practice 3 ½ years
Female White British NHS + private practice 23 years
Female White British NHS 3 ½ years
Female White Other NHS (via private sector) + private practice 6 years
Male White British NHS + private practice 4 years




Why conduct a pilot study?
According to Sampson (2004), a pilot study has many benefits and should be considered an
essential feature of the research process. Advantages include having the opportunity to test
out the practicalities of location and timing, assess validity, identify research problems or gaps
in the data collection, and to become familiar with the particular data gathering task at hand.
The primary aim of the pilot for this research was to test the interview questions and provide
the researcher with some concrete experience of interviewing.
How were the questions generated?
The interview questions were generated from a consideration of the research rationale. For
example, the first aim of the research was to simply explore the ways in which authenticity is
constructed, thus indicating the use of an open question regarding what authenticity might
mean to the participant. It was decided that such a question might also function well at the
beginning of the interview, by allowing the participant to set out their initial understanding of
the research topic.
A further aim of the research was to explore how training and paid employment might
offer particular ways-of-being in relation to ‘authenticity’, which counselling psychologists
might then appropriate (Willig, 1999a). It therefore seemed appropriate to ask a question for
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each of these two areas, i.e. what authenticity brought to mind in terms of their training
experience, and similarly what it raised in terms of their work experiences. In seeking to
address the ‘extra-discursive’ and explore whether there were any other material constraints
on authenticity discourse, it also seemed apt to ask a question about whether there were any
barriers to authenticity, and  conversely how they might describe when authenticity is present.
Prior to the pilot interview, the researcher went through a repeated process of
brainstorming additional questions and then assessing their potential for inclusion in the
interview schedule. For example, two such questions were:
- What are your views on self-disclosure and authenticity?
- What does the term ‘real-relationship’ mean to you?
However, these and other such questions were dismissed as unnecessarily leading. Eventually
two subsidiary questions were settled upon:
- Can you describe a time when you have experienced authenticity / inauthenticity with
a client?
- Has anything ever happened to you that has impacted on your sense of being able to be
authentic or not with clients?
Who took part?
A single interview was conducted with a female counselling psychologist, previously known
as an acquaintance to the researcher.  It was decided that a further interview would not be
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necessary, the pilot having been a success.
What was the procedure?
The same procedure was followed as outlined in the method chapter of this thesis.
What was the outcome and how did this inform the final interview schedule?
The pilot study was very helpful and it demonstrated that only a small number of questions
were necessary to open up discussion and fill the allocated hour. The introductory question
about meaning and the questions about training, barriers and authenticity being present, all
worked very well. However, it was realised that the question about experiences in
employment was somewhat unnecessary because such material was being drawn on
throughout the responses to the other questions. An alternative question was therefore
developed that was less prescribed whilst also inviting evaluation (i.e. what place does
authenticity have in practice?).
In terms of the subsidiary questions outlined above, it was again realised that a
question about the experience of authenticity or inauthenticity with a client, was probably
unnecessary as such references were likely to be made in answer to other questions. However,
the question about anything having impacted upon the participant’s sense of being able to be
authentic or not, was trialled in the pilot and then dropped from the final interview. This
decision was made on the basis that although the question was well received and actually
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generated interesting data, the researcher felt that it was potentially intrusive and therefore
unethical.
The final interview schedule consisted of five questions in total. It started with the
general introductory question which asked the participant (i) what authenticity meant to them,
and was then followed by (ii) what authenticity brought to mind in terms of their experience
of counselling psychology training and (iii) what place authenticity has in practice, (iv)
whether there were any barriers or difficulties relating to authenticity and (v) how they might




○   ○ encloses speech that is quieter than the surrounding talk
CAPTIALS represents speech that is louder than the surrounding talk
↑ indicates rising intonation
↓ indicates lowering intonation
(1.0) defines a pause length in seconds
>  < encloses speech that is faster than the surrounding talk
˂ ˃ encloses speech that is slower than the surrounding talk
::: represents an extended sound
Underline indicates stress/emphasis
- marks when a word is broken off
(.hhh) shows an in-breath
(hhh) shows an out-breath
(   ) encloses words that are not clearly audible
[   ] indicates overlapping speech
{   } contains clarification, e.g. tone / gesture / laughter
= marks the immediate continuance of successive talk, with no interval
? indicates an upward intonation characteristic of a question
The above notation system is based upon those used within two critical realist discursive
studies by Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig (2007) and Wetherell (1998), both of which were
primarily derived from the transcription conventions developed by Jefferson (1985).
A comma has been used to code pauses of less than one second. The researcher took the
position that the current research would not gain from measuring pauses of lesser duration (as





[Start of recorded material]
Int: Ok, um so my first question is what does authenticity mean to you?1
Par: Um, I’ve been thinking about this quite a lot and, I, not really sure what it means2
and then, as I was walking to work the other day there’s a restaurant and it has in3
big letters, on the side, authentic cuisine, and then it says authentic cuisine Italian4
Indian Chinese and Mexican, and I, remember looking at it and thinking well how5
can you be authentic to everything, and then it said authentic chefs, and I was6
thinking well that means, that must mean they’re, you know real Mexicans or real7
Indians or real Chinese people cooking (.hhh), and it made me think about, well8
it’s something about real, and it’s something about, honest, and I think the word9
honest is the one that sort of stuck in my mind that there’s something about (.hhh)10
authenticity, authentic, being, about being honest and whether that’s, you know in11
that food sense it came to me well that means the food is, is kind of genuine, it’s12
like people in Mexico would eat, do eat, and then for me, to be authentic means13
that I’m honest that I’m not, I’m not being dishonest =14
Int: = mm =15
Par: = I’m not being, um, I’m not hiding behind something I’m not um {cough} I’m16
not, wearing a mask, or, um, yeah I suppose I’m ○ not hiding behind something17
um, ○ and I mean I was thinking trying to think about it in, sort of different areas18
of my life in terms of sort of me as a person as an individual and me as a, in19
practice and in theory and I mean, shall I just, keep [talking?]20
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Int: [mm yeah]21
Par: So I was thinking in (.hhh) in practice I was thinking about it with a particular22
patient that I’m seeing at the moment who, is so sort of split from her feelings that23
she could quite, easily sit for a session and just talk, and (.hhh) she’d talk about24
very moving things, but actually her feelings are so split off that actually, it almost25
feels dishonest =26
Int: = ○ mm ○ =27
Par: = the way she talks because, she just, because there’s no connection, there’s28
there’s nothing there, so you hear the story, and, there’s something very29
inauthentic unauthentic about, her telling of it, because, she’s telling about her30
brother dying, but actually, there’s no feeling and so you you, it it does feel like, ○31
you know ○, something is missing, so authentic then for me, authenticity it’s32
something about, (.hhh) being very real, and connecting and presenting things,33
honestly. Being honest with yourself I think, um, and I think that, I’ve really no-34
I’ve really been sort of aware of that particularly with her because it’s so clear,35
and she’s also, she’s very aware of it, she talks about, ○ you know ○ she talks36
very openly about, finding it virtually ○ impossible to think about any of these37
feelings ○, and (.hhh) is slowly very gradually beginning to, sort of let herself feel38
some of them in our sessions, um, and that kind of raises the question well what39
what is, you know what’s the aim of it, is the aim, you know, to produce this40
person who, oh produce, I mean to, to help her, you know, connect with them so41
that she then can present this pers-, herself to the world who is, one self rather42
than these two and I suppose that is part of the aim, but I guess (1.0) thinking43
about it in the context of primary care and and short term work that, that is quite44
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difficult it’s just ○ perhaps about raising awareness of of what it ○ means to be45
honest with yourself =46
Int: = mm =47
Par: = (.hhh) and I think for me, that perhaps is something that has come up in my own48
therapy as well in terms of being, honest with myself about how I feel, um, and I49
think that (1.0) so for example, {name}, my husband {name} is away a lot, so he50
works four weeks away four weeks at home and > I find that very difficult and51
I’ve always found that very difficult < (.hhh) and I’ve always been very clear that52
I found it difficult, but I’ve, I used to not really be terribly clear about what I53
found difficult and how it affected me and I think that was partly you know, me54
splitting that off myself =55
Int: = mm =56
Par: = and, I would see people um my parents particularly when he was away I’d get57
angry with them, (.hhh) {smiled} and actually, in the therapy we spent I spent a58
lot of time thinking about, what actually are the real feelings, you know what what59
actually, why do I get angry with my parents particularly and (.hhh), and actually60
once I could, I think accept, my own neediness, that I’m lonely, or I’m sad, that I,61
resent the attention the work gets rather than you know I get, and once I could62
actually accept that then I, could, ask for help, so I could sort of say to friends63
look {name}’s going way, can, you know can we do something? Can I come over,64
[can I] stay? Whatever, and actually, to then, be able to be honest about that with65
Int: [mm]66
Par: them, in a way that I hadn’t, and I think that allows me to feel, that I am being67
authentic I suppose, I’m being, I’m not being dishonest either with myself or with68
them, um =69
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Int: = So there’s almost, a surface level which is about honest communication =70
Par: = Yes71
Int: But for it to be something really authentic there’s this underneath, something72
which is about being honest with yourself, mm?73
Par: Yes, Yes, and I think, I think you can, give the appearance on the surface of being74
honest and authentic, and actually prob- perhaps something that a lot of us do, and75
actually, what’s underneath isn’t, and actually I think to be very authentic, both at76
the surface level and at a deeper level you, do need quite, a good, ○   I don’t know77
if good’s the wrong word ○, but you need, to understand your internal world I78
suppose your inner world, your emotional world, your unconscious world as well,79
you or you need to be, in the process of examining that ○ I think, and I think, I80
mean that’s ongoing I guess, as well ○.81
Int: So there’s definitely a sense of, it’s about what is internal in our psyche, and as82
best we can knowing, what that is?83
Par: Yes, yeah I think so, (.hhh) I think so and and as you, said that I was thinking84
about the, the psychodynamic ideas of counter-transference, and actually being85
allowed and being able to say I don’t like this patient, this patient makes my skin86
crawl, this patient makes me feel really, uncomfortable, and actually ○ I really87
don’t like them ○, rather than feeling that you have to say, you know, I’m trying88
this, just I’m finding this work difficult or I’m finding this patient difficult but ○89
you know I like them as a person ○, is actually, it’s it’s difficult, it’s not easy at all90
I think.91
Int: Mmm. So to be truly authentic in your, even just in your client [work] is, difficult92
Par: [yeah]93
Int: because it may mean owning things like that.94
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Par: Yes, yeah and I think that, is that sense of being honest with yourself, with, the95
feelings that you you are owning, I suppose (.hhh) the really difficult feelings the,96
the feelings that, (.hhh) yeah the feelings that are difficult to own, and it’s not97
necessarily about, you know those, I suppose to present then an authentic self to98
the world it’s not necessarily about, all those feelings kind of spilling out =99
Int: = mm mm =100
Par: = but it’s about, you having some, ○ understanding of them, and understanding101
how they’re influencing your, your work or your context, your, I think102
relationships I [suppose], yeah ○.103
Int: [mm mm], So to be authentic with clients in that example104
if you didn’t, if you didn’t like a client say, it wouldn’t, necessarily be about,105
saying it as such but it would be owning, or understanding it?106
Par: Yeah, I think so, I mean I, (hhh) I was thinking I mean I haven’t, I don’t think I’ve107
really working with somebody where (.hhh) where I’ve, oh I suppose that’s about,108
>  that (comes into the thing there’s sort of) something about self-disclosure (I109
think) there <, I mean I {sniff},  thinking about a client that I worked with who I110
really didn’t like and I just, he did make my skin crawl, (.hhh) and I knew there111
was something going on and I couldn’t on my own kind of work out, I knew he112
reminded me of somebody I’d, I’d gone out with years ago and there was113
something in that reminder that made me, find the work very difficult, find him114
very difficult and find him very (1.0) um, er almost, almost like when he came in115
the room I kind of felt contaminated (.hhh) and, I knew I needed to understand116
that because without understanding that I couldn’t, I couldn’t ↑ work ↓ with him117
really, I couldn’t I was, of very, kind of limited use I wouldn’t have be-, you know118
I was, yeah I couldn’t really have worked with him, um so I knew I had to take119
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that to therapy and, really think about, er, this relationship, that I’d had that, was120
very up- painful and upsetting to think about and what it was within that, and this121
patient and (.hhh) and how it all came together, and, it wasn’t necessarily yes122
about saying to him, actually I don’t like you, because it wasn’t actually about not123
[liking him], it was about, not liking what he reminded me of, and actually once I124
Int: [○ mm ○]125
Par: could think about that, it became, yeah it became clear to me that it wasn’t about126
liking him, or it wasn’t about not [liking him] it was about, my feelings and once I127
Int: [○ mm ○]128
Par: could,own my feelings and be in the room with him, realizing that they were129
mine, and that I could be honest with myself about those feelings, I suppose then,130
I was able to be, more authentic with him, I suppose, [again] I think the word, I131
Int: [mm]132
Par: guess the word (1.0) ○ is it how ○ yeah there’s something about how you use it133
[as well], it’s um.134
Int: [mm] You can use it in different ways [like you were saying]135
Par: [Yeah]136
Yeah coz you know, was I authentic with him? I mean would it, you know how137
how do I know, that I was actually authentic with him.138
Int: (1.0) It sounds like there’s something about this, this aspect of authenticity which139
is, about, being reflective and, honest with that =140
Par: = yes =141
Int: = that sounds important?142
Par: Yes, I think it is and I think it is, that process of reflection and that process of, of143
honesty and, being able to look at yourself and look at what’s going on, you know144
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in pra- in clinical work, being able to look at what’s going on in the room with the145
patient, look at the relationship, look at, (.hhh) the experience, look at your own146
feelings, um, and, really, not be afraid of examining them I suppose, um, if you do147
want to be, real I suppose, um (2.0) yes I think that’s, I think that’s it, it feels148
important to be real, and, I think, I can, see a difference in my personal149
relationships, having had therapy, I had, a therapist I worked with, for sort of two150
and a half years, over the course of training and, sort of, over the following151
months =152
Int: = mm =153
Par: = (.hhh) who, I think, that’s something actually we’ve really worked on, not154
always kind of in an overt way, an explicit way, but it it’s been underlying a lot,155
that there is this sense of being, being real, um and, and >  actually I can see that156
my relationships are a lot better for it, < I really can, I mean my relationships with157
my parents, which has always been good, but I felt had been strained for quite a158
few years, is a lot better, and I think that’s because I, am able to be, more real with159
them =160
Int: = mmm =161
Par: = um, and I think that is, I mean that’s through therapy, that’s through, having a162
chance to explore that and, and so on, and I think, yeah I can see that in a lot of163
different relationships, um.164
Int: So that stands out the personal therapy, um has played a significant, role, in in you165
having this sense of being able to be more real?166
Par: Yes, I think so and I think, yeah, I think it, it I was just thinking that (1.0) it’s167
something about, {tut} because I don’t even know I don’t know if it’s necessarily168
that I’ve been, most real with my therapist, I mean I think there’s, you know I169
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have, found it difficult to always be completely open with her, and you know to170
be really, not honest, it’s not that I’ve lied, but I’m pretty sure I’ve held things171
back, (.hhh) but I think, I’ve also been aware of doing that, and I think that there’s172
something in that =173
Int: = ○ mm ○ =174
Par: = in as much in the process of being aware of holding something back as there is,175
as actually being completely open, um (1.0) and so I do wonder about that, um176
(1.0) and um what, you know how that effects, or how what impact that’s had on177
my process =178
Int: = mm =179
Par: = Um, ○ yeah ○.180
Int: (.hhh) that kinda ties in with something I wanted to ask which was about (1.0)181
what, wh-, what comes to mind for you in terms of training [and authenticity]?182
Par: [mmm]183
I think, different things at different times. I think, when I think back to me in, the184
first year of the training, I think I see myself as very different from now, because,185
I was quite overwhelmed, I think, I was quite, I was terrified to be honest by it, I186
think, I mean I hadn’t I didn’t really, I had a good solid understanding of187
psychological theory, but I didn’t have a very good understanding of counselling188
theory, or the theories, that we were looking at or the, (.hhh) not in the detail189
depth in any way, and I felt overwhelmed, and I felt, I suppose out of my depth,190
and, I felt, like I needed to be, showing quite a professional, you know se- sense,191
and, (.hhh) the thing that always stands out to me, is one of the lecturers, {name of192
lecturer} saying something like you’re a bit like a duck, you know you’re on the193
surface you look like you’re gliding and underneath actually your legs are194
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furiously paddling, (.hhh) and there was something about that actually has really195
stuck with me, because, is, that feels very inauth- inauthentic, you’re present, what196
you’re presenting to the world actually is very different, but somehow she’d seen197
that, erm, and I think, that meant a lot to me, because I think it felt like the first198
time anybody had really noticed that, and, I think, her noticing that allowed me199
perhaps to try and, do it or to feel it was ok to, to show that I was struggling, and I200
think that training is difficult though, because on the one hand you’re encouraged201
to be very open about your process, and (inaudible word) and on the other hand202
actually, there’s also this sense, well it’s a doctorate you should be able to manage203
get on with it, and I think, that presents you with quite a difficult dilemma in a204
[way].205
Int: [Mm] that’s a dilemma about authenticity isn’t it, [and] it sounds similar to, what206
Par: [○ yeah ○]207
Int: you were saying about, you’re trying to be professional, you’re taking on all these208
[skills], um and presenting a certain way, whereas actually underneath, perhaps209
Par: [yeah]210
Int: feeling very overwhelmed, [and], and then there’s something yeah of a conflict211
Par: [yeah]212
Int: for authenticity [there].213
Par: [yeah], because you’re, you’re trying to be, this professional214
person, but actually underneath, I felt like a complete (.hhh) fraud I suppose, um,215
and I still feel it sometimes I’ve got quite a long corridor to walk down at work,216
from where I pick the, where I meet the clients, to the room, and I know it, as I217
walk down that corridor (with them behind), I sometimes feel like, a fraud, and,218
and I have to say to myself but you’re not, a fraud, you’re not pretending to be219
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something you’re not, you’re, you’re here in this capacity because you can do the220
job, and, it’s only on that walk, I don’t quite know, I think maybe,  maybe it’s221
something about, (.hhh) maybe it something about boundaries as well actually,222
[because], that walk does mark the boundaries of the room, and I’ve got one,223
Int: [○ mmhm ○]224
Par: client particularly who always, sort of starts making kind of small talk225
conversation and I find it immensely difficult =226
Int: = ○ mm ○ =227
Par: = because I don’t want to (1.0) start chatting about the weather, because that feels,228
I suppose in a sense it feels kind of dishonest, because that’s’ not what we’re here229
to talk about and, so I think perhaps the university, the training, it puts you230
through some very difficult experiences in that sense of feeling a conflict between231
being real and authentic and, your authenticity, you’re trying to, trying to develop232
I suppose, and trying to, show and trying to, well yeah trying to develop for233
yourself I think and, it put, it challenges it [immensely] I think.234
Int: [○ mm ○]. So at the235
same time as trying to develop greater authenticity in yourself, to know yourself236
[better] and this sort of stuff, um, you’re having to be quite inauthentic because of237
Par: [yeah]238
Int: the system in a way? =239
Par: = Yes =240
Int: = And it sounds like in, in some ways, that there’s a struggle that continues into,241
when one isn’t in training [and] as a professional as well because there’s242
Par: [yes]243




Par: Yes, I think, yeah there, there’s something about, trying to, (.hhh hhh) (1.0) trying247
to fit ,or trying to fit yourself to the situation, um and so in your training in248
university that’s perhaps, um you know whether that would be in a lecture or in an249
essay in a piece of written work for example, um, and perhaps, I mean thinking250
about my research, perhaps there’s a sense that I, was inauth-, you know I wasn’t251
very authentic, >  I didn’t present a very authentic self in that < because I really252
struggled to show my process of, (.hhh) um reflection and my process of253
motivation to do the research, and perhaps, reading that the examiners felt that254
actually that wasn’t very authentic because, I wasn’t very clear, in that, and I think255
that, again is that conflict between, sort of being very very open, and feeling a256
boundary =257
Int: = ○ mm ○ =258
Par: = and that was a boundary I imposed on myself, um (1.0) yeah and it was a259
boundary I felt was necessary, because I didn’t want to [be] any more open.260
Int: [○ mm ○].261
Maybe that shows something of, another conflict in that, maybe part of you262
authentically didn’t want to [{small laugh}], um but there’s another aspect to263
Par: [Yeah, yeah]264
Int: authenticity which is about communicating something.265
Par: Yes, communicating the struggle to be, authentic in a sense {‘authentic in a sense’266
said with small laughter}, (.hhh),and that yes, I and I guess in a sense that comes267
back to, the idea of actually well, if you’re aware of, that you’re not being open, is268
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that being authentic, as authentic, as if you were actually being open, how how do269
they sit together =270
Int: = mmm =271
Par: = or, are they opposites? I don’t, I’m not sure. But there’s th-, yeah there’s272
something about that.273
Int: Do you have any more thoughts on the, idea of boundaries in, [as a] professional274
Par: [mm]275
Int: with ○ authenticity ○?276
Par: (.hhh) I think, I mean the the word that comes to mind there is self-disclosure and,277
and I think, there’s (1.0) I, I’m quite, I’m quite big on boundaries, I’m very strict278
on timings, I, I’m not, I don’t, very little self-disclosure, um at all really, and I279
suppose you know some of it is inevitable in terms of your, your expression, your280
affect, your um, things like, I mean I find things like um, you know, room281
temperature and, the the difficulty in the ro- coz one place I work at the moment282
(.hhh) is quite a cold room and it is quite bare, and it’s quite, it’s not a very nice283
room, and I, you know the patients come in and they,  I think you know they284
assume it’s my room in a sense and that I’ve created it like this (.hhh) and that285
feels quite dishonest, because what I really want to say to them is this isn’t a very286
nice room it’s really cold, but it’s nothing to do with me {short quiet laugh}, it’s287
not my choice that we’re in this room {small laugh while speaking}, but, that, >288
you know < that’s not, I don’t know that, I mean that would, that’s something,289
that’s another aspect of the therapy perhaps that there would be, you know that290
there would be, you know perhaps there’s something that, I think what I’m trying291
to say is, that is (.hhh) an aspect of therapy perhaps, but there’s something about292
being, honest or, or I’m not quite sure.293
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Int: So there’s something about the environment that shapes how much [you can]294
Par: [yes, yes]295
perhaps that’s it =296
Int: = either disclose or maybe, shapes the very experience? =297
Par: = yes, I think so, yes and I think, I mean and it comes into different things as well298
it comes into the model you’re using, the approach you’re using, (.hhh) it comes299
into the setting, the context, the, you know the timing, yeah you know, how many300
sessions do you have and (.hhh) you know wha- what’s what’s your, what are you301
doing in the therapy, you know is it, is there areas, is it very goal focused, and you302
know (.hhh) I guess if you’re doing CBT perhaps it’s, there’s a different approach303
to it perhaps there’s a slightly different approach to it than if you’re working304
psychodynamically and, (.hhh) you are being much more of a, a blank therapist305
but then, you know with twelve sessions in primary care, can you, you know, can306
you do that? I, I’m not entirely sure that you can [or] that it is, the right way to307
Int: [○ mm ○]308
Par: work, so (.hhh) there’s something about in practice, being authentic, being real,309
being genuine, is (1.0) the, is, I suppose what I’m saying is that it’s, how authentic310
you can be, depends on lots of different factors I guess.311
Int: Mm, some of them sound like the practical environment, the very theory, [how312
Par: [yes]313
Int: much] it encourages that kind of, particular way of relating or not, things like314
that=315
Par: = Yes, yes so, um, so I’m working psychodynamically at the moment and I’ve316
(sort of) I’ve got very good psychodynamic supervision, so I am encouraged to,317
think like that [and] think about what’s going on in the room and think about my318
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Int: [○ mm ○]319
Par: process and how, you know the impact of that and, and so on, and, that I think320
allows for, that sort of authentic stuff, it it takes into consideration the fact that,321
the room may be difficult or, this walk along the corridor or, the fact that the322
patient reminds me of somebody else and that stirs something in me, um, whereas323
I think perhaps, I was thinking of a colleague who, is working doing CBT and was324
talking about a patient, in a supervision group, and (.hhh) everybody else in the325
supervision group had quite a strong reaction of oh this patient sounds horrific ○326
you know ○ they’re so perfect it’s just just awful I can’t bear the thought of them,327
whereas the therapist (.hhh) just thought they were the most lovely person and,328
there was this sense that she couldn’t quite get out of that way of looking, she329
couldn’t really understand where everybody got this, you know quite distasteful330
reaction from, and there was something very, disconnected for her, I think, and I331
think that was her training and her approach to the work, it didn’t allow, and she332
had no experience of, actually sort of reflecting on that, yet she knew that there333
was something missing and that’s why she’d bought it to supervision group334
because she knew there was something missing and actually when people started335
talking about it, she really struggled, to say, to understand in a sense I think that336
she was allowed to feel like this about the person,  um, so yes I think in practice,337
there are, lots of different factors that influence, (>  I suppose I was gonna say <)338
how authentic you can be, but also how, authentic you allow yourself to be? =339
Int: = mm =340
Par: = And, yes yeah I think there’s a lot about, allowing yourself and finding a way of341
working where you can be honest and you can be, au- authentic and present an342
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authentic self and feel that you’re being authentic within a system I suppose, and343
=344
Int: = the system, the system sets limits =345
Par: = yes =346
Int: = and different  models, open it up in different [ways].347
Par: [yeah], yeah.348
Int: Can you say more about what you think, it is about something like CBT that349
would limit, authenticity?350
Par: I think, there’s a (hhh), I think, I guess I’m a little bit hesitant because I, have351
done some CBT but I haven’t done a huge amount and, I don’t think I was terribly352
good at it {small laugh while saying ‘terribly good at it’} (.hhh), um because most353
of the work that I’ve done has been from a a psy- more psychodynamic, well from354
a psychodynamic approach, [um], and wa- was psychodynamically, um355
Int: [mm]356
Par: influenced anyway I would say, rather than you know, it’s not straight357
psychoanalytical work by any means {small laugh while saying ‘work by any358
means’} but with those influences (.hhh) but I think within the CBT, the and359
certainly with the CBT supervision I’ve had, you are not encouraged to, and the360
importance, the emphasis isn’t placed on the process between you =361
Int: = ○ right ○ =362
Par: = is my understanding (,hhh) and I know that there is a lot written about the363
relationship in CBT, and the, the therapeutic relationship in CBT and how that364
works and stuff and I, I, I know that there is stuff written about looking at the365
relational or what’s going on between you but I think that was my experience of366
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doing CBT the (.hhh) there wasn’t in the sessions or in the, the supervision, there367
wasn’t the space for that ↑ =368
Int: = ○ mm ○ =369
Par: = Um.370
Int: So when, when you were saying that, there’s something about the psychodynamic371
model that perhaps encourages and allows for authenticity, it’s because of that372
mutual focus on the client and yourself, is there then something about authenticity373
that is about (1.0) the there being two people, there being something that happens374
with two rather than [one].375
Par: [Yes], I think, yes it’s something about being (1.0) open to376
looking at what’s going on for both the therapist and the patient or client (1.0)377
yes, so it is that sense of looking at yourself in relation to the other person, I think,378
and you’re encouraging, the client to look at their process in relation to working379
with you, (.hhh) so I was thinking of somebody that I’m working with, who is um380
she she actually works as a prostitute, and for her to tell me that was incredibly381
difficult =382
Int: = ○ mm ○ =383
Par: = um she really struggled to tell me but she wanted to tell me coz she’d been to384
some therapy before and hadn’t told the therapist (.hhh) and it just meant that they385
couldn’t do anything because it was such an important part of her identity, and the386
things it brought with it, the shame it brought, the embarrassment, that she carried,387
meant that she just couldn’t work with this therapist because there was this huge388
part of her that was missing, and when she told me, it meant that I, in a sense and389
we, talked about her feeling of shame, and embarrassment, and her expectation of390
being judged and it really made me, think about, my own thoughts about her391
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work, and what she’s doing and, her difficulty telling me and, you know am I392
judging her, was I judging her, what was I thinking about it, my preconceptions393
and my, stereotypes and, the feelings for her, and feelings about the kind of work394
that she’s doing, and, I, there was space to think about that, in the session, and in395
supervision particularly as well, my supervisor encouraged me to think about ○396
some of these feelings ○ and I think because (.hhh) I was in that sort of process of397
thinking, I could talk about it in supervision quite easily, and, it yeah, and it398
means that an area of work that I mm- have-, > sort of <, I’ve fou- you know399
there’s bits of working with this girl that I have found quite difficult because400
there’s this whole kind of world of prostitution that I don’t, you know, [I401
Int: [○ mm ○]402
Par: don’t] know about and I don’t understand and I’ve, you know, had to ask some403
questions about various things, and, (.hhh) I suppose it’s it’s trying to find a way404
to be honest with her, that, yes I don’t, you know, it feels like you know it is a405
completely different world, but I’m open to hearing about it? I think? It’s406
something about, yes that within, the psychodynamic, approach there is, a space407
and an encouragement to think about what’s going on between the two of [you].408
Int: [○ mm]409
mm ○410
Par: Um, and (.hhh) I think there’s also the language to do that, and I think that really411
helps you know you, you use words of transference and counter-transference, and412
you use the words of um (1.0) while you’re thinking about your own experiences413
and having said the language helps I can’t think of any {laugh} of the language at414
the moment, but there is the, it’s there within the model.415
Int: Yeah, [well] transference and counter-[trans]ference are very sort of powerful416
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Par: [whereas] [yes]417
Int: [words] aren’t they.418
Par: [yeah] And I think the difference for me ,with CBT is that, I419
don’t know that there are the words, the language for that and certainly in the420
CBT supervision I’ve had, there wasn’t the language, for that, and when I tried to421
look at it from a more psychodynamic approach, the the counter-transference for422
example, my supervisor wasn’t, wasn’t’ able to help me with that really.423
Int: It puts me in mind of what you said at the beginning as well, about authenticity424
(.hhh) in part being about connection =425
Par: = mm=426
Int: = and that there’s something about your client sharing the truth, that she wasn’t427
able to share before =428
Par: = mm =429
Int: = then allowed you together, to create something that was, that was a more430
authentic therapy because it was about how you, both were really feeling about431
[each] other.432
Par: [Yes]           Yes I think so and I think (1.0) yes because it did it meant we could433
connect with that, and you know where I’m sure there are things, where we’ve434
missed a connection =435
Int: = ○ mm ○ =436
Par: = you know, there will inevitably always be things where you miss a connection437
or you, you know (.hhh) you get it wrong, but, that was a big connection that if we438
hadn’t made, the work just, it would have been impossible, we wouldn’t have439
been able to do it I don’t think because it, it is such a kind of central part of, her440
identity, and (.hhh) not just so much, her identity but a central part of what she441
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brings, to the sessions, why she is there, um because a lot of the sort of factors442
influencing that, that actually if I didn’t understand the work that she’s doing now,443
they wouldn’t make sense, so, um, yes there’s something about connection ○444
definitely ○.445
Int: Ok, (.hhh) and I was going to ask what you thought, some of the barriers or446
difficulties of authenticity are, and it sounds like that’s, partly what you’ve been447
answering =448
Par: = mmm =449
Int: = so using CBT as an example, it sounds like, one of the barriers you see is not450
having a language or a space =451
Par: = yes =452
Int: = attention given to, reflecting on [your] sort of response to [the] client.453
Par: [yes] [yeah]         (.hhh).454
Yes I think it’s, I think there’s it’s not having the attention, and I think that’s455
something I worry about, for myself because I’ve stopped personal therapy and I456
do, and I’m not having as much supervision as I’ve had, for example when on457
placements and things, and I do, not necessarily worry but I guess I am concerned,458
that, I don’t have enough space and that maybe I haven’t developed enough of an459
internal supervisor yet to, to manage that, and, I know how, from my own460
experience I know how important supervision is for allowing that process, of461
reflection, and personal therapy for allowing that process, and so I suppose I am462
concerned and I think, for myself and how I manage that, as I, you know as I463
progressed in my career, and I stopped personal therapy for a variety of reasons464
but part of it was because I felt like I, I’d been doing it for sort of over three and a465
half years continuously, and (.hhh) and I wanted an opportunity to see [I think]466
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Int: [○ mm ○]467
Par: how I managed it, um so almost a bit of an experiment really and I know I will go468
back to personal therapy, at you know different times in my life, but I’m not469
putting in (or aware of) a date on it, and I, I wanted to see how I would manage,470
and, I, I think it has also, really reminded me of the value of therapy, that it does471
give you that dedicated space, to reflect, um (1.0), it m- means that it’s built into472
your week then, that there is this space, because it’s difficult to do that otherwise,473
and in work, you know you’ve got a heavy caseload there isn’t time to do that,474
um.475
Int: So is it, could it, are you saying that, as you get into work and perhaps the- you’ve476
got this increased case[load] and more demands and one of the barriers to477
Par: [mm]478
Int: authenticity might be not having so much, like you say therapy or supervision, or479
space to reflect?480
Par: Yes, yes I think and that, I think sometime- some people are probably very good481
at managing that themselves um, you know whether they build that in to their day482
somehow um and I think I, I do it, I haven’t built it into my week in a dedicated483
time slot, I think I do a bit of it here and there =484
Int: = ○ mm ○ =485
Par: but I think there’s something about having, a specific time, and I suppose that’s486
something about boundaries as well there because you, you give yourself a space487
and then that means it’s, (sort of saying) it’s almost like it’s covered, you know488
you’re doing it (.hhh) =489
Int: = ○ mm ○ =490
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Par: it doesn’t creep in to other areas of your life, um. I think, so I mean in terms of the491
question about barriers, to authenticity, I think not having a space, to do that is492
definitely a barrier =493
Int: = ○ mm ○ =494
Par: = um, and I guess, in the sort of the trainings, where you don’t have a personal495
therapy I would say that is, that is a a barrier to au- authenticity in that individual496
and those professions, I mean I don’t want to, sort of make a sweeping statement497
about all, professions who don’t have therapy, you know psychological498
professions but (.hhh) there’s something I think there’s something in that.499
Int: Yeah, coz from this viewpoint it’s about saying that authenticity, I think what500
you’re saying is that authenticity, can be understood as about being in touch and501
being with yourself, and having as much self-awareness as you [can].502
Par: [Yes], yes, and503
I mean I was just, as as you were saying that I was thinking about a good friend504
who, actually two good friends, one who’s an {identifying information removed}505
and one who’s a {identifying information removed} and both of them (.hhh) um506
both of them lost their mothers, their mothers both died, um at different ages and507
in different ways, but (.hhh) with both of them there is this sense of, something508
shut away, that neither of them have aver talked about it, and that, the work509
they’re doing, they both work with children, that it it’s there, somewhere, and510
actually there is always this sense and I think I am particularly aware of it now,511
much more so than I used to be, but there is this very strong sense of something,512
blocked off and shut away and, unreal about them, because this enormous, you513
know, founding part of their experience of the, person they are, is not part of the514
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person they present, it’s not part of the person you see or you talk to, because it is,515
it’s so locked up in them, I don’t mean it should be part of your every516
conversation or that it’s part of you know, you talk about it every time you see517
them (.hhh) but it’s also, I think it’s partly something about, avoid- you know518
these are large topics of conversation that you avoid, there’s all these different519
areas of life that you avoid talking about and, I know that there are a lot of520
emotions around for both of them, around losing their mothers that they just521
haven’t (1.0) I don’t know if dealt with is the right word, but that they haven’t522
confronted I suppose, um and that, makes something very unreal about them, um.523
Int: So there’s something about when some- when it’s inauthentic, there’s, it’s524
something that’s really shut off =525
Par: = yeah =526
Int: = and [blocked out].527
Par: [yeah] Yeah, and I think for these two friends particularly, it feels528
like that, I mean one, one much more so than the other, one manages it very, I529
suppose more efficiently, in a sense, she has a very good relationship with her530
boyfriend, she, she works very well, she’s very efficient in her job, you know she531
is, y- you know, to all intents and purposes doing incredibly well, whereas the532
other one, is not, you know she has a good job, she does it very well I think, but,533
her personal life is a mess, and I think that is something to do with, um,  the other534
one has almost too efficiently kind of shut it off =535
Int: = ○ mm ○ =536
Par: = and this one just, she can’t she’s desperately trying to shut it away, but she can’t537
and, yes I suppose it comes back to that idea of connections, connection within538
yourself =539
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Int: = ○ mm mm○540
Par: Um =541
Int: = ○ mm ○ and it shows what you were saying about authenticity isn’t necessarily542
about what one says =543
Par: [= no]544
Int: [coz] you said it’s not about expecting them to sort of say it in con[versation]545
Par: [no, no]546
Int: it’s something more about their way of being?547
Par: Yes, yes it is, it is much more about their way of being, than of their way of548
saying, you know the what they’re saying I think, um, yes and that’s a difficult549
thing to (.hhh) to sort of put into words, to describe completely, because I mean550
how would they be different =551
Int: = ○ mm ○ =552
Par: = if they had, confronted these feelings, I don’t know, but I guess, I can only look553
at myself in that and think well how am I different in having confronted some554
very difficult feelings about the job {name}’s doing and the work and the fact that555
he’s away, and the fact that he chooses to be away from me for six months of the556
year and how that makes me feel (.hhh) and those were you know, those have557
been very very difficult feelings to, confront, but actually having confronted them558
I feel, more whole I suppose, um, and actually, having confronted them, and faced559
them and been open with him about them and other people about them, it’s easier,560
to manage him being away =561
Int: = ○ mm ○ =562
Par: = I don’t get so lonely, um, and I I guess that’s part of, I suppose in terms your563
grief work, there’s something about that isn’t there =564
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Int: = ○ mm mm ○ =565
Par: = um.566
Int: Accep- acknowledging the loss and [accepting] it and then, adjusting [to it].567
Par: [yes] [yes] and,568
I suppose that makes, there’s something in that about being, authe- authentic that569
you are somebody who has lost =570
Int: = ○ mm ○571
Par: but you are still somebody who, is there [in a sense], um and it doesn’t mean572
Int: [○ mm mm ○]573
Par: you’re not still mourning the loss.574
Int: ○ mm ○575
Par: And I guess, loss is perhaps a big one that comes into that, um, you know,576
whether that’s loss of a person, it’s a loss of a, a feeling, whether it’s a loss of,577
um, but it’s, yes it’s something I think.578
Int: So being authentic is being prepared to accept what can be very painful as well?579
Par: Yeah.580
Int: Um, but in order, something about having a greater sense of wholeness, I think581
you said something early as well about when you were describing a client who582
seemed to be very split into two [and whether] our aim is to help people to sort583
Par: [yes]584
Int: of be, have more of a sense of, one, [even] if that one is different [parts] but.585
Par: [yes] [yes]586
Yes, and I think, in practice, in short-term work that can be very difficult and587
actually what I’m beginning to realise is that um, perhaps, it’s not necessarily588
about, helping them become this int-integrated, no what’s the right word, um, but589
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this one whole kind of thing rather than split, but perhaps it’s about, helping them,590
in short-term work it’s about helping them, understand that there’s this split and591
recognising it, and recognising perhaps where it has come from, and thinking592
about how they, they manage to make a whole, and where they can get the help to593
do that, and it’s not necessarily something we can do in primary care there’s just594
not enough, time, and we ca- you know we can’t do that, and I think you know595
when we’re talking about depression and, it, we talk about the psychodynamic596
approach that it’s part of that split self and, if we can help, ( ) excuse me, help597
people understand that that’s what it is then, they can come back to it =598
Int: = ○ mm ○ =599
Par: = um.600
Int: and do you think it’s possible to reach that state of, wholeness or something that601
feels very authentic?602
Par: (.hhh) I don’t know, I mean I guess there’s something very idealistic in it isn’t603
there and I think, when I started training, my sense was that that’s what my604
therapist would be, she was this completely whole, and actually I had two605
therapists during the training and the first one I stopped with, partly because I, I606
felt like she wasn’t. =607
Int: = ○ mm ○ =608
Par: = there was and I remember I fe- I really, in our very last session she was dressed609
completely different than how she was normally dressed and I was thinking well ○610
maybe she must be ○, she looked like she was going out for the afternoon or611
something, (.hhh) and, and I remember feeling quite, like I’d made the right612
decision to stop seeing her because there was something so different, that actually613
there was, and maybe that would have been something that we should have talked614
202
about, I don’t know, I mean thinking about it now and if I was in that situation615
now, I think I’d be able to bring that, and say you know, part of the reason I want616
to end is because actually I don’t feel like, well no, part of it was I think, that she617
didn’t live up to this kind of idealistic, sense that I had when I started that this is618
what a therapist should be somebody who has clearly managed all of these things619
for herself =620
Int: = ○ mm ○ =621
Par: = (.hhh) and I was very aware although I couldn’t necessarily have put it into622
words, that there was something that she wasn’t managing, because there was623
something about the way she approached {name}’s work, her, her feelings about624
it, that weren’t, there was something missing for her there I think, and I’m not625
sure I quite realised it, at the time I knew there was something not, it didn’t feel626
right with this women, that I wanted to change, (.hhh) and I suppose, with my627
second therapist I had much more of a sense that she had, worked at this, to, find a628
way to be, very real, um (1.0) and I wonder maybe if that was something in their629
training, something in their experience, my second therapist was a Jungian analyst630
and, although I was seeing her for once a week therapy, sort of psychodynamic631
psychotherapy rather than, Jungian analysis, she had that, underneath, you know I632
know she had been in long-term therapy for herself, and I think maybe there was633
something different and she was a lot more experienced than the first therapist I634
saw so, (.hhh) there is this very idealistic sense that one can present this635
completely [authentic sense]636
Int: [it’s going along side] what you’re saying about something being637
more convincing [as well]638
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Par: [yes] yeah and I think, I feel since doing the training and my own639
therapy and client work (.hhh) with friends who do seem to present this quite kind640
of inauthentic self, I feel less patient.641
Int: mm642
Par: Or I feel rather inpatient with them I think, um, yes, I, I do, and I notice it =643
Int: = you sense that they’re being that way =644
Par: = yeah, yeah, I do and I find it quite frustrating, because, you know there’s your645
role as a friend and you’re not their therapist you’re a friend and it’s some very646
long-standing friendships and yet, there’s something there that just feels,647
[uncomfortable].648
Int: [And that raises] interesting dilemmas for authenticity [as well], coz it’s like, do649
Par: [yes]650
Int: you,wh- wh- what part of you do you then bring [in to] that relationship [when]651
Par: [yeah] [yeah]652
Int: your authentic response [is quite] irritated you can [see] this stuff =653
Par: [yeah] [yeah]                 = yeah =654
Int: [or] is that bringing your professional you into [what was] a friendship that didn’t655
Par: [yeah]656
Int: have that before =657
Par: = Yeah and it yes it does, it changes the dynamic, and it makes you, and I think658
that’s taking me quite a, you know that’s taken four years to, to, you know, I659
haven’t found the answer by any means, I think I’ve found more of an answer, I660
think I tend now to think of myself as the friend who would say things that other661
friends wouldn’t say, um.662
Int: So that’s you trying to keep the sense of whole [as well] isn’t it [that]663
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Par: [yes] [yes]664
Int: being authentic with your friends means staying true to something of, [what] you665
Par: [yes]666
Int: hear?667
Par: Something of, something of my training as well =668
Int: = right =669
Par: and something of, that this is part of me, um that actually it’s imp- yes that it’s670
very important to me, now, to be that real person, and yes, in a sense actually671
thinking that, I do have quite a split in that I have a, I practice under my maiden672
name and I, have a life in my married name =673
Int: = ○ mm ○ =674
Par: = and that’s a very purposeful split, it’s something I decided I would do and, made675
a conscious effort to do {sniff}, so there is that kind of split, but I don’t, and I676
maybe that, you know it’s not like I take my wedding ring off when I go to work,677
but there is something perhaps, I don’t know, [I don’t know].678
Int: [What does] that provide for you?679
Par: Well there was something I wan-, it was quite a big decision, I spent a long time680
thinking about it but it was something about privacy.681
Int: It sounded like the boundary [thing almost] then.682
Par: [Yes, yes] I think it was and I think it683
was also, I thought quite a lot about it and thinking, in sort of terms of, you know,684
gender issues and women, taking their husbands name and you know old ideas of685
ownership and stuff, and then actually I thought well, perhaps actually this is an686
area where I have an option that men don’t have, um I can, you know, have a687
married name and it was important to me actually that, we did something joint688
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that was together and it was part of our joint identify (.hhh) but actually I can also689
have this identity that is about work and, and so I think on a, sort of, there is this690
kind of split in terms of name, yet they’re both still me and I think, this idea in691
sort of in friendships particularly is a way of trying to, express both, that I am me692
as the friend but there is this other, you know there’s a whole I think rather than693
being split, my name might be different, but actually, I am a whole person, and I694
would like to think that, I would, that’s what people see I think.695
Int: So it’s possible to have different identities, your married identity, your work696
identity, but it sounds like it feels important to, within that have a sense of697
continuity [that’s] sort of, you’re happy to own [as all] you.698
Par: [yes] [yes] yes, yeah, I think699
so and tha- and there’s something just made me think about, when you, you’ve700
people who go out and get drunk and change, are very different, and actually,701
there’s something very, obviously there’s the effect of the alcohol and something,702
but there’s something very (.hhh) unreal about that then, about that split, that703
there’s this part that can only come out with the alcohol and actually is kind of704
disowned in sober normal life, and I think it’s been quite important for me, over705
the last few years to try and find a way of being, me, whether I am, at home with706
{name}, at work, with my parents, with friends, and there are obviously different707
parts of me that are at the fore, but I’m still me, and I think that is something that708
is quite, is relatively new and I think it is definitely a result of training and therapy709
=710
Int: = ○ mm ○711
Par: and I think in my previous job as a teacher I always felt like I was acting, I was712
putting, I was very much putting on a mask, and I, struggled with that, I found it713
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really difficult, um, because you stand up in front of a class and you are somebody714
different and you have to be and there’s a survival mechanism in that, um and I715
think often when you meant people who are very, inauthentic in that sense there is716
a survival mechanism in that =717
Int: = protection =718
Par: = yeah, yeah and I think perhaps, (.hhh) changing career has meant that I haven’t719
needed that survival mechanism, um =720
Int: = So for you personally, there’s something really, um valuable? In the way that721
training and, the practice, of counselling [psychology], is sort [of], um, sees this722
Par: [mmm] [mm]723
Int: authentic [kind] of thing, that before you felt there was a mask and now you’ve724
Par: [yes, yeah]725
Int: found something that you feel [brings] more of this?726
Par: [yeah] And I think in that sense I727
feel like I’ve found, what I was looking for, and, and I think back, to when I was728
thinking about doing this course, and, thinking about the training, looking ahead729
to, you know, well do I want to do this, is this what I want to do, (.hhh) and I730
wasn’t aware of this aspect of it, but it must somehow have appealed, there must731
have been something in it that appealed, and I couldn’t say you know what that732
was, it wasn’t conscious by any means, um, and actually, actually that makes me733
think coz in my interview, for the PsychD, the interviewer got half way through734
and she said, she said I’m going to stop you because I can’t, I don’t think I can735
really hear what your motivation for this is and, I’ve always wondered about that,736
but actually, I wonder if I just wasn’t consciously aware of what my motivation737
was, really =738
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Int: = ○ mm ○ =739
Par: = and, when I think about it now, you know that (.hhh) sense of being really me, I740
think is, I think I’ve gained most.741
Int: It sounds like you [feel] you’ve gained a lot, maybe more of a space to do [it in]?742
Par: [yeah] [yes,743
yeah] and I think that’s, something that I know for me, or when I think about my744
career ahead, I think about psychodynamic work because it, it provides I know it745
provides for me a way, to do that, and perhaps I will find that at different times in746
life in other approaches or models, or ways of working, or contexts of working,747
but at the moment, that’s where I can see that I will get that, and that’s something748
I know I need, that space to reflect, to allow the difficult feelings to come through,749
to own them, accept them, to acknowledge, to understand, to reflect on them, and,750
I know I need that kind of contact, to kind of kind of maintain that I suppose, that751
sense of being real and being me and  (.hhh) and being me as a, a whole person I752
suppose, rather than, and I suppose I come back to that idea of split and753
connections and stuff.754
Int: ○ Mm ○755
Par: ○ Yeah ○756
Int: ○ Ok ○ (1.0) one last thing then [that] I’d just like to check with you and er,757
Par: [ok]758
Int: obviously you have touched on this [throughout] what you’ve been saying (1.0)759
Par: [○ hm mm ○]760
Int: but could you describe, or try and put into words, how you know when761
authenticity is present.762
208
Par: (.hhh hhh) that’s difficult isn’t it {smiling}, I think (hhh), I think it’s sometimes763
(2.0) I guess actually for me the way I would do it, is in terms of764
countertransference is that you can feel it, um so for example the patient I was765
talking about at the very beginning who is incredibly split, actually, as she talks766
about these very moving experiences of her brother dying, you don’t feel767
anything, I don’t feel sad, I don’t particularly feel moved, I can kind of feel move768
intellectually, but emotionally, I don’t feel it, and I think that is, a bit for me, is a769
big clue, and I think again, working psychodynamically gives me the language to770
explain that and to understand that, um, and I think in sort of personal771
relationships it’s something similar, it’s when you, feel that everything’s very772
much on the surface that, and that doesn’t mean that you have to be talking about773
deep dark feelings, emotions, but, it’s, not feeling that they’re cut off  from you,774
it’s feeling that if you wanted to say you were pissed off about this, you could say775
it, and it wouldn’t [be cut off from you]776
Int: [so something of freedom?]777
Par: Yeah, it, it, I think it is, it’s a sense778
of freedom, and it’s a sense, for me the knowing something is authentic or779
somebody is being authentic with me is very much about feeling that they are, and780
it’s not necessarily something that I could kind of put into intellectualize, but it is781
kind of a gut response I suppose, that something’s not, hidden or cut off from you,782
I think.783
Int: I think that’s the hard bit to put into words isn’t it that it is, a sense =784
Par: = yes =785
Int: = a kind of gut [sense]786
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Par: [yes] and it is quite a, intuitive thing I suppose, and, and I guess787
that, you know, it’s not necessarily something you could measure, or, you know,788
I’m sure somebody’s come up with something {small laugh} but it’s, it’s difficult789
to, yeah, to, to objecti- objectify I suppose,  um or look at objectively in that sense790
because, it’s not, yes, it is’s something it does feel quite subjective, [and], I don’t791
Int: [mm]792
Par: know whether friends would say, about me or what they would say about me in793
terms of being different or, ○ feeling seeing me different ○, so, you know, is it794
something that I’ve, a process I feel I’ve gone through =795
Int: = mm =796
Par: = do other people recognise it, I don’t know, I’m not sure, it would be quite797
[interesting to find out] actually, yes yeah, start asking all MY FRIENDS798
Int: [it would be interesting]799
Par: {small laugh} what they think of, if they think I’ve changed or not, um.800
Int: {small laugh} It’s certainly something you sense within [yourself], with oth[ers]801
Par: [yes] [yeah]802
Int: and for yourself =803
Par: = yes.804
Int: ○ Mm ○.805
Par: Yeah.806
Int: ○ Ok ○ is there anything else that’s come to mind that I haven’t asked or that you807
want to mention?808
Par: Um, I don’t think so, I think that covers ○ everything, (that’s something) we’ve809
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talked about ○, yeah, no, yeah, that’s, that’s everything.810
Int: Yeah? Lovely. Thank you.811
Par: Very, very interesting.812
[End of recorded material]
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